Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

255. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defenseʼs Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)¹

Washington, August 1, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Prisoners in Vietnam

Here are some thoughts about prisoners in Vietnam and a recommendation for your consideration.

The Vietnamese program for prisoners is still mostly an “oriental mystery.” U.S. military and civil authorities in Vietnam have some knowledge of and influence on parts of the Vietnamese program, and some improvements have been made. However, the entire program is still quite short of the real potential a well-done prisoner program has for giving substantial support towards winning the war against the Communists.

In Vietnam, the war embraces the entire population. In Vietnam, also, the political prisoners range from captured Vietcong military on down to non-Communist politicos opposed to the regime, including some whose opposition is mainly forensic. In a total war, such as Vietnam, what happens to all of these political prisoners has a direct bearing on whether or not the people support the governmentʼs war effort. In effect, the people are the judge and the governmentʼs actions must reflect the true desires of the people, to be successful. If the actions donʼt reflect this, being either too timid or too harsh, the people will either lose respect for the government or sullenly resent it; in either case, they will be vulnerable to Communist exploitation.

A well-done prisoner program should follow a uniform code, in practice and not just lip-service. It should include providing ways and means for establishing true justice in the country, for collecting intelligence, for attracting the surrender of the Vietcong, for separating hard-core Communists from other prisoners, and for true rehabilitation of prisoners as deserved and earned.

The Vietnamese leaders have been sensitive about their prisoner program, probably due to spotty administration as much as anything. It is embarrassing to have an American note sloppy work by an administrator and then criticize it; this is particularly true if the American is inclined to righteousness over maladministration of justice. The problem of Vietnamese prisoners is further compounded by the jurisdictional overlapping between GVN Defense and Interior, the split of U.S. responsibilities between U.S. civil and military authorities, and the emotions aroused by the savagery of guerrilla warfare. Also, Vietnamese methods of prisoner rehabilitation, based on French “disintoxication” procedures, deserve a hard evaluation

U.S. experience with the handling of prisoners similar to the problem in Vietnam is limited. Most of the prisoner problems in Korea were quite different. In Greece, there was some pioneering experience with the rehabilitation of Communists in the Greek Army (which gave me some starting ideas for the later development of EDCOR in the Philippines). In Vietnam, my own early work was mostly on assisting the Vietnamese compile a single code of justice from three regional codes then in existence and in establishing uniform penal procedures; I relied heavily on “metis” in the French Army at first, and later passed the legal and police program aspects to Michigan State contract personnel with USOM in Vietnam; my last work on this was when President Diem asked my advice on quelling a prison riot, some time ago.

The Philippine experience in handling Huk prisoners offers a helpful starting point, although there are some basic differences in the Vietnamese problem which must be considered. The psychological aspects of the Philippine experience, which led to the surrender of large numbers of Communist guerrillas and which led to favorable rumors throughout Asia, and the sound social justice administered (even when the writ of habeas corpus was suspended temporarily), suggest that there are lessons to be learned and applied.

Recommendation

It is recommended:

a. That you continue giving a personal touch to U.S. actions in Vietnam by sponsoring a team to visit Vietnam, where it will assist the Country Team in constructing a full, realistic Vietnamese prisoner program, in the spirit of the Presidentʼs memo of 18 July about helping Country Teams in critical areas.²

b. That the team be interdepartmental, within the framework of existing Task Force, but known to have your personal backing; both the substantial help to military operations and the need to scotch ugly stories of torture m the presence of U.S. military dictate Defenseʼs paramount interest in the program.

c. That ISA assist you with Task Force staffing and that my office assist you in the selection and readying of the team; my staff and ISA know how to work well in tandem for you.

d. That the team be small, picked for its “feel” for political/psychological and intelligence needs as well as technical penal know-how, and composed of workers willing to work hard in cooperative staffing in Vietnam for the Country Team; my choice would be a personal representative for you and a technician from AID, with your representative being either Lt-Col Wilson of my staff or Col Kent of ISA; the team must be able to get willing cooperation from the Vietnamese—not just write another staff paper.

e. That the team visit the Philippines, en route to Vietnam, to obtain details of the prisoner program (including EDCOR) during the Huk campaign.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C)(A) Files: FRC 77-131, Republic of Vietnam, 1961-1962. Secret. Signed “Ed”. Also addressed to Gilpatric and copies were sent to Adam Yarmolinsky, Nitze, and Bundy. On the source text was written “8/4 To Gen. Lansdale, A good idea—try to work it out with Gen. Krulak. R McN”.
2. Not found.