Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

207. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 23, 1963, 5 p.m.

768. Eyes only for President only, pass White House directly, no other distribution whatever. Herewith my weekly report pursuant to Deptel 576² for the week ending Wednesday, October 23.

Question 1: Are we gaining or losing on balance and day by day in the contest with the Viet Cong?

Answer: A. There appears to have been no significant change in the last week on a day-by-day basis. But a thoroughly responsive answer to this question requires one to strike a balance between a multiplicity of often contradictory military, political, social and economic “facts”—any one of which can be used to prove almost anything.

B. To strike a balance, the word “victory” must first be defined. How do we know when we have won? My definition is: a condition in which large numbers of Viet Cong surrender (as their counterparts did in Malaya) and others simply don’t report for duty anymore. All that would then remain would be sporadic banditry which the regular police forces could handle.

C. This condition would be reached when, to use Mao Tse Tung’s figure of speech, there is no longer friendly water in which the Viet Cong’s fish can swim. In the condition the people no longer like the Viet Cong, no longer want to see them around, no longer give them food or information.

D. The people come to feel this way, first, because the farmer feels safe and is not being shot at; and then because his government does not oppress him with burdensome taxes and forced labor; because he is making a good living; because he thinks his strategic hamlet is a good place in which to live, with enough food, with a school, with a dispensary, with the beginnings of local democracy; because he has learned how to control rats and insects and how to produce hogs; because his fishing is better.

E. Favorable factors towards bringing the above about are:

F. First and foremost is the work of the U.S. and Vietnamese military which is not only the hope for future victory, but is today a tremendous obstacle to total Viet Cong domination of the country. This result is being achieved at a much lower cost than would be the case if we were to do it alone, as the French tried to do. We are also doing much on long-range economic and social programs which should have lasting value. The strategic hamlet idea too is most constructive. While many of the hamlets are not up to standard, there are undoubtedly some which are really good in an all-around way, that is, they are not merely little armed camps where people are given a chance to defend themselves, but true communities which appeal to the whole man and which also have dependable sources of military support from outside. Vice President Tho said there are only 15 to 20 such all-around hamlets in the area south of Saigon which are really good. Let us hope this is low. Finally it can also be said that the rice crop is moving into the city regularly.

G. Unfavorable factors:

H. This is after all a pacification effort which really cannot be considered successful as long as one cannot drive as much around the country as one could two years ago and so long as gunfire can still be clearly heard from Saigon. Then there are not only no mass surrenders; on the contrary, the Viet Cong is always up to strength and is, in fact, reckoned at a higher figure than it was two years ago, even though it is often said that 24,000 Viet Cong have been killed during that period. The hatred of the government continues to be an incentive for young men to join the Viet Cong. And, this hatred is sure to have harmful effects on the Army. In fact, there are signs that it has already tended to diminish the Army’s vigor, enthusiasm and enterprise. The rumors that the Generals are being paid off with money and with flashy cars, which are much in evidence, are believable. Finally, the report of the Delta Subcommittee of the Committee on Province Rehabilitation, which includes representatives of MAAG, MACV, USOM, USIS, CAS, and Embassy, dated October 14,³ specifically says: that the Delta situation is serious; that it gives cause for concern; that while our side has ample resources, it is making unsatisfactory progress, but that the Viet Cong are gaining.

I. Unless there is a change in government therefore, it would appear that the hatred is bound to grow. Also, the existing political control over troop movements, which prevents optimum use of the Army, would be bound to continue. And, therefore, when it comes to defeating the Viet Cong, time is not working for us as long as the government is run by brother Nhu in the way in which he is now doing it.

J. All this could be quickly changed. But present circumstances compel me to say that in the contest with the Viet Cong, we at present are not doing much more than holding our own.

K. We have done and are doing big things in Viet-Nam which are changing the country basically for the better. In the forefront is the intelligent, courageous, and selfless leadership of the U.S. military which is bold yet practical and is in the best American tradition. There is the excellent economic and social work of USOM. We are, by all these means, producing an instrument which, if properly used by the Government of Viet-Nam, would bring victory. But at present the GVN’s main preoccupation with protecting its own internal power structure seems greater than its preoccupation with victory over the Viet Cong. And the Viet Cong is developing.

Question 2: Is the government responding at any point to our threefold need for improvement in (a) campaign against VC, (b) internal political developments and (c) actions affecting relations with American people and government?

Answer: A. Under (a) General Harkins reports that “in no case has Government of Viet-Nam flatly resisted recommended improvements”.

Under (b) there has been no significant improvement in internal political situation during past week. GVN engaged in extensive security sweeps and arrests of student leaders to prevent demonstrations during visit of UNGA delegations. All evidence to date points to concentrated GVN attempt to cow potential adverse witnesses and prevent their appearing before the delegation and to keep delegation busy on a cook’s tour. Great interest in UNGA delegation among educated Vietnamese coupled with a general belief that GVN will not permit delegation to function freely. GVN reacted strongly against my approach concerning UNGA delegations access to Tri Quang. Rumors abound of further student agitation, more self-immolations during delegation’s visit, and GVN-inspected attacks against Embassy and USIS.

B. But I am nonetheless sure our actions under Deptel 534 are producing results. For one thing, Thuan told me that Diem was worried and Diem directed Thuan to ask me on October 19 whether Washington had reached any decision on commercial imports.⁴ Then experienced observers believe that our actions are creating favorable conditions for a coup. Although I as yet see no one who looks as though he means business in this regard, General Don has said he was impressed by commercial import suspension and said that our action regarding Colonel Tung was “one of the best things” we had done. See also CAS Saigon 1896.⁵

C. While I cannot prove it, I believe our actions are making Diem and Nhu much more careful about repressive measures-at least about getting caught. I also believe our actions under Deptel 534 constitute the first time that the U.S. has sought to discharge its moral responsibility for the behavior of this government, which surely would not stay in office without us. This is understood and appreciated and has attracted attention.

D. My present thought is that we should continue with this suspension at least until Madame Nhu’s trip is over and at least until the GVN has dipped into their foreign exchange reserves. We should stop short of an economic crisis which causes a popular outbreak.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 S VIET Top Secret; Eyes Only. Received at 10:44 a.m. and passed to the White House at 12:55 p.m.
2. Document 195.
3. Not found.
4. See Document 203.
5. According to CIA telegram 1896 from Saigon, October 23, General Don contacted Conein on October 23 to inform him that the Generals’ coup committee planned to take advantage of the presence of its members in Saigon during the October 26 national holiday to stage a coup within the week. Don was concerned about a conversation he had with Harkins on October 22. Harkins reamed of the Generals’ plans because a member of Don’s staff, Colonel Khuong, had contacted a MACV officer and asked for support of the coup and recognition of the new government. Harkins had told Don that it was the wrong time to stage a coup because the war against the Viet Cong was progressing well. To make matters worse, Don said that Diem had reamed of Khuong’s approach and had extended the assignment of two key divisions outside the Saigon area. The coup leaders had planned on these units supporting the coup in Saigon. Don repudiated Khuong and told Conein that he would be disciplined by the coup committee. Conein challenged Don to produce proof that a coup committee existed. Don promised to turn over plans for political organization to Ambassador Lodge on October 24. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, CIA Reports) General Don, in Our Endless War, p. 98, discusses both the October 22 conversation between Don and Harkins, which Don recalls took place at a British Embassy party, and the October 23 meeting between Conein and Don.