Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

239. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 30, 1963, 9 a.m.

816. Herewith are some ideas for study in the Department and for possible discussion when I am in Washington on the conditions under which the U.S. might resume payment of commercial imports to Vietnam.

1. We should decide that we will not again give the GVN a blank check and that for the future all aid will be given, for example, on a quarterly basis so that at all times we have some control.

2. We should also make it clear that we will not pay back the amount which was lost by the suspension.

3. If we decide to resume payments on the strength of an offer by them to do certain things, I would hope that these things would really go to the fundamentals. For example, I attach no value whatever to reshuffling the cabinet. This is one example of a purely superficial measure.

4. Some of the steps which would have some meaning would be as follows:²

a. Putting Mr. Nhu into the Cabinet or into some position with definite limitations where he could be more easily watched and controlled.

b. Liberating the prisoners, both Buddhists and students.

c. Reopening all the schools.

d. Eliminating discriminatory features of Decree Law No. 10.

e. Loosening press censorship so as to provide a safety valve for unorthodox opinions.

f. Stop arresting people who oppose the government so that there can be some loyal opposition. In general, to be less timid.

g. Allow the legislature to function better by having Cabinet Ministers subject to questioning by the legislature.

h. Allowing labor to operate in the provinces.

i. Let the UN Mission see whomever and whatever it wants.

5. I can think of no way whereby the execution of such a plan could be guaranteed or how we can protect ourselves against foot dragging and evasions.

6. We may also face a situation in which they refuse to do anything and yet we consider that we might resume payments. In that case I might call on Diem, tell him we were going to resume payments on certain items for limited periods and read to him a statement which I would then leave with him and which might say something as follows:

“Mr. President, the United States is about to resume payment for certain types of commercial imports for a limited period of time.

“You should know that we suspended these payments in part because of the police state methods used in Vietnam against Buddhist leaders, students and even against Americans. Public opinion was also concerned that the public statements of Madame Nhu and others apparently expressed the point of view of the Government of Vietnam. These things had weakened the support of American public opinion for American help to Vietnam. Under our system of government, even our President cannot go against the full force of public opinion.

“We now conclude that while much has been done to shake American confidence, there is still faith that the Government of Vietnam, working with the people and the army, and abandoning any exaggerated concern for its own tenure of office, will concentrate wholeheartedly on winning the war against the Viet Cong.

“But candor compels us to say that we must not again be put into the position of condoning brutality and totalitarian practices which go squarely against our traditions and customs.”

7. Hope Department will study which of the measures in paragraphs a to i are more or less self-enforcing, that is which the public can watch and see that they are done.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT 1 S VIET. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:39 a.m. and passed to the White House at 4:50 a.m.

2. In telegram 820 from Saigon, October 30, Lodge added the additional suggested step:

   “The most important aim for the government of Vietnam is an effective program for land ownership by the masses of everyday peasants of Vietnam. No other single measure could do more to make the peasant feel that he has a stake in the country and that he will therefore give information and food to the government of Vietnam. This might be that extra political and psychological something which would put the whole war effort over the top.” (Ibid., POL 27 S VIET)