Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

264. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, November 1, 1963—10:50 a.m.

673. For Lodge from Secretary. Ref CAS Saigon [document number not declassified].²

1. If coup succeeds, recognition problem will be urgent. Of course, you would expect to deal in friendly and cooperative fashion with effective authorities from the outset but timing of our announcement of formal recognition might be delayed for brief period. Since coup is wholly Vietnamese, Generals should understand that false recognition by the United States in advance of other governments would falsely brand their action as American-inspired and manipulated. Since Generals plan to establish a government within two or three days, formal recognition might better await that action.

2. Re CAS Saigon critic 04³ and CAS Saigon critic 07.⁴ Tri Quang is of course free to come and go as he pleases.

3. However, after studying reports of Embassy conversations with Tri Quang we are somewhat uneasy about his political orientation and as to effects of his strong anti-Catholic views on political stance of new government.

4. On balance we are inclined to believe intention coup group designate Tri Quang as Buddhist adviser new government makes better sense than his inclusion in Cabinet as minister with significant portfolio. Giving him specific responsibilities limited to Buddhists has two advantages in our view, (a) it reassures Buddhists; and (b) it does not frighten Catholics or other groups which would be concerned by prospect overzealous Buddhist reaction to Diem-Nhu repression. At same time, advisory position for Tri Quang with new government would avail Generals Tri Quang’s considerable talents without prejudicing non-denominational stance new government.

5. Regarding reftel, we assume Generals leading coup will not call on you in large group, thus giving false impression they were reporting to headquarters. A certain formality and correctness is greatly in their interest in preserving Vietnamese character their action.

6. Assuming your departure Washington temporarily postponed.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 S VIET Secret; Flash. Drafted by Hilsman and Sullivan, cleared by the White House, and approved by Rusk.

   At 10 a.m., President Kennedy met with his principal advisers: Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Harriman, Hilsman, McGeorge Bundy, Robert Manning, Colby, Krulak, Forrestal, and Kline. Many had been awake most of the night following the coup developments as the reports came into Washington. During the meeting, which is described as “Off the Record,” the President attended Holy Trinity Church’s All Saints Mass from 10:55 to 11:29 a.m. Kennedy then returned to the meeting which had continued without him. The President and his advisers met until 12:15 p.m. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book) No other substantive record of this meeting has been found. Both Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 301, and Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 519, recall being awakened early on the morning of November 1 to follow the coup situation. Taylor states that Kennedy received the news of Diem’s death at this meeting when, in fact, he received the news at the 9:35-10:05 a.m. meeting on November 2; see Document 274.

   Telegram 673 was apparently drafted before the 10 a.m. meeting.

2. This telegram, sent from Lodge to Rusk via CIA channels, November 1, received at 7:55 a.m. reads as follows:

   “Re Critic Flash CIA no 7, following message is being passed to General ’Big Minh’:

   “1. Generals will be received at Embassy after coup is over. (FYI: I expect to receive them myself.)

   “2. We believe it would be better for Generals to meet with Tri Quang outside Embassy. We will advise him it is safe to leave when Generals inform us that in their opinion it is safe.

   “Presume Department will require further information re composition and intentions new government but will be prepared act promptly on recognition as soon as this information available.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 S VIET)

3. CAS Saigon Critic 4, DTG 101955Z, November 1, received at the Department of State at 5:08 a.m., reads in part as follows:

   “Conein reports from JGS that Gens are interested in whether or not Thich Tri Quang will be released from asylum at Embassy in order to join government as Buddhist advisor to symbolize freedom of religion.” (Ibid.)

4. Document 260.