Office of the Historian

351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1

Washington, December 6, 1963—10:29 p.m.

908. For Lodge from the Secretary.

1.
The President has expressed his deep concern that our effort in Viet-Nam be stepped up to highest pitch and that each day we ask ourselves what more we can do to further the struggle.
2.
We have accordingly instituted an all-agency review of the situation and of activities and programs and how they might be improved, looking towards a meeting with the President sometime next week.
3.
At preliminary high-level interdepartmental meeting today DOD presented disturbing analysis of the current military situation, with the following conclusions:
a.
The GVN desires to respond to US military advice and to improve its operational effectiveness. It has the capability to do so and its plans are basically sound, but it is in a state of organizational turmoil.
b.
The VC are making an intensive effort to increase their hold on the countryside while the new government is shaking down.
c.
The VC have exhibited a powerful capability for at least a brief period of intensified operations, and their skill in counter-airborne operations is improving.
d.
There is ground for concern that infiltration of materiel has increased, but 1itde hard proof. This is a prime intelligence deficiency. It affects not only military tactics but our over-all Southeast Asia strategy.
4.
The conclusions were based on these factors:
a.
VC incidents have increased greatly since the coup, going as high as 1,000 in one week. While presently decreasing, the post-coup average is still above the 1962 average (363 per week) and the average for the first half of 1963 (266 per week).
b.
The great preponderance of incidents are in the III and IV Corps zones.
c.
GVN weapons losses have increased greatly since the coup, and exceed by a considerable measure the 1962 weekly loss average (99) as well as the first half 1963 weekly average (116).
d.
VC weapons captured have not shown a corresponding increase, with the result that the weapons loss ratio has grown more unfavorable to the GVN since the coup.
e.
The VC appear, despite heavy casualties, still to be able to maintain their hard core strength.
f.
The numerous changes in GVN division and corps boundaries, changes in major commanders, in sector commanders and district chiefs have all united to cause organizational turmoil, and to provide an inviting opportunity for VC action.
g.
VC activities, such as that which resulted in the damage of twenty aircraft on 24 November, exhibit a growing enemy anti-aircraft capability. This is reinforced by the recent capture of AA weapons and related equipment of possible Russian or Chinese design.
h.
Additionally, the continued appearance of recoilless rifles and ammunition, of apparent Chinese design, as well as new Chinese rifles in the Delta raises the question of the possibility of increased infiltration.
i.
Disquiet has been expressed by both COMUSMACV and CINCPAC regarding the possibility of increased infiltration, and has resulted in recommendations for relaxation of various restrictions related to border patrol and surveillance activities.
5.
The foregoing presentation, although acknowledged to cover a brief period, was viewed as possibly indicative of a protracted intensification of VC effort, as well as suggesting the possibility of increased outside aid, both of which might seriously derange our prospects for the future. Your comments are requested on the factors outlined above as well as on the conclusions.
6.
To meet situation described in briefing, DOD made four suggestions, as follows:
a.
Institute program of pressures in NVN of rising intensity.
b.
Institute probes into Laos, including use of US advisers and air resupply.
c.
Institute aerial recon of both Cambodia and Laos.
d.
Accelerate dispatch of US economic experts to SVN.
7.
After discussion, following was agreed:
a.
To expedite for further consideration plans for phased operations against NVN.
b.
Institute analysis of waterborne traffic into Viet-Nam and develop plans to interrupt infiltration by this means.
c.
Develop for further consideration detailed plans for probes into Laos including aerial recon over Laos and Cambodia.
d.
Assessment of political consequences of “c” above including what must be done covertly and what Lao Government might agree to
e.
Expedite high-level economic expert to assist you in economic negotiations with GVN.
f.
Give you herewith authority to respond favorably and immediately to Minh’s proposal for “braintrust”. We visualize this as creating any type of close advisory arrangement you deem appropriate and agreeable to GVN.
g.
Sending William Jorden shortly to Saigon with a mission of examining evidence to support new report re-emphasizing Hanoi’s control and support of VC.
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 S VIET-US. Top Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only. Drafted by Hilsman and cleared in draft with Rusk, in substance with Krulak, and with Bromley Smith. Repeated to CINCPAC eyes only for Felt. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 212D.↩