Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

159. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, September 30, 1963, 7 p.m.

613. CINCPAC for POLAD.

1. McNamara, Taylor, and I had conversation with Vice President Tho. He opened up conversation immediately by recalling that two years ago he had said to General Taylor that the American effort in Viet-Nam should have three characteristics: It should be rapid; it should be efficient; it should be intelligent. We had succeeded in the first two parts but had failed in the third: we are not using our strength intelligently.

2. When asked to elaborate on this. He said that it was obvious that police state methods were being used and that this was creating deep discontent and yet we were unable to do anything about it. He felt sorry to speak so frankly, but the situation was very serious.

3. When asked to say what we should do to be intelligent and to make our influence effective, he said that he did not feel free to tell us. It was his duty not to set himself apart from the President, that he had already gone very far in saying what he had.

4. We pressed him hard on different methods which had been proposed. He agreed that protestations and words by Ambassadors and others were totally ineffective. He said that withholding economic aid would do nothing since we had inflation already; introduction of US troops would be “idiotic” as would be an attempt by the US to organize a coup d’etat.

5. When we asked him if there were any Vietnamese or foreigners in Saigon whose advice we should seek, he said that the best people were out of the country but that they could not advise us on details. When asked to suggest persons out of the country, he suggested Vu Van Maul

6. When asked whether it was true that all the dissatisfaction was in the cities and that there was none in the villages, he said that this was not true, that he had spent his life in the villages of the southern part of country and knew them intimately. There was serious discontent in the villages, but not because of the police state methods being used in the cities. The villager is discontented for several reasons: first, he feels he has to pay too much money to the local village agent who is demanding much more than the 100 plasters and ten days of work which the villager had agreed to do. Then, said Tho, when the villager leaves his hamlet in the morning to go out to work in the field, he meets the Viet Cong who forces him to pay another set of taxes.

7. When General Taylor remarked that this should not happen in a well fortified hamlet, Tho said that it did not happen in the hamlet-it happened when the villager steps out of the hamlet and goes into the field.

8. When General Taylor said that in a properly defended hamlet this should not happen, Tho said: Why, General Taylor, there are not more than 20 to 30 properly defended hamlets in the whole country.

9. With some warmth he said: Why do you gentlemen think that the Viet Cong is still so popular? Two years ago there were between 20-30,000 in the Viet Cong army; for these last two years we have been killing a thousand a month; and yet the Viet Cong is even larger today. Why is this true?

10. When General Taylor and I suggested it might be intimidation, Tho said: Intimidation can make them join, but it cannot stop them from running away. While some of them do run away, there are many who stay. Why is this?

11. When I suggested that it might be the promises that the Viet Cong make, Tho said: They cannot promise a thing-neither food nor shelter nor security. The answer is that they stay in the Viet Cong army because they want to, and the reason they want to is their extreme discontent with the Government of Vietnam.

12. Comment: Vice President Tho evidently wants us to straighten out the whole situation here and yet does not hesitate to disapprove of any methods of doing so. But his analysis of village attitudes is worthy of consideration.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 OSD. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC. Passed to the White House.