Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

54. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington February 9, 1962, 11:30 a.m.¹

Pentagon, Washington, February 9, 1962, 11:30 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of item I, the situation in the Congo.]

II. Viet Nam

Mr. Johnson opened the discussion of this item by stating that he had asked Mr. Hilsman to make an oral presentation on his report to the President on Viet Nam.² Mr. Johnson said that he felt such a presentation would allow a personalized approach which would not be reflected in the written report.

Mr. Hilsman stated that he was distressed over any concern of the JCS which might have arisen as a result of his oral presentation to the President.³ He certainly had not intended any reflection on anyone and had not known of the matter until Mr. Johnson had brought it to his attention. General Lemnitzer accepted this explanation for the JCS and stated that the JCS were happy to have Mr. Hilsman present with them.

Mr. Hilsman said that he would like to stress and expand on a few key points contained in his report. First, we must get across to the liberal press the fact that it does not necessarily follow that the existence of guerrilla war in Viet Nam means that the government is unpopular and bad. The village people live an inward existence and are concerned largely with their own immediate problems. They have no regional or national feelings or loyalties, and while they are basically anti-communist, they are still very isolated. The people respect Diem, but they do not have any feeling of love or admiration for him.

Second, the importance of the existence and availability of Viet Cong infiltration routes has been overplayed. The establishment of a completely effective wall across the border would not unduly affect the Viet Cong activities. While the Viet Cong does use these routes to bring new regular Army cadre personnel into South Viet Nam, they do not rely unduly on them for anything else.

Third, the Viet Cong has ready access to the villages, and it does not employ any great degree of terror tactics against the villages. They buy their rice at premium prices from the villagers and do not take property or food by force. The Viet Cong does, however, obtain money and goods through actions against business people such as robbery, blackmail, and ransom. Most of their arms are obtained or manufactured locally and do not come in over infiltration routes. There is a great deal of Viet Cong small arms manufacture taking place in South Viet Nam. The true Viet Cong logistic lines stem out from the villages where they obtain rice, arms, and recruits. The Viet Cong have access to, and are using, about 2,000 such villages.

Fourth, we must institute a program of civic action which will tie the villages to their districts and to the central government. These programs must be designed to assist the villages with their problems and by performance demonstrate to the villagers that they can expect help if they ask for it. The few hard-core Viet Cong supporters in the villages must be removed through aggressive police work. This will require the establishment of a system of ID cards, personnel checks, etc. The villages must be provided effective physical protection which in turn will permit the control of movements of supplies and personnel. The problem is a tactical one involving combat, and not strategic intelligence operations. We must get across to the villages the fact that we will provide them real and adequate protection against revenge if they provide us information and assistance.

Fifth, the regular army is static and relatively immobile as a result of its role of defending strong points. We must free it to act as a mobile force. We must institute a full reorganization of all friendly forces at the working level along the lines of basic guerrilla principles and counter-insurgency tactics. Aggressive patrolling must be instituted. When these patrols make contact with the enemy, they should call in the Jungle Jim units and the paratroopers. We should not rely on helicopters for attacking.

Sixth, Diem is in a difficult political situation. State has been pushing him too hard for reforms. Many of these reforms are not necessary and perhaps some are undesirable. More reforms should be pressed at the lower levels.

Seventh, we need many more U.S. company grade officers and NCOʼs to assist on the spot. We also need effective police type training and assistance. The strategic village is not the key because it really is only a fort of sorts. The key element is the zone. We must establish zones and control them by civil guards with the Army ready to step in to assist. We have to put the Viet Cong in a meat grinder. By cutting off access to the villages, they will have to attack, and we should be in a position to react with superior force.

Eighth, the purely military effort is going well, but we must complement it by equally effective civic action programs. Self-defense units must be established, and they do not require more than minimum training. This must be a rapid program, and it should be conducted simultaneously with a leadership program for selected people from the villages.

General Lemnitzer noted that we had already faced the problem of a lack of native recruits for present programs. Mr. Hilsman said that we need about 1,000 company grade officers and NCOʼs (Special Forces type people) to train personnel and set examples. We must show the way at the bottom and ease the pressure on the top echelons. Mr. Hilsman said that there are no effective gimmicks to substitute for people. He noted that the results of the defoliation program have been marginal. The real solution is men who will go out into the jungle, live there, and close with the enemy. General Lemnitzer said that the U. S. military in Viet Nam had the same objective.

Admiral Anderson asked Mr. Hilsman how much time he had spent in Viet Nam in preparing his report. Mr. Hilsman replied that he was in Saigon for five days.⁴ General Lemnitzer asked how many police officer personnel would be required for training the Viet Namese. Mr. Hilsman estimated that about 200 would be required and noted that the British and the Malayans would be prepared to provide part of this number of people. General Lemnitzer remarked that we now have about 3,000 U.S. personnel in Viet Nam and that the present program called for a total of about 6,000. He then noted that General Taylor had recommended the institution of provincial civic action studies in Viet Nam.⁵ However, the survey teams included only military and intelligence people. Mr. Johnson pointed out that Diem had vetoed the inclusion of political and economic people in these study groups. General Lemnitzer said satisfactory progress in civic action required the development of a comprehensive plan of action by the Viet Namese. Mr. Hilsman indicated that such a plan had been prepared by the British and was under study by Diemʼs people. General Lemnitzer said that our USOM people had not been forceful in their actions. Mr. Hilsman agreed that AID should do more and that its Public Safety Division should be improved. He said that AID is the weakest element in the civic action program. Mr. Johnson asked just what we should expect from AID. Mr. Hilsman said that we should not expect too much from AID and that we may have to move the MAAG into the field of police type action and training.

Admiral Anderson asked if he was correct in assuming that Mr. Hilsman did not feel that the U.S. military in Viet Nam had been sufficiently effective, helpful, imaginative, and resourceful. Mr. Hilsman said that our decision to support rather than just advise the Viet Namese was a very recent one and that until that time our people in Viet Nam were merely advisors, as we all were. He said that probably no government ever had so much advice. Accordingly, we cannot blame our people on the spot for any lack of positive action since they were instructed to act as advisors. Admiral Anderson then asked if Ambassador Nolting and General McGarr agreed with Mr. Hilsmanʼs views on the required actions in Viet Nam. Mr. Hilsman replied in the affirmative. General Lemnitzer remarked that we must now build up our resources in Viet Nam. Mr. Hilsman said that while Ambassador Nolting and General McGarr agreed with his general approach, he could not state positively that they agreed with all of the details of his report. General Decker asked if Mr. Hilsman had discussed his report with General McGarr. Mr. Hilsman said that he had not because he did not begin to write it until after he had left Saigon. He had not sent a copy of the report to General McGarr because Mr. Gilpatric had asked him not to make any distribution of the report outside certain Washington Agencies for the time being.

General Lemnitzer noted that the JCS have a strong directive from the Secretary of Defense regarding provision of full support to our effort in Viet Nam. He asked if other Agencies of the U.S. Government have similar directives. Mr. Hilsman said that AID does not.

[Here follows discussion of Items III and IV, the Punta del Este Conference and the Inter-American Defense Board.]

1. Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 65 D 172, February 1962. Top Secret. A notation on the cover sheet indicates that it was a Department of State draft that was not cleared with the Department of Defense. U. Alexis Johnson headed the Department of State delegation. The meeting was held at the Pentagon.
2. See Document 42.
3. According to the Presidentʼs log, Hilsman and Taylor met with the President from 7 until 8 p.m. on January 29.
4. Hilsman traveled to Vietnam on January 15, following the Honolulu Secretary of Defenseʼs Conference. He witnessed the Binh Hoa operation on January 21 and then returned to the United States.
5. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. I, Document 210.