Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

355. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson¹

Washington, December 7, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Southeast Asia and Vietnam

Pursuant to our conversation last Thursday night,² attached herewith are memoranda which were sent to President Kennedy over the past years.³ They deal with the Southeast Asian situation and Viet Nam in particular. In addition there is appended a speech of mine of two years ago and a report to the Senate a year ago.⁴ Subsequent events have changed some of the details. But it seems to me that the basic observations and conclusions remain valid. In some specifics, actions of the Executive Branch coincide with these observations and conclusions. In many they do not. In any event, this material may be useful by way of background.

I would add only these thoughts on the present situation:

1. Present policy says that there is a war which can be won in South Viet Nam alone. There may be only a war which will, in time, involve U.S. forces throughout Southeast Asia, and finally throughout China itself in search of victory. What national interests in Asia would steel the American people for the massive costs of an ever-deepening involvement of that kind? It may be that we are confronted with a dilemma not unlike that which faced us in Korea a decade ago. It will be recalled that Mr. Eisenhower’s response was not to pursue the war to victory but to go to Korea to make peace, in reality, a truce.

2. Similarly, there may be a truce that could be won now in Viet Nam alone and eventually a peace which might be won throughout Southeast Asia at a price commensurate with American interests. That peace should mean, in the end, a Southeast Asia less dependent on our aid-resources and support, less under our control, not cut off from China but, still, not overwhelmed by China. If there is any opportunity of winning that kind of truce and peace it would appear to involve initially the following actions:

a. It would involve an effort to strengthen the hold of the Saigon government on those parts of South Viet Nam which it now controls. What is called for are political and social acts of popular benefit by the Vietnamese authorities where they can act, even if it means curtailing the present elusive and so far unsuccessful chase of the Viet Cong all over the land.

b. It would involve an astute diplomatic offensive which would seek to enlist France, Britain, India and, perhaps, even Russia and all other sources of potential use in a bonafide effort to bring about an end to the North-South Vietnamese conflict. A settlement might be on terms which reduced our influence (and costs) provided it also inhibited Chinese political domination. France is the key country.

c. It would involve U.S. understanding, sympathy and sensible encouragement for the Cambodian desire to stand on its own feet without one-sided U.S. aid. At this time, Cambodia would appear to be the principal prototype of any eventual peace for Southeast Asia. It would be an independent southeast Asia, not dependent on a costly U.S. prop. If Cambodia falls to its neighbors or if it goes over to China, we may as well resign ourselves to an involvement of years in all of Southeast Asia at great cost in resources and, probably, lives. Or alternatively, we will be faced with an ignominious and dangerous abandonment of the Southeast Asian mainland to Chinese political domination. In connection with these alternatives we need to keep in mind the rising public hostility towards foreign aid in particular and government costs in general.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vietnam, Memos and Misc.
2. No record of this conversation of December 5 has been found.
3. Attached was a copy of Mansfield’s August 19 memorandum to the President (vol. III, p. 585.) and a statement from Mansfield to Kennedy, November 20, on U.S.-Cambodian relations, not printed.
4. The speech, which was attached, was a commencement address by Mansfield to the graduating class of 1962 at Michigan State University, June 10, 1962, entitled “Interests and Policies in Southeast Asia.” See vol. II, p. 448, footnote 4. The report, which was not attached, is apparently that of December 1962 which was sent to the President and reflected Mansfield’s own conclusions; see ibid., p. 779. This report was subsequently sent to the Senate in modified form in February 1963; see vol. III, p. 122.