Office of the Historian

131. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

Saigon, September 19, 1963, 4 p.m.

545. Eyes only for President only, pass White House directly, no other distribution. This telegram supplements my 5442 I am in general agreement with list of “possible helpful actions” with the important qualification that items are for most part not possible of attainment. They involve leopard’s changing his spots. Specific comments on correspondingly lettered items paragraph 4 follow: [Page 263]

a.
Clear the air. Diem is, of course, in a sense already trying to get everyone back to work and focussed on winning the war. That is, he would like them to forget or ignore or accept his interpretation of recent events. He is in his present situation precisely because he took a deliberate decision not to be broadminded and compassionate and not to adopt a real spirit of reconciliation. Much the same comment applies as in a.
[b.]
Diem will not let any of the leadership elements out unless he is satisfied that they are thoroughly cowed and will cause no further trouble. He will not leave them unmolested if they turn out to be uncowed. His whole approach with Buddhists and students has been to terrorize them. If he were now able to convince students, for example, that they would not be molested, chances are very great that demonstrations, etc., would get completely out of hand. This is on assumption that there had not been simultaneously a radical change in the government.
c.
Press. For the moment foreign press appears to be operating as freely as before August 20, censorship is off, dispatches are going through without delay. I do not think Diem would consider changing GVN policies on domestic press.
d.
Secret and combat police. This would be equivalent to asking Diem to tie both hands behind his back. He will abandon operations against opposition when he is satisfied they are no longer a proximate threat and resume them when he concludes that they are.
e.
Cabinet changes. Popular discontent does not run particularly to the Cabinet but to the family. I should not be surprised to see some Cabinet reshuffling after elections, but I would not expect it to have any measurable effect on popular attitudes, since public would not expect new blood to have any more authority than the old. For example, there is a brand new Foreign Secretary, Mr. Cuu, and he is the most shameless sycophant I have ever seen.
f.
Elections. These are now ten days away. We have already reported before elections postponed that there are only about half as many candidates as the last time and that there was widespread apathy among voters. Elections will not be a meaningful expression of popular will and could not at this stage be made to seem so, even with most skillful press agentry. Government will probably have to make massive and well observed effort to get voters to polls.
g.
Assembly. GVN may well submit policies to Assembly for vote of confidence, but I do not really believe that this will have much effect on the “external image.”
h.
Party. Diem might conceivably agree to abolish Can Lao party. However, as we have previously estimated, something else would immediately be created to take its place, because a secret political organization is an essential part of the family’s power base and scheme of operation.
i.
Decree No. 10. Possibly something can be done on this.
j.
Rehabilitation of pagodas. This is going forward and is probably nearly completed.
k.
Ministry of Religious Affairs. Department previously rejected this idea in favor of Council on Religious Affairs (Deptel 1196).3 Believe this was right decision.
1.
Liberalization of passport issuances, etc. This is a key control device which Diem would not consider giving up. It would probably work against our own interests, in removing from the country much of the solvent opposition.
m.
Buddhist inquiry mission. GVN would not permit free inquiry by outside body, in my opinion.

Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 S VIET Top Secret; Immediate. Received at 7:16 a.m. and passed to the White House at 8:02 a.m.↩
  2. Document 130.↩
  3. vol. III, p. 364.↩