49. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Taylor)1
SUBJECT
- Binh Hoa Operation of 21 January 1962
The following information is provided in reference to the Binh Hoa operation of 21 January and in response to your memorandum of 30 January 1962.2 It is based on the best information that the JCS was able to provide.
Brief Outline of the Operation Plan. The purpose of the two phase plan was to destroy the Viet Cong, their bases and installations in an area as shown on the inclosed map.3
Phase I called for airstrikes on D-day, 21 January 1962, followed by a parachute assault by the 5th Airborne Battalion to seize objectives in the drop zone. During Phase 1, the 1st and 3rd Battalions (8th Regiment) and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions (11th Regiment) were to cross the Vaico River from east to west to attack and occupy IA and other objectives in the operations area.
During Phase II, the 5th Airborne Battalion was to move from its previous objective in the drop zone to Cu Chi via Saigon for deception purposes and to establish blocking and ambush positions. In the meantime, the 1st and 3rd Battalions were to move from their original objective and seize new objective IIA, while the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were to seize new objective IIB.
[Page 100]In effect, the Viet Cong would then be caught between the 5th Airborne Battalion in the vicinity of Cu Chi, and four Battalions of the 8th and 11th Regiments closing in from the west on objectives IIA and IIB.
Aerial observation by L-19 and fighter aircraft was to be continuous. The 57th (US) Transport Company was to provide an aerial Command Post, medical evacuation, parachute recovery and on call reserve lift.
Composition of Friendly Forces. Ground Forces consisted of elements of the 8th Regiment, 5th Division; and the 11th Regiment, 7th Division. River forces consisted of eight special purpose craft. Air forces consisted of 11 Farm Gate aircraft, 10 aircraft of the VNAF and one U.S. light helicopter company.
Composition of Enemy Forces. Enemy forces consisted of various enemy units with an approximate total strength of 750 men.
After Action Report. The airstrikes were executed as planned on D-day (210 755H). During Phase I, the 5th Airborne Battalion jumped from VNAF C-47ʼs and secured its objective. Four soldiers were killed and many documents captured. Patrolling continued throughout the day. Phase I Battalions of the 8th and 11th Regiments crossed the Vaico River as planned, attacked and seized their objectives. All units continued search operations through D+2. Phase II units continued the attack on 22 January and elements of the 8th and 11th Regiments seized their new objectives. During Phase II the 5th Airborne Battalion was re-deployed and used as blocking and ambush forces in the vicinity of Cu Chi. Operations concluded on D+4. No supply or maintenance problems were encountered. Evacuation of casualties was timely. Lack of external antenna for ground radios created some communications problems.
Planning was detailed and US advisors participated throughout. Intelligence during the planning phase was detailed, accurate and up to date.
Study of CHMAAGʼs report of the entire operation indicates that the plan did not make adequate use of the element of surprise. Troop movements prior to the attack alarmed the VC and the heavy air activity caused a VC alert and evacuation. Had troop movements been carried out gradually over the period of a few days prior to the attack and with some deceptive moves included, VC suspicions may not have been aroused. Aerial reconnaissance and the airstrikes appear too prolonged and without an attempt at deceptive strikes in areas outside the actual objective zones.
Results. While the execution of the ground operation was considered excellent, and the airstrike and airborne operation was carried out as planned, the results were disappointing. The VC in the area had [Page 101] evacuated prior to the attacks and the number killed and/or captured was negligible. Enemy casualties consisted of five killed, 15 captured, and 64 suspects held for interrogation.
Attack on Cambodian Village. On 21 January 1962, an airstrike in nearby Cambodian territory due to faulty target identification was reported. The intended target area is shown on the attacked map, as well as the small village of Bathu on which the attack was actually made.
Foreign correspondents, ICC representatives, the U.S. Army Attaché, Cambodia and SVN officials were flown to the scene on 22 January 1962. Ground reconnaissance showed undeniable evidence that Bathu had been attacked and essentially confirmed the Cambodian account. The U.S. Embassy, Saigon, reported on 24 January 1962 that it appeared that an error in navigation had occurred and that Bathu had been hit by Farm Gate aircraft participating in a GVN action against a suspected VC concentration west of Binh Hoa.
On 25 January 1962 the GVN apologized to the Cambodian Government for the incident and agreed to make indemnification. Though the U.S. had offered to reimburse the GVN for damage payments, Secretary Thuan on 25 January 1962 dismissed the matter of funds as being of minor importance.
On 26 January 1962, the Cambodian newspaper Depeche carried a front page editorial focused on the Vietnamese “gesture of good will” in offering regrets and expressed the hope that this gesture augurs a new era in Cambodian-Vietnamese relations.
- Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-142-69. Top Secret. Transmitted under cover of a February 6 memorandum from Gilpatric to Taylor stating that the Department of Defense was submitting a draft of the events at Binh Hoa that differed from that submitted by Roger Hilsman in Document 42. On the transmittal memorandum was the penciled notation in Taylorʼs hand: “Report to HA 8 Feb ’62.” Another copy of the memorandum in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489, Sensitive 7-61, includes a covering memorandum from Lansdale to Gilpatric recommending that Gilpatric forward the paper to Taylor.↩
- On January 30, General Taylor sent a memorandum to Secretary McNamara stating that the President had expressed an interest in the Binh Hoa operation. (Ibid.)↩
- Not printed.↩