Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

274. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, September 5, 1962—11:33 a.m.

913. Reference: Embtel to Dept. 401, Saigon 2, Ottawa 2, London 63, Vientiane 5.² Under instructions from GOI Ambassador Nehru called on Harriman August 30 discuss Viet Nam. In addition, wide range other subjects covered in relaxed, cordial but exceptionally candid exchange:

Viet Nam: Referring to Galbraith-Gundevia conversation (reftel) Amb raised question Viet Nam and said GOI uneasy about continuation and intensification US activities in SVN. GOI hoped after Laos conference³ there would be slowdown but there such obvious breaches of agreement by GVN, e.g., introduction US helicopters, that ICC will be forced issue citation and GOI cannot prevent it. Said M.J. Desaiʼs view is “Indian cannot apply different standards to each ICC”; the Laos agreement must be enforced and this means the same ICC treatment for SVN. Ambassador continued that with escalation conflict SVNGOI worried that ChiComs will intervene. He asked if ChiComs assisting Viet Cong.

Harriman replied we have no indications yet that ChiComs moving into Viet Nam since they preoccupied with own internal problems and Indian border dispute. We know ChiComs are building road near Phong Saly (Laos) and have combat troops this area, but there no way by which they can move easily into SVN. Said it was DRV rather than ChiComs who assisting Viet Cong in SVN. In Laos Soviet had supplied most equipment and transport, DRV the troops.

Harriman said our position SVN as stated by President has not changed. We providing mil aid at Diemʼs request for self defense; if DRV aggression stops our additional mil aid would no longer be needed. Harriman had made three efforts with Pushkin in Geneva and also with DRV Foreign Minister to talk about DRV “calling off dogs” and had got nowhere.⁴ Both had maintained that Viet Cong entirely local operation and Pushkin had contended that US backing unpopular tyrant. They seem believe Viet Cong can win in SVN with support of North by disrupting country. They would take over country but for our assistance. This much easier for ICC to see than is covert assistance given other side. Yet new Viet Cong offensive may come after end of wet season. ICC should look under the rug and not report only what is visible.

In answer questions from Amb if we satisfied with political/military progress SVN and how future looks, Harriman said we would like broader based government which would gain more support among intellectuals in Saigon; however we believe people in villages responding favorably to provision arms by GVN and ready to fight in defense. We believe villagers primary concern is security against Viet Cong. As to future we see guerrilla war might extend for years unless North decides it has had enough. Our objective is to help SVN get Viet Cong out of their country. In view very unhappy situation there we would welcome any constructive ideas which Indians can offer as friends.

Amb replied he wished India could help; GOI had made approaches both sides without success. His reason for coming in see Harriman was to warn us there may be ICC reports which very displeasing to US. Harriman answered we have left it to our Embassy in Saigon to discuss this problem with ICC. Situation is different in Laos since under terms 1962 agreement⁵ICC reports to co-chairman who have responsibility to see that agreement is carried out. Harriman said he did not wish to interfere with Saigon talks nor transfer them to Washington.

Laos: Harriman noted that ICC not really enforcing agreement re withdrawal of troops in Laos although we very gratified at efforts Indian Chairman to make Commission effective. Problem is refusal of Pathet Lao permit ICC move about and inadequate number of ICC checkpoints. Souvanna helpful but Souphanouvong refuses admit Viet Minh presence in Laos though they have been observed by many reports. It ridiculous have only three check points; at least three required each zone. Our people are moving out of Laos on schedule in accordance with agreement that departure be checked by ICC; VM not doing same however. Harriman said we hope ICC will be vigorous and active in enforcing Laos agreement. Amb replied it will be.

Cambodia: Harriman said our Amb now exploring with Sihanouk means assuring integrity, neutrality Cambodia and we now in process drafting Presidential reply Sihanouk letter.⁶ Said we hoped Sihanouk would accept as substitute for conference of Geneva powers series letters in which each power would give bilateral assurances. Said US taking Sihanouk letter seriously since he man with many good qualities and laudable objectives despite his emotional approach to certain issues. Amb did not comment on Sihanouk letter except to say GOI also working on reply.

ChiComs: Harriman mentioned having met Chen Yi socially in Geneva although nothing of substance discussed between them. Found Chen trying hard project himself as pleasant and reasonable but found no evidence ChiComs prepared yield any material points. Amb said Chen not quite so affable with Indians in Geneva. Said news of Krishna Menon and Chen dining together, and picture of Menon clinking glasses with Chen and Gromyko had caused strong public reaction in India. Noted Indian public very much worked up over border issue.

Meeting concluded with agreement that Harriman and Amb should consult whenever problems of common interest arise.⁷

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/8-362. Secret. Drafted by Barnard and cleared with SOA.
2. Telegram 401, August 3, reported that Commonwealth Secretary Gundevia had asked the United States to go slow in its visible introduction of material into Vietnam lest it prejudice the utility of the ICC both there and in Laos. Galbraith suggested that Indian Ambassador Nehru call on Harriman for a full explanation of U.S. policy. (Ibid.)
3. The International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, which met intermittently May 15, 1961-July 23, 1962.
4. Regarding Harrimanʼs conversation with Foreign Minister Mau see Document 246. Regarding Harrimanʼs conversation with Pushkin on September 13, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. I, Document 133, footnote 2. The other two efforts have not been identified.
5. For text of the Declaration and Protocol on Neutral Laos, July 23, 1962, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1075-1083.
6. For text of Sihanoukʼs letter, August 20, and the Presidentʼs reply, August 31, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1002-1004.
7. The following sentence at the end of this telegram was deleted before transmission: “General tone entire meeting leads us hope Ambassadorʼs report will give accurate and sympathetic interpretation US position.”