Office of the Historian

177. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency1

Saigon, October 5, 1963.

[document number not declassified] 1. Lt. Col. Conein met with Gen. Duong Van Minh at Gen. Minh’s headquarters on Le Van Duyet for one hour and ten minutes morning of 5 Oct. 1963. This meeting was at the initiative of Gen. Minh and had been specifically cleared in advance by Ambassador Lodge. No other persons were present. The conversation was conducted in French.

2. Gen. Minh stated that he must know American Government’s position with respect to a change in the Government of Vietnam within the very near future. Gen. Minh added the Generals were [Page 366] aware the situation is deteriorating rapidly and that action to change the government must be taken or the war will be lost to the Viet Cong because the government no longer has the support of the people. Gen. Minh identified among the other Generals participating with him in this plan:

  • Maj. Gen. Tran Van Don
  • Brig. Gen. Tran Thien Khiem
  • Maj. Gen. Tran Van Kim

3. Gen. Minh made it clear that he did not expect any specific American support for an effort on the part of himself and his colleagues to change the government but he stated he does need American assurances that the USG will not attempt to thwart this plan.

4. Gen. Minh also stated that he himself has no political ambitions nor do any of the other general officers except perhaps, he said laughingly, Gen. Ton That Dinh. Gen. Minh insisted that his only purpose is to win the war. He added emphatically that to do this, continuation of American military and economic aid at the present level (he said one and one half million dollars per day) is necessary.

5. Gen. Minh outlined three possible plans for the accomplishment of the change of government:

a.
Assassination of Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can keeping President Diem in office. Gen. Minh said this was the easiest plan to accomplish.
b.
The encirclement of Saigon by various military units particularly the unit at Ben Cat. (Comment: Fifth division elements commanded by Gen. Dinh.)
c.
Direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyalist military units in Saigon, in effect, dividing the city of Saigon into sectors and cleaning it out pocket by pocket. Gen. Minh claims under the circumstances Diem and Nhu could count on the loyalty of 5,500 troops within the City of Saigon.

6. Conein replied to Gen. Minh that he could not answer specific question as to USG non-interference nor could he give any advice with respect to tactical planning. He added that he could not advise concerning the best of the three plans.

7. Gen. Minh went on to explain that the most dangerous men in South Vietnam are Ngo Dinh Nhu, Ngo Dinh Can and Ngo Trong Hieu. Minh stated that Hieu was formerly a Communist and still has Communist sympathies. When Col. Conein remarked that he had considered Col. Tung as one of the more dangerous individuals, Gen. Minh stated “if I get rid of Nhu, Can and Hieu, Col. Tung will be on his knees before me.”

8. Gen. Minh also stated that he was worried as to the role of Gen. Tran Thien Khiem since Khiem may have played a double role in August. Gen. Minh asked that copies of the documents previously [Page 367] passed to Gen. Khiem (plan of Camp Long Thanh and munitions inventory at that camp) be passed to Gen. Minh personally for comparison with papers passed by Khiem to Minh purportedly from CAS.

9. Minh further stated that one of the reasons they are having to act quickly was the fact that many regimental, battalion and company commanders are working on coup plans of their own which could be abortive and a “catastrophe”.

10. Minh appeared to understand Conein’s position of being unable to comment at the present moment but asked that Conein again meet with Gen. Minh to discuss the specific plan of operations which Gen. Minh hopes to put into action. No specific date was given for this next meeting. Conein was again non-committal in his reply. Gen. Minh once again indicated his understanding and stated that he would arrange to contact Conein in the near future and hoped that Conein would be able to meet with him again and give the assurance outlined above.

  1. Source: Department of State, Har-Van files, Coup South Vietnam. Secret. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. II, pp. 767-768. There is no time of transmission on the source text.↩