Office of the Historian

139. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)1

Saigon, September 20, 1963—6:55 p.m.

MAC J00 7585. Ref A. Saigon to SecState 542.2 B. Saigon to SecState 556.3 I had read ref A prior to a meeting with Sec Thuan this afternoon and among other things we discussed how the war was going, Strategic Hamlet program, Thompson report,4 and the wealth of rumors that were still going around Saigon. I said one of the rumors was that he (Thuan) wanted to resign and get out of the country. He categorically denied this and said it was fantastic. He said any such rumor that could be spread around deeply endangered his life. He said that he was discouraged for a time and that his health was not too good and that he said he thought he would like to have an Ambassador’s post some place. He asked me to please try to “squelch” even the discussion of such a rumor that he wanted to resign or that he could get anybody else to go with him.

Ref B (556) which is an unevaluated statement by General (Big) Minh: I have this to say—since I have known Big Minh a year and one-half, though I have a very high estimate of his leadership qualities, he has contributed nothing to the war effort here either as commander of the field command or as an advisor to the President. In fact, he has done nothing but complain to me about the government and the way it is handled ever since I have been here. As you know, Big Minh has been under suspicion since 1960 and has never been given real command of troops since that time and he has been kept in positions where people keep a close watch on him. My intelligence people, in analyzing his statement, feel this: that he might have been again attempting to probe the US position to elicit an expression of support for a coup. This was Minh’s first meeting with Americans since the 21st of August and this might also explain his eagerness to communicate his views. The statement that 80 percent of the populace no longer supports the government can certainly not be confirmed. We [Page 275] have no evidence to indicate that numbers of students are turning in desperation to the VC, though there is some element of collusion between student group leaders and the National Liberation Front.

At the meeting today with all senior advisers, none evidenced any disaffection of the middle ranks.

As I have said before, you can get almost any viewpoint you want and some of these indicate there are still coup discussions going on among the military. We will continue to evaluate all statements as well as we are able.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Defense Cables. Secret; Immediate; Personal. Also sent personal to Taylor. A note on the source text indicates that the President saw this cable. Received at the JCS at 9:54 a.m. The JCS relayed this message to the Department of State exclusive for Rusk, Ball, Harriman, and Hilsman; to CIA exclusive for Helms; and to the White House exclusive for Bundy.↩
  2. See footnote 5, Document 130.↩
  3. Document 138.↩
  4. Not further identified.↩