306. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (Hilsman) to
the Secretary of State1
Washington, November 8,
1963.
SUBJECT
- JCS Comments on Department of
State Research Memorandum RFE-902
We appreciate receiving the detailed comment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
relevant to INR’s Research Memorandum
RFE-90, Statistics on the War Effort in South Vietnam Show Unfavorable
Trends, October 22, 1963 (Attachments A and B3 respectively). We concur fully with
Secretary McNamara’s view that
we should not issue military appraisals without seeking the views of the
Department of Defense, nor have we done so in this instance.
You may be assured that our working level officers maintain close contact
with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and with General Krulak’s office. As noted in the first page of the
Research Memorandum, all statistics used in this report were compiled by
DIA and by General Krulak’s office. Recognizing
limitations in these statistics, we have explained at some length, in
the first two pages of our report, how the statistics are incomplete,
sometimes unreliable, and omit other factors that are important but
cannot be quantified. However, the statistics selected are among those
regularly highlighted by the Military Assistance Command (MAC) and
DIA in its weekly briefings
[Page 583]
of State’s Vietnam Working
Group. We recall that Generals Krulak and Wheeler, during last spring’s
discussions at CIA on the South Vietnam
National Intelligence Estimate,4
declared that these statistics, then running in favor of the Vietnam
Government, were not given sufficient emphasis in the estimate.
While it is true that the data in our report cover largely a period of
only seven weeks (actually, three sets of figures extend over nineteen
weeks), it should be noted that MACV
and joint US mission reports from Saigon on trends and developments in
the counterinsurgency program, including statistical compilations, often
examine much shorter periods.
We naturally agree that military assessments are basically the
responsibility of the Department of Defense. However, the unique and
varied political factors involved in the insurgency in South Vietnam and
the continuing political crisis since May led us to investigate the
possibility that the counterinsurgency effort may have been adversely
affected during this period. Indeed, over the past few years we have
similarly made intermittent political-military assessments of progress
and problems in South Vietnam.
We would like to comment briefly on two assertions in the Joint Chiefs of
Staff memorandum. It claims as a favorable indicator “the rise of
confidence and fighting efficiency of the Vietnamese military forces.”
(Page 2) We agree that these qualities have improved generally over the
past few years but we believe that morale nonetheless has been adversely
affected in recent months. The US Military Attache in Saigon reported
last month that the Vietnamese Deputy Commander of Corps III feared mass
desertions among his troops, possibly as high as 80%.
The JCS memorandum also claims that the
armed strength of the Viet Cong has decreased. While it is true that the
present estimate (October 1963) of Viet Cong strength, as reported by
MACV, is lower than the previous
estimate of last March, it should be noted that MACV has changed the criteria for determining the Viet Cong
order of battle. In its October report, MACV states:
“In previous editions of the MACV Viet Cong OB, an arbitrary figure of 100
personnel per company and 30 per platoon was assigned in those
cases where hard evidence was lacking upon which to base a
strength computation. Commencing with this edition, all strength
estimates have been based on evidence obtained from
prisoner-of-war estimates or from captured documents.”
Thus there is no basis for comparing the most recent
estimate with those of six months and one year ago.
[Page 584]
In conclusion, we note that a very recent CIA report,5 prepared independently of our analysis, concurred
with our findings using essentially the same statistical indicators and
the same time period.
Tab A
DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT
- Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Estimate of Military Situation in South Vietnam
- 1.
- The Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research
has published and distributed a memorandum (Tab B) which
concludes that, as of 22 October, the military situation in
Vietnam may have reverted to the condition of six months to one
year previous. This conclusion respecting the military aspect of
the Vietnam war is derived from an evaluation of four
statistical factors: casualties, weapons losses, defectors and
Viet Cong incidents covering an eleven-week period from 1 July
to 18 September 1963. In short, the paper makes a broad military
judgement of a complex combat situation, derived from a survey
of a limited number of factors in a limited period of
time.
- 2.
- In confining itself to the four indices mentioned, the
memorandum does not take into account fundamental military
considerations which should weigh heavily in any appraisal of
the progress of the campaign. These include such factors as:
- a.
- Growth in the character and intensity of the
Vietnamese offensive effort—air, sea and ground—over the
past year.
- b.
- Degree of pacification achieved in the plateau and
coastal prams.
- c.
- Strategic and tactical implications of the shift in
Vietnamese offensive effort to the Viet Cong stronghold
in the Delta.
- d.
- Nature of the Viet Cong tactical reaction as they are
compressed into a progressively smaller area.
- 3.
- The conclusion that a major military retrogression has
occurred ignores various substantial indices of military
progress which include:
- a.
- The rise in confidence and fighting efficiency of the
Vietnamese military forces.
- b.
- Increases in freedom of movement and increased use of
the roads and rail lines, particularly in the north and
central regions. (The memorandum would lead one to
believe that the freedom of movement had
decreased.)
- c.
- The number of people resettled in strategic hamlets
(population now in hamlets—9.7 million; 6 months
ago-about 6 million; 12 months ago-less than 2
million).
- d.
- The number of strategic hamlets organized, built and
equipped (number of completed hamlets now—over 8,300; 6
months ago—6,000; 12 months ago—3,000).
- e.
- Number of village and hamlet radios installed and in
use, bringing a new level of security to rural regions
(5,200 radios now installed; six months ago—2,500; 12
months ago—1,300).
- f.
- The steady diminution in the strength of Viet Cong
forces (present estimate-about 93,000; estimate six
months ago—114,000; estimate 12 months
ago—123,000).
- g.
- The numbers of paramilitary forces trained and
equipped (total to date—188,000; six months ago—151,000;
12 months ago—53,000).
- 4.
- Apart from the above omissions, the following points in the
memorandum also warrant attention:
- a.
- The paper projects unfavorable end-1963 values for
three of the four statistical factors, based upon an
extrapolation of the selected eleven-week period to the
end of the year. Extrapolation of a limited sample must
be heavily discounted, since graphic representation of
those military factors considered in the paper plot
irregularly over any short period of time. Trends, and
trends only, may be detected—through the general upward
or downward direction of the over-all trace—while
extension of any rising or descending period can produce
deceptive results. Indeed, in the 6 weeks following the
cut-off date of the State evaluation, the number of Viet
Cong attacks, for example, decreased by about 40%. Using
the same extrapolative method of estimate employed in
the State paper would result in the unlikely conclusion
that, by end—1963, there would be no Viet Cong attacks
whatsoever.
- b.
- The paper points out that the “Chieu Hoi” Amnesty
Program rates have decreased from 3,200 per month to
about 1,600 per month, and uses this as part of the
basis for its conclusions regarding a military
retrogression. The paper fails, however, to take note of
the more important fact that twelve months ago there was
no Chieu Hoi
Program at all, and that surrenders were rare. To date
the program has already collected about 14,000 persons.
When the effort was initiated in the Spring of 1963 a
large wave of persons came over to the Vietnamese side.
The monthly rate has since decreased from the high
initial figure, but is continuing to bring in
substantial numbers daily. The reservoir of potential
returnees, of course, is also diminishing, since 9-1/2
million of the 12 million rural residents are already in
strategic hamlets.
- 5.
- It is the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, based on an
appraisal of all of the relevant factors up to 1 November, that
the military situation should be appraised as follows—As of that
date the GVN offensive effort
has not achieved the optimum levels envisaged in the National
Campaign Plan, but is on the way thereto. Meanwhile, the Viet
Cong have been reacting sharply to the intensification of
[Page 586]
operations in the
Delta area. Coup plotting in Saigon, as well as genuine doubt
regarding US intentions deriving from our economic sanctions
against the GVN, have operated
against a more vigorous prosecution of the campaign. Overall,
the military campaign is still progressing favorably and clearly
has not been “set back to the point it occupied six months
ago.”
- 6.
- About 40 copies of the State Department document have already
been distributed to the White House, to various offices of
USIA, AID, CIA and the Departments of State and Defense, and a
request has already been received, at the action officer level,
for Joint Chiefs of Staff concurrence in release of the document
to Senator Hickenlooper and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. While the study has little importance in itself, the
diffusion of its inaccurate military conclusions could have
unfavorable effects, since it contradicts publicly announced
Department of Defense estimates on these military
matters.
- 7.
- Accordingly, it is recommended that the matter be brought to
the attention of the Secretary of State, either orally or in the
form of a memorandum, as attached hereto.
