Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

323. Memorandum of Conversation, Gia Long Palace, Saigon, December 1, 1962, 11:30 a.m.¹

Saigon, December 1, 1962, 11:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Senators Mansfield, Pell, Smith, Boggs, Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu, Mr. Meloy the Ambassador, Mr. Truong Buu Khanh (interpreter)

The party arrived at Gia Long Palace at 11:30 a.m. Senator Mansfield expressed the groupʼs pleasure at being able to visit Mr. Nhu. He noted that the Ambassador and President Diem had already briefed the Senators on the Strategic Hamlet program, and that the party had just visited National Assembly President Truong Vinh Le and Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho.² Senator Mansfield asked when the Strategic Hamlet program was likely to be completed. Mr. Nhu said that three years from now was the target date for complete implementation of the Strategic Hamlet program. Two thirds of the population will be living in Strategic Hamlets by January 1, 1963. The political, social, economic, and military revolution involved in the program would not be complete for three years, however. Ambassador Nolting noted that, while speed was important in implementing the program, thoroughness was also essential.

Senator Pell asked Mr. Nhu to explain the over-all Strategic Hamlet concept and its long-range goals. Mr. Nhu said the concept was intended to be a positive contribution to international strategy in the anti-Communist struggle. Subversion is the principal Communist strategy on the international level, and Viet Namʼs contribution is to develop a means of countering subversion. As long as the Communists are able to engage in subversive war, the free world cannot negotiate with them, because the Communists will not negotiate in good faith. The war here may be won militarily, but so long as the Communist Bloc retains the capability of waging subversive war, any free world victories will not be definite. By destroying the Communistʼs subversive capability, we will be placing them in the strategic deadlock in which we presently find ourselves.

Senator Mansfield noted that we were thus trying to turn the tables on the Communists.

Mr. Nhu stated that neither the Communists nor the free world wants a conventional war at this time. The Communists thus have an element of superiority in being able to wage subversive war, and it is not in their interest to negotiate. They will negotiate sincerely only when they are convinced they will not win by subversion. This is the perspective in which the strategic hamlet program should be seen.

Mr. Nhu noted that underdevelopment in Viet Nam has three aspects: 1) a feeling of humiliation, 2) a disunity of minds, resulting in contradictory forces, and 3) Communist subversion. To combat the problem of underdevelopment there are two great historical forces, one tending toward centralization, the other toward fragmentation.

The history of underdeveloped countries in the last fifteen years shows that the tendency toward concentration and centralization has predominated. All governments in underdeveloped countries that have tried democracy have been overthrown and replaced by military regimes. The backward nations have used only one of the great historical forces presently at work, concentration. Mr. Nhu said he had developed the idea that Viet Nam could make use of both of these forces, authoritarianism and democracy, to combat underdevelopment. He compared these forces to positive and negative electrical currents, which produce thunder, fire, and death, when not harmonized. If we can harness these forces, however, we can provoke not destruction but power.

The device for accomplishing this is the strategic hamlet. It attempts to exploit the war in Viet Nam for progress and democracy. This is contrary to history, but Viet Nam is trying to prove history wrong. Thanks to the war, the peasants recognize the usefulness of the strategic hamlet in providing them security. Security, however, is but one consequence of the social and political revolution contained in the strategic hamlet philosophy.

If there is no such revolution in Laos, Thailand or Cambodia, these nations will not be able to fight Communism or to make progress. The international proletariat of underdeveloped countries, and Communist subversion, have upset the classical norms of economic development. A more dialectical concept is needed. Most Afro-Asian countries choose neutrality in order not to be subject to pressures from East or West. Because of their distance from the West, they enjoy the indulgence of the Communists, but they still cannot achieve economic progress. Cambodia and Laos, for example, should wage an economic social, and political revolution.

Senator Pell asked whether land reform was necessary in Cambodia.

Mr. Nhu said that it was necessary, for each man should have his own property. Viet Nam has supported land reform with land development and agricultural credit programs. 87% of the population in Viet Nam is rural; this is the usual ratio for underdeveloped countries. However, this segment of the population enjoys only l/a of the national production, and this gives rise to a feeling of injustice. With the Strategic Hamlets, we hope to be able to reverse this ratio.

The West pays too much attention to winning the sympathy of the population, and not enough to organizing it. If the population is not organized, the Communists will be able to mobilize it against the government overnight. In Cambodia, for instance, the Communists could foment a rebellion at will, because the population is not organized. This would not be done only by political propaganda. In 1954, after the Geneva Agreements, the Communists regrouped 135,000 people to North Vietnam, and 10,000 of these were Cambodians. With this 10,000, they can blackmail 10,000 families, and can infiltrate agents into Cambodia whenever they wish. This is how the problem started in Vietnam.

It is impossible to combat Communist subversion with the personal popularity of the leadership. President Diem, for instance, was elected by the whole people, but the government is still subject to a subversive war.

Senator Mansfield noted that the President had explained this concept in theory to the group yesterday. The Senator stated that the relationship between our countries is excellent, but that occasionally people in the United States read about difficulties with the Western, and especially the United States, press. He said he was raising this question not only from a personal point of view but also from a Congressional standpoint. Some things that happen here create an unfavorable reaction in the United States. The Senator asked whether something could not be done about this problem, bearing in mind security and mutual respect, because it is a serious problem, and really the only one between the two countries. He said that he was asking this in the friendliest spirit.

Mr. Nhu said he was glad that Senator Mansfield had raised this question, as he was concerned with the problem as a part of global strategy. The free world is not adapted to subversive war in all fields. The Western press, especially the American press, is not adapted to subversive war, and lags in the world evolutionary process. For example, American newspaper correspondents in Vietnam are very young and inexperienced

Mr. Nhu stated that he had seen Mr. Crawford, a Newsweek editor, recently and had talked to him in the same vein. Mr. Crawford had asked him why the things he was saying were not known in the United States. Senator Mansfield asked if these things were new to Mr. Crawford. Mr. Nhu said that Mr. Crawford had told him that he had talked to the American Embassy before he called, but that Mr. Nhuʼs remarks went far beyond anything he had heard. Mr. Nhu said he had told Mr. Crawford that he understood it was difficult for the United States press to send high level correspondents to Viet Nam. However, newsmen must meet minimum standards of intellect and of emotion in order to grasp the problems in Vietnam.

In the case of Vietnam, in addition to Communist infiltration, there exists infiltration from other countries who have interests contrary to those of Vietnam. Vietnam is a former colony, and a certain class of people were left behind after independence who remained attached to colonialism. This class has lost its privileges as the go between for the colonialists and the Vietnamese people. As former landowners, they are the victims of agrarian reform, and therefore discontent. Because they know how to speak foreign languages, they find it possible to communicate with foreigners.

The Ambassador explained that Mr. Nhu was referring to the tendency of foreign correspondents to get their views from French and English speaking Vietnamese, who sometimes provide a distorted view.

Mr. Nhu noted that “our French friends” believe they have been replaced by the Americans, and are dissatisfied.

Before the Strategic Hamlet program, Mr. Nhu stated, there was great discontent in the Vietnamese countryside. Under the pressure of Communist subversion, the army was not capable of protecting the population. Military operations fell into a vacuum because the Army was not helped by the population. The people were dissatisfied with the army, troops were dissatisfied with their officers, and far from protecting the people, the army created popular discontent.

Senator Boggs asked Mr. Nhu to describe the reaction in North Vietnam to the economic and social progress being made in the Republic of Vietnam.

Mr. Nhu said that the North Vietnamese reaction was to seek a method of countering this progress, but that up to now they had not found an adequate one. He said that his objective was not to break the natural process of Communism, but rather to exploit it. The enemy is thus placed in an impasse. The Strategic Hamlets are a point of attraction for VC troops. Traditional in Asia, leaders have been afraid of remote regions, because distance can foster dissidence. The Strategic Hamlets will attract Communist troops and they will abandon their leaders. Mr. Nhu compared this tendency to the tendency of the Chinese who migrated to California to implant themselves there and forget their origins.

Mr. Nhu noted that the Laotian settlement failed to exploit this tendency, because Laotian neutrality, which is really pro-Communist neutrality, is destroying the hope of eventually liberating North Vietnam.

Senator Mansfield pointed out that there was a difference in the Laotian and Vietnamese problems because the Laotians would not fight. Mr. Nhu stated that this was because they do not know how to fight a subversive war. Senator Mansfield observed that the United States had spent 400 million dollars in Laos to help them fight. Mr. Nhu said that they had not been organized and thus did not know how to fight. Senator Mansfield said that the pro-Western Laotians had only shot their guns into the air, and that the Pathet Lao must have been stiffened by North Vietnamese, and even Chinese, soldiers. Mr. Nhu asked why we had not sent our own cadres to stiffen Gen. Phoumiʼs troops. Senator Mansfield asked if this had ever been suggested. Mr. Nhu said he had suggested it to Governor Harriman and to the French. He went on to say that if, in foreign policy, we say we accept the facts, that means we refuse to break the balance of forces. But we must break the balance of forces if it is not in our favor. One year ago, the balance was against us, but Mr. Nhu would not accept the facts and refused to believe the Laotians would not fight. In Vietnam too, before, to [the?] Strategic Hamlets, the people did not want to fight. As he said earlier, the population was against the soldiers, the soldiers were against the generals, the generals were against the government, and the government was dissatisfied with United States effectiveness. This general dissatisfaction prompted Mr. Nhu to develop the Strategic Hamlet program.

Senator Mansfield noted that Mr. Nhu had said he was dissatisfied with United States aid. The Senator noted that we had sent our best generals to Vietnam, and asked what had been wrong.

Mr. Nhu said that what he had meant was that when the situation was bad, everyone blames his neighbor. He said he had refused to accept these dissatisfactions, and had thought something else was wrong. What had been needed was a master plan corresponding to the requirements of an underdeveloped country in the Twentieth Century. Senator Mansfield asked if he had found it in the Strategic Hamlet plan. Mr. Nhu said that the Strategic Hamlet plan was only one element. He said that it must be considered in the context a) of Vietnamese history, b) of the historic movement of underdeveloped countries, c) of General Taylorʼs visit, and d) of men in the modern world. It was part of a new kind of humanism. The freedom which one acquires oneself is more precious than the freedom that is given by Santa Claus.

There has been a tremendous enthusiasm arising in the countryside during the last month. Mr. Nhu said he did not reproach the United States press for ignoring this popular movement, but he did notice that the press was not up to date.

Senator Mansfield asked if this was just the American press.

Mr. Nhu said that the American press is the most powerful. He said that his ambition was to bring a positive contribution to the United States, which is the leader of the free world. United States strategy leans on regional organizations, but is weak in underdeveloped areas. These areas have been a dead weight so far for the United States and have made no contribution. Mr. Nhu said that if we succeed in our experiment here, it will be very valuable for all other countries.

The Ambassador said, with respect to the press, that there was always a time lag in reporting. He said he tries every day to explain to the press how things are moving in Vietnam. One mark of the journalist, however, is skepticism toward government releases. The journalist wants to go out and see for himself. If he sees that the government is applying pressure on the people, he compares this with the governmentʼs own statements. The Ambassador asked again that there not be a severe reaction to unfavorable stories, as this only increases the skepticism of the press and makes our mutual task more difficult.

Mr. Nhu said that we must not concentrate so much on this question because the American people have a good sense of fair play. Once they recognize their mistakes they change their attitude. For a powerful country such as the United States, opposition to the press is nothing. For a small, poor country at war, like Vietnam, there is great popular sensitivity. Mr. Nhu said that the Vietnamese are conducting an impassioned war, not subject to reason. There are only 14 million South Vietnamese fighting against international communism, represented by 650 million Chinese. Vietnam has been fighting 23 years for subjective reasons. Its passion must be respected as that is all it has left.

He said that he thought the attitude of the American press had changed, because the Americans have a high respect for those who are willing to fight. The Vietnamese are proud to fight, and want to be proud of their friends. He said that the United States reaction to the Cuba situation had made the Vietnamese proud.

Senator Mansfield said that we were very pleased to hear this.

Mr. Nhu continued that the Vietnamese had been humiliated, however, by the United States policy in Laos and Cambodia.

Senator Smith asked Mr. Nhu to describe the background of the Cambodian and Laotian problems, and to estimate how long they would last. Mr. Nhu said that when the United States found an adequate solution for subversive war, we would win. So long as we have no solution, we will be humiliated.

Relationships between Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia include United States involvement as a factor. What the Communists are seeking in Laos and Cambodia is to weaken Vietnam and to drive the Americans out. That is all. They accomplished this in Laos and Cambodia and are trying to do it in Vietnam. The Ambassador said that they had not done it yet in Cambodia. Mr. Nhu said that Cambodia had asked that the MAAG withdraw. The Ambassador noted that this had not yet been done, and that the problem was very delicate.

Mr. Nhu said that both Souvanna and Sihanouk realize that their value lies in their distance from the U.S. If they were committed to the U.S., they would lose their value. By leaning toward the Chinese Communists, they retain their position with the U.S., but if they aligned themselves with the U.S. they would be despised. They have a means of pressure on the U.S., but the U.S. has no means of pressure on them.

The Ambassador asked whether Mr. Nhu thought Prince Sihanouk would like to see North Vietnam take over South Vietnam. Mr. Nhu said that Sihanouk hates North Vietnam. There are two elements in his policy: 1) the conviction that communism is the wave of the future, and 2) the desire to retain his bargaining position with the U.S. He takes advantage of the fact that America has no means of pressure on him. If we develop a theory of subversive war, and can wage it ourselves, we will have a means of pressure on him.

Mr. Nhu continued that in the meantime, America should not drop its existing friends for potential friends. Sihanouk and Souvanna are not friends of America. America has a firm friend here in South Vietnam, and must not sacrifice it for the sake of those who will never be Americaʼs friends. If the Communist Chinese come to Southeast Asia, Vietnam will fight them. The Vietnamese would like to fight the Chinese, and there are elements in North Vietnam that would support such a war.

At this point the meeting broke up. The Ambassador asked Mr. Nhu, after the meeting, for clarification on one point. Had Mr. Crawford of Newsweek magazine said that he had not understood our explanation of the situation in Vietnam? Mr. Nhu said that Mr. Crawford had understood it, but that he, Mr. Nhu, had clarified his understanding of the problem.

On leaving, Senator Mansfield thanked Mr. Nhu for being so frank and direct. Mr. Nhu said that his frankness was an expression of Vietnamese friendship for the United States, and added that America is Vietnamʼs only friend in the world.

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 22.1. Mansfield Visit to Saigon. Confidential. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text, which is apparently a draft as it contains numerous handwritten corrections. The meeting was held at Gia Long Palace. On October 18 Kennedy had written Mansfield asking him to lead a bipartisan group of Senators to visit Berlin, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia to review the situation and U.S. policies in these areas. (University of Montana Library, Mansfield Papers, Series XXII, Box 95, Folder 13) The Senators left Washington on November 7 and returned December 17.
2. Memoranda of these conversations are ibid., Folder 8.