116. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- South Vietnam
I am trying this memorandum mainly as an exercise in relieving some of my own frustrations.
I think we have come to a position of stall in our attempts to develop a Washington consensus. For a week now the fundamental attitudes of the principal officers of the Government have remained unchanged. The reason for this is, I think, two-fold. First, the nature of the problem itself tends to force the basic political outlooks within the President’s official family to the surface. On the one hand, Averell sees a world in which the only successful way to resist the Communist menace is to provide the people concerned with an alternative worth fighting for. On the other hand, to Bob McNamara the issue is more than mechanical: if enough of the enemy can be identified and killed by methods his department has been so successful in developing, there will be time to concentrate on the political and social welfare of the people in the countries where insurgency exists. Each fundamentally views the other’s position as an impractical one.
Because of this difference in world views, I do not see how the development of any further information is going to change conclusions. This leads me to the conclusion that the governmental situation here requires Presidential guidance. I am sure that there is a sufficiently large reserve of loyal acquiescence in the official family to permit the President to make a free choice on fundamental policy, but I am equally sure that as time goes by and positions continue to harden, a Presidential decision will become more painful.
Two other thoughts prompt me to hope for early Presidential action. The first is that the longer we continue in an attitude of semipublic fluidity, the worse the leak problem becomes. Until there is a policy behind which to close ranks, the human tendency to influence decision by every means at one’s disposal will continue. My second thought is a corollary to the first. General Krulak has just called me to complain that our instruction to the field2 to hold off major aid decisions [Page 236] is, in his view, a back drawer way of effecting a policy which has not yet been agreed upon. As time passes, General Krulak’s point will become more valid and emotions will start to rise again.
If the President is inclined to grasp the nettle, I have a thought on the way he might do it. On the assumption that his political guidance will be to the effect that we must attempt to bring about the changes in policy and personnel which would restore to the GVN a fuller measure of its people’s support, the President might direct that the first phase of Roger’s “pressure plan” be put into effect immediately. The President might observe that, as a practical matter, the first phase is almost parallel to the “policy of reconciliation” which Bob McNamara calls “Track 1”. The significant difference is the political tone which the U.S. adopts during this first phase. Instead of embracing the GVN and trying to endorse its public image, we maintain the current public atmosphere of disapproval and tension. In short, I am suggesting that the President approve a mechanical course which I think would be acceptable to Bob McNamara while at the same time setting a political tone which would be unacceptable but on which, I think, the Secretary of Defense would quickly and sincerely defer to the President’s judgment. This might best be done by direct conversation between the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense. Of course we will inevitably have to face the problems implicit in phases 2, 3, etc.; but once the political direction has been set, we can get back to the more logical and less emotional business of analyzing our own actions in the light of their intrinsic value as tools to accomplish our purpose.
Two items of incidental intelligence: Roger tells me that he believes the Secretary of State is waiting for the President to give a signal and is also very concerned (I think rightly) about Ambassador Lodge’s opinion. I also have just had a talk with Greg Henderson, political officer in Korea. He confirms very strongly that the Korean Government is watching us in South Vietnam with great care. The Government-controlled press in Seoul is advising us to stay out of internal affairs in Vietnam and in Korea and to eschew aid as a means of influencing political development in both countries.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Memos and Miscellaneous, Part 11. Top Secret, Eyes Only.↩
- Document 97.↩