Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

331. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, December 19, 1962—6 p.m.

604. Deptel 603.² All things are relative, and an “explosion” of the Vietnamese Armed Forces is not likely to take on the characteristics of a similar phenomenon occurring in the US military establishment. The word may be unfortunate but the objective, I think, is sound and essential: it is to get a relatively prompt return on the very substantial military investment that has been made here.³

General Harkins and the rest of us have fostered and watched the really formidable build-up of Vietnamese military and paramilitary capabilities over the last year, and we are very conscious of the fact that these increased capabilities have not yet been fully used.

There is no change in our (or GVNʼs) basic concept of operations. This basic concept remains that of extending the govtʼs authority and the services of govt throughout the country. The primary means of doing this continues to be the Strategic Hamlet Program in all its aspects. But the success of this program and the speed with which it proceeds depend absolutely on the parallel and coordinated military effort to destroy VC regular forces or, at a minimum, to keep them off balance. The explosion operation—for which we shall find another name and which is not to be advertised as a once-and-for-all nationwide offensive—is, we believe, a sound means of using to the fullest one of our major resources in the overall counterinsurgency operation.

There is no detailed plan of operations as yet. Such a plan will only be developed as VC strongholds and units throughout the country are identified and marked by intelligence and operahona1 reconnaissance. After this has been done, there will be an effort to strike these strongholds and units simultaneously insofar as possible. There is no thought that this will be a one-time operation: what is involved is moving to a higher intensity of operations which it is recognized may have to be continued indefinitely. The emphasis will not be on large operations but rather on simultaneous or consecutive attacks on identified VC units with the forces required for each. There is no possibility, we recognize, of achieving strategic surprise. There is no thought of diverting resources from clear-and-hold operations or the Strategic Hamlet Program. On the contrary, a fuller employment of available forces should bring more rapid progress in overall pacification.

In short, I believe this concept is sound and psychologically necessary at this juncture. The concerns registered in reftel we have very much in mind and will try to guard against them. This is not meant to be a dramatic operation but it appears timely and necessary in the near future to spur on a sustained, vigorous offensive. The forces and organization on our side are ready for this, or nearly so, and the VC are hurting. I feel strongly that we should not hold back from trying to exploit these factors to the utmost.

In conversation with Diem today touching on this question, I gathered that he is also thinking in the terms indicated above, and that, having achieved something in the nature of a national mobilization, he too is eager to pursue the present advantage.

To be clear, I should like to repeat that we should be very careful not to bill this concept or operation as the final climax of the struggle here.

General Harkins concurs with the above.⁴

Nolting

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/12-1962. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad.
2. Telegram 603, December 14, asked for a description and status of the Explosion Plan. (Ibid., 751K.5/12-1462)
3. Next to the first paragraph in the source text Heavner had written: “Shall we call it ‘poof’.”
4. On the source text between the last line of text and the signature Heavner had written: “Oh alright already.”