Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

86. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defenseʼs Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)¹

Washington, February 26, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Life Magazine and Vietnam

After your approval, I accepted the invitation by Charlie Murphy to meet with the editors of Life magazine for an off-the-record discussion on Vietnam. We had a two hour talk at lunch in New York last Friday, 23 February. I spent several more hours with the writers and photographers who are working on Lifeʼs coverage of Vietnam. Charlie Murphy, who arranged this and accompanied me, was most constructive in his comments and questions.

Essentially, the editors (George Hunt, Hugh Moffatt, Joe Kessner, etc.) seemed to be sincerely trying to make up their minds on whether or not the U.S. is wise in supporting Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam. “Can we win with him?” “Should a coup replace him?”

The questions apparently were raised by a series of letters from Time-Life correspondents, sparked to some extent by Stan Karnow of the Hong Kong office who is violently opposed to Diem. Karnow is the man who was opposed to our aid in Laos and, earlier, our aid to Chiang against Mao; he has a low opinion of Nolting, McGarr, and Felt. Anyhow, as a result, Life editor Roy Alexander has gone to Vietnam for a first-hand look, to help advise on Lifeʼs editorial policy re Diem.

I gave them several different angles for consideration. Since there seems to be a stepped-up campaign Newsweek, New York Times, and certain parts of Washington) to denigrate the Presidentʼs decision to support Vietnam and Diemʼs government, some of my remarks may be of help to you. I note the highlights below, along with some of the questions asked.

At the start, I remarked that they—and other Americans—were trying to play God, by trying to pick a leader for Vietnam. If they were serious, as they seemed to be, then they needed a yardstick to measure up Diem and other Vietnamese, to compare them for the job. I had some suggested measurements which Americans might use:

1. Dedication to defeat the enemy. Since Vietnam is essentially in a life-or-death struggle, the leader on our side must be every bit as dedicated to victory as Ho Chi Minh is on the Communist side.

2. Executive ability. The leader must have the ability to keep his government running, in many complex fields, despite the lack of competent or experienced Vietnamese administrators.

3. Moral courage. In a war, such as Vietnamʼs, there are many tough decisions that have to be made. None ever seem to be “black and white” problems, but mostly fuzzy gray ones which take real moral courage to decide.

4. Constitutionality. Since Vietnam has gone through real birth pangs in becoming a nation, we must consider the value of the legality of the Presidency. The Vietnamese had elected an Assembly to write a Constitution in 1956, had voted for this Constitution which established a government for the people, including a President, Vice President, and an Assembly, and had voted in the Presidential election of 1961 for President Diem and Vice President Tho. Do we want to make that Constitution a scrap of paper or a viable legal document?

5. Integrity. We should want a Vietnamese leader who has deep honesty, a selfless dedication to the cause, a man who won’t use U.S. aid for his own selfish ends. Even those who hate Diem admit he is puritanically honest.

6. Team leader. Diem is weak in delegating authority and in getting the whole Vietnamese team to follow him whole-heartedly. But, have we really thought about why? U.S. officials have insisted that Diem give authority to civil and military officials who are weak, if not disloyal; a number of our own Presidents have had similar problems and we might well show a little more constructive understanding by helping him solve this problem rather than force him to compound it.

7. Popularity. The leader of the free Vietnamese must vie in popularity with the leader of the slave Vietnamese, Ho Chi Minh. Diem is the best known free Vietnamese. Making him the best liked is simply a professional chore, with some help from Diem; the chore is neither one for Madison Avenue techniques nor Communist techniques. It was done in 1954-56, and could be done again, if necessary. As a corollary, it is noted that intellectuals who are most critical of Diem do not speak of love or affection for and by the people. Intellectuals instinctively mistrust the people, with their belief of superiority of intellect needing to be kept unsullied by trust of others. This snobbery or arrogance is amusing but empty when it turns to being critical of a person for not being popular.

8. Liberal? Conservative? Some of the criticism of the Vietnamese government and of Diem is based on unusually fuzzy thinking for this day and age. Much of the political reform measures we insist that Diem adopt need to be looked at in the harsh light of the violent combat in Vietnam. An honest, hard look will reveal that they are “gimmicks” with much the same flavor as “deforestation”; the political gimmicks are pushed forward with much the same do-good enthusiasm as military and economic gimmicks. We should be desiring a Churchill, not a Chamberlain, for these critical moments in Vietnam. Some reforms are needed, but we must help Diem and the Vietnamese towards practical ways of solving their problems, not just sit on the sidelines and give orders for actions which are not solutions.

9. Know the needs of people and country. There are a number of politicians in Vietnam who aspire to be the top leader. In talking with a number of them, including some who are friends of mine, I know of none who has the depth of understanding his people and country which is needed for leadership now. Some are sincere patriots whom I would like to see growing politically today by holding positions of public trust. Others only seek to satisfy narrow aims or their vanity.

A rather lively discussion took place after this description of a suggested “yardstick.” It continued after the editors left and when Scott Levitt (writer), Howard Sochurek (photographer), and I discussed the articles the two of them will prepare. Some of the questions asked in both sessions stick in my mind, and I am noting them below, as of interest to you:

Q.: What makes you think Americans should “play God,” as you put it?

A.: I was merely putting the correct label to what you, and other Americans, seem to be up to today. You wonder if we can win with Diem or be better off with a coup and a possible military leader in Vietnam. President Kennedy has pledged U.S. support to Diem, and we are matching that pledge with a series of actions. Now you express doubt that this is what we should do. You hint that there are alternatives. When I suggest that these alternatives be taken out in the daylight and measured, it should cause no surprise. It is obvious that you, as responsible editors, are doing much the same as we are doing in Washington—acting as Americans for the best good of our country and trying to think very hard before we take each decision.

Q.: Does President Kennedy really want to win in Vietnam? Isn’t there some hedging on this desire when Secretary McNamara says it will take 5 to 6 years?

A.: I feel that the Administration has made it very plain that the U.S. is determined to help the Vietnamese win their struggle for freedom. The President has said so in plain terms, not only to the U.S., but to the Vietnamese and the world. Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, along with General Lemnitzer, are taking many actions to make our military aid and advisors really help the Vietnamese. To those who hope for a quick, cheap, and easy victory, the top folks in the Pentagon are saying honestly that this looks like a tough job that is going to take some doing.

Q.: Why was General Harkins appointed? Did Secretary McNamara think he needed more rank in the U.S. military? Can a conventional soldier win this kind of a war?

A.: General Harkins was picked as the military man who could best use U.S. military resources to help the Vietnamese win. He has just arrived. Why not wait and see how he does?

Q.: Why donʼt we get rid of people like Gardiner in USOM and McGarr in MAAG? They aren’t getting anywhere with the Vietnamese and aren’t helping anybody win.

A.: This question is in the category of “why donʼt you stop beating your wife.” Any answer I give damns me. However, it should be obvious that someone in authority has placed them in Vietnam and believes they are serving usefully.

Q.: Why do we have the big “paper-mill” MAAG in Saigon? Why so many U.S. military at desks and not out in the field?

A.: This is much the same category of question as the previous one. Taking these questions, and your earlier ones on Diem, it seems that you and too many other Americans, including both military and civil officials in Washington and Saigon, simply fail to realize the facts of todayʼs war. Our side is under deadly attack. It is life-or-death today in Vietnam, tomorrow elsewhere. The American people should be awake to this condition of war—and grimly determine that anything short of victory is too little. Since part of the deadly attack today includes the art of tranquilizing Americans at the same time, all of us—including Life reporters—who have seen the face of this enemy in the attack should bring it home to other Americans. In combat, we remove the commander when his unit fails to take the objective. If we saw todayʼs struggle as combat, we would do the same—whether the commander was an ambassador, an economist, an information man, or a military man. You know how our press would scream about the relief of “good guys” from devoted service to their country in some hardship post abroad. Well, we still have some toughening up to do, to relegate the “nice people” to our social life and start asking only if the man we put in is winning or not, the way we want him to.

Q.: Yes, but donʼt you think the American people deserve to know all that is going on in Vietnam? After all, some Americans are being killed there, and it is likely that more will be, with the big build-up of our forces there.

A.: Certainly I agree that Americans must have the truth, every bit of it that won’t help the enemy defeat us. But, isn’t it time that you started doing this constructively—rather than treating Vietnam as some quaint and strange place, full of peculiar little people, out at the end of nowhere where our good “American boys” donʼt belong anyhow, and where some Americans are all thumbs in what they’re doing? You who have been there say that the Vietnamese are wonderful people, with a deep love of individual liberty. Well, why donʼt you picture them to the American people that way—as real people not too unlike us, people fighting against tyranny today? Then, as Americans go out to help them in this good fight—as advisors where the shooting is—standing up to be counted right alongside them—the American people can understand why Americans took the risks along with the Vietnamese. Hellsfire, we both love the same concept of freedom, and you know it, and I know it, but you haven’t told that to the American people yet. They deserve that truth. And, to encourage the very Americans we need as dedicated volunteers in Vietnam, why donʼt you give some recognition to our really good guys out there? You’ve seen them in action, committed right up to the hilt in this struggle. I know that the Vietnamese love this type of American and bust their britches trying to be as good as he thinks they are. Well, we ought to love this type of American, too, and let him know it—to give him the encouragement he richly deserves. We have them in Vietnam today. I think your readers deserve to know about them. If a guy like that becomes a casualty, every American will feel it and not have to wonder what he was doing halfway around the world.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam 7. Confidential; Sensitive. Also sent to Gilpatric. Lansdale signed the memorandum “Ed.”