Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

260. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, August 7, 1962—4 p.m.

126. In course conversation with Richardson and me yesterday, Thuan reported following items:

1. A meeting at Ministerial level was held August 4 on Montagnard problem, attended by all concerned GVN ministries and agencies. Definite decision taken to encourage by all means possible exodus Montagnard population from areas controlled by VC to areas control by GVN. Montagnards would be encouraged to come to nearest suitable government-controlled areas, generally within their own provinces thus minimizing distances of evacuation. They would be resettled to provide (a) maximum security, and (b) maximum economic advantages. Where these principles conflicted, security comes first. Already substantial migration, plus expected increase resulting from news government relief and rehabilitation activities, impose necessity cutting back on certain agreed uses of counterpart fund in order to provide for Montagnards. It had been agreed by GVN to seek US concurrence; also to seek such direct aid as US might be able to provide. I said we would be quite willing to discuss financing, since we heartily endorse principle of encouraging Montagnard exodus from areas where they could not defend themselves, against being used by VC. In this connection, Thuan said that migration of Montagnards had already left many growing crops available for VC harvesting and use, and current plan to encourage movement would augment this. He urged again a favorable answer re selective use chemicals for spraying crops, emphasizing that month of August is harvest time for many crops in certain areas. I told him that this matter was still under consideration in Washington and that I would do my best to get policy decision promptly.

2. Referring to recent GVN military successes, especially by 7th division, Thuan said that available information from POWʼs, documents, etc. strongly reinforced his conviction that VC concentrating, both by regrouping within country and by infiltration for major large-scale offensive in central Viet-Nam (precise area uncertain) in order establish bridgehead for puppet liberation government. I expressed view that such an attempt might well play into our hands, since our side should command great superiority in pitched-battle type warfare. Thuan did not seem particularly reassured by this observation.

Nolting

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/8-762. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Paris. and London.