Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

245. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 30, 1963, 5 p.m.

821. Eyes only for President, pass White House directly. No other distribution whatever. Herewith my weekly report pursuant to Deptel 576² for the week ending Wednesday, October 30.

Question 1: Are we gaining or losing on balance and day by day in the contest with the Viet Cong?

Answer: No major change in military situation during last week. Most noteworthy event which happened to me personally is highly secret statement by Gen Don, Acting Chief, Joint General Staff, that he did not think the war could be won [with] the present government in power before the Americans left and certainly could not be won after that. I continue to think that we can and must continue the present utterly essential holding operation, but that it will take something more than is now being done by the GVN politically and psychologically to get a real victory.

Question 2: Is the government responding at any point to our threefold need for improvement in (a) campaign against VC, (b) internal political developments and (c) actions affecting relations with American people and government?

Answer: On (a) no major change. No specific responses have been received from GVN concerning the military areas which we have cited as needing improvement.

Under (b) no major change other than the activities reported on CAS channel.

Under (c) no major change.

Question 3: What does the evidence suggest on the strengthening or weakening of effectiveness of GVN in relation to its own people?

Answer: A report from the Acting Consul in Hue cites the case of a Vietnamese lady, headmistress of a girls school in Hue, who was still in prison because she had been guilty of writing a letter to the President “almost asking for changes in government” and of having it signed by members of the school faculty. The letter urged the President to exert his leadership to solve the Buddhist problem and to reject the oppressive actions of the lower officials. The American Consul, who took the matter up with the government, was told that as soon as she finished “confessing” the problem would be brought before a military court. Over the last weekend the lady was released, but it is believed that this was done in connection with the visit of the UN delegation and there is speculation as to what will happen to her after the UN delegation leaves. There is no reason to think that this case is extraordinary.

There is also a report of Army officers being asked to make lists of those in their units whose actions are opposed to course taken by government.

Question 4: And more specifically, what effect are we getting from our own actions under Deptel 534³ and what modifications in either direction do you think advisable?

Answer: We are beginning to get some effect from our pressure under 534 but little concrete action. Diem invited me to spend Sunday with him and raised the whole subject of suspension of commodity imports which, I hope, is the start of a dialogue. Thuan later hinted that Diem’s overture might be the beginning. Suspension of commodity imports and the cessation of aid to Colonel Tung appear to have impressed GVN with our annoyance as no amount of rhetoric could have done. Perhaps they will propose some steps be taken by them in exchange for our resuming our aid, although I doubt that they will offer anything significant. Whatever they promise to do would be subject to delay and would be difficult to verify.

When we decide the time is ripe for us to resume aid then perhaps I should be authorized to make a statement to Diem explaining that the policies of the GVN had made it very difficult for us to continue aid, but that, although American confidence had been weakened, we nonetheless had concluded that they intended to win the war; that they would be less worried in the future about their own tenure of office, and that, on strength of these assumptions we would resume payments on specific categories released at periodic intervals.

Other reactions were as follows:

a. Dr. Herbert K. Walther of the USOM education division, who probably sees more Vietnamese students and professors than any other official in the Mission, reports that not once had a professor or a student expressed anything but praise for the U.S. decision to withhold aid to Vietnam. All of his contacts with remarkable unanimity said they welcomed the recent U.S. moves and their only criticism was that it should have been done sooner.

b. General Don expressed pleasure that Colonel Tung’s force had been placed under the Joint General Staff. He was also concerned with devaluation of plaster.

c. Vice President Tho asked a visitor whether I was strong enough to stand firm in current situation. When told that I was, he replied; good”.

d. In the market place prices of imported goods continued upward with GVN reportedly controlling flour and condensed milk, as wholesale quantities unavailable. Currency market continues gyrations. Gold which rose 50 percent dropped 12 percent reportedly because large amount smuggled in from Hong Kong last week. Greenbacks steady at 140-150.

Rumors of GVN actions persist, but nothing happens. Reports on licensing not received from GVN since October 17, so unable to determine whether any additional items formerly U.S. financed have been picked up by GVN. Overall picture remains one of confusion among businessmen and civil servants. Some expressions discontent now being heard from trade unions. GVN officials also personally concerned at price movement, combined with rumored threat of salary cut and increased cost of living resulting from having buy noon meal when new working hours go into effect.

I understand there is enough milk to last until December or January. I intend to make this available whenever necessary to assure normal amount for popular consumption.

Finally GVN appears to be off to a good start with the U.N. mission. So far they have allowed them to meet everyone, including imprisoned Buddhists.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 S VIET. Top Secret. Received at 12:32 p.m. and passed to the White House at 12:45 p.m.
2. Document 195.
3. Document 181.