Office of the Historian

83. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Bagley) to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Taylor)1

Washington, February 23, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Concept of Operations, SEATO Plan 7 (Counter-insurgency in South Viet-Nam)2
1.
The SEATO Military Advisors are reviewing the concept of operations contained in the draft SEATO Plan 7. The plan includes the directive, intelligence annex, and concept at this time; on national approval of the concept, the question of force allocations will be undertaken so that the Plan can be discussed in detail at the 21 April meeting (now scheduled for Paris, but under review to relocate in SEA).
2.

The main points of the draft concept are extracted below:

MISSION: To assist the GVN to counter Communist insurgency and gain full control of its territory, so as to establish conditions in which it can resolve its problems and maintain the security and independence of South Viet-Nam.

EXECUTION: Immediate assistance to GVN will be given by externally based air and naval forces. This will be followed as rapidly as possible by the deployment of a substantial SEATO Force to key strategic areas of SVN.

Aims of SEATO Force:

(a)
Initially:
(1)
Assist in securing the Seat of Government.
(2)
Release the maximum GVN forces for offensive operations.
(b)
Subsequently:
(1)
Assist the GVN to destroy the Viet Cong.
(2)
In areas cleared of insurgents, assist the GVN to ensure a proper environment for the re-establishment of the normal civil authority and the protection of the local population on an effective and continuing basis.

SEATO Field Force Tasks:

(a)
Deploy forces to such key strategic areas as the situation may require to achieve the aims of the SEATO Force.
(b)
Participate in operations to isolate the Viet Cong from North Viet-Nam: initially an effective naval and air patrol of the Vietnamese coast and the waters of the Mekong delta to be established to prevent the flow of Communist personnel and equipment by sea or inland waterway from north of the 1 7th Parallel and Cambodia, subsequently, SEATO ground and air forces to assist the South Vietnamese forces to effectively control their land border.
(c)
Provide air and naval support to GVN and SEATO forces; to include reconnaissance, interdiction and support to ground forces by SEATO units operating from bases in South Viet-Nam. SEATO air and naval units also may be deployed to bases in Thailand to provide additional support to operations in South Viet-Nam and to provide improved capability to respond to overt aggression. The type and amount of support to forces in South Viet-Nam that can be provided by air units based in Thailand will depend greatly on whether overflight of Laos is authorized.

Deployment: Initially, SEATO forces should deploy to the Saigon and Tourane areas with the bulk of the ground forces deployed in the Tourane area. However, plans must be sufficiently flexible to allow for a changing situation and variations in the planned deployments. Thus it may be necessary to include, additionally or alternatively, Nha Trang or other suitable areas in the initial deployment locations.

Deployment and subsequent operations will be supported by forces, including Special Forces, remaining under national command. Some of these may be deployed to Thailand, South Viet-Nam, and the South China Sea as appropriate.

Contingencies: The Commander SEATO Field Forces will be prepared for the following contingencies; the implementation of plans for these contingencies will be subject to prior specific direction by appropriate higher SEATO authority:

(a)
Partial implementation. It is not possible to foresee the exact conditions which might exist at the time the SEATO Council approves a request for assistance from the GVN. The plans for the employment of SEATO forces, therefore, must provide for maximum flexibility and lend themselves to partial implementation.
(b)
Counter-insurgency in Laos. It is possible that the Royal Laotian Government will conduct counter-insurgent operations in southern Laos either alone or with SEATO assistance (MPO Plan 5 operation). In either event SEATO forces in South Viet-Nam will be prepared to coordinate their operations with any such operations in Laos.
(c)
Extension of operations into Laos. The successful execution of the SEATO mission in South Viet-Nam may require extension of air and/or ground operations into southern Laos for the purpose of denying the Viet Cong safe havens and lines of communication in that area.
(d)
Attack on SEATO forces by external forces. In the event of such attack, SEATO forces will take action for their security appropriate to the circumstances.
(e)
Overt aggression. In the event of overt aggression, transition to operations under the appropriate SEATO plan will be required.

3.
The plan recognizes the current situation and in that respect is more suitable to the problem than Plan 5 is in Laos. It ignores Cambodia except inferentially by reference to lines of communication in Laos (which could be used to reach Cambodia, then into SVN). The question of action against NVN, in any form, if external support of insurgency in SVN continues, is not faced, though the possibility of escalation is. It is psychologically sound to include the deployment of Plan 7 forces to Thailand in addition to the increased readiness gained thereby to meet broader intervention.
W.H.B.3
  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-133-69. Top Secret.↩
  2. SEATO Plan 7/61, “A Plan to Assist the Government of South Vietnam to Counter Communist Insurgency in South Vietnam,” December 20, 1961. (National Archives, RG 349, SEATO Registry Microfilm, Reel S-3-61)↩
  3. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩