Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

237. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defenseʼs Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)¹

Washington, July 7, 1962.

SUBJECT

• The “X-Factor,” Vietnam

Here is a way of getting a sharper picture of how we’re doing in Vietnam. The “way” uses the largest U.S. resources in Vietnam. Defense resources under your control.

Attached are a list of questions. Most of them concern the “x-factors” of the real war in Vietnam. Some are vital to true measurements, others are significant as collateral. They are in addition to basic needs on enemy order-of-battle, casualties, lost weapons, etc.

Inexpert use of these questions in Vietnam can be harmful to our cause. If they become widely known among Vietnamese, as being of real official concern to the U.S. military, the Vietnamese could take this as a U.S. loss of faith in the Vietnamese armed forces, government, or people; they could open a bad, political Pandoraʼs box among Vietnamese or in our relations with them.

Thus, it is recommended that the questions be used in the following way:

a. The use of the questions should be a staff function of MAC-V; General Harkins could have a small team (2 or 3 U.S. military) to handle this; they should be good listeners, good writers, who know Vietnam.

b. The questions should be asked only of Americans who have been out in the field, who have had first-hand experience, and who are judged to have gotten close to the Vietnamese; out of thousands of Americans, 50 or 100 might be selected; this should be repeated periodically.

c. The questions should be asked at a time and place where these “field Americans” can reflect upon them amply; if our best Americans in the field are given brief R&R leaves in Saigon, Dalat, Hongkong, Clark, or Baguio, it would be wise to add extra time and then question them there.

d. The questioners should do the work, not those questioned; verbal give and take can get better results than making field men write down what they know.

e. Since conditions vary from locality to locality, it is important to get a geographic fix on each locality reported upon; results could be translated on charts or maps, after analysis; every significant locality should be reported on.

In Vietnam, we are up against an enemy who uses Mao Tse-tungʼs tactics. The text-book rule of imposing our will on enemy forces needs further interpretation. The real contest is to win over the people on the land, which includes protecting them. My questions are to this point.

[Attachment]

VIETNAM QUESTIONS FOR U.S. MILITARY

Villagers

(Think of people you have seen, talked to in specific villages and hamlets, usually away from military camps.)

1. Where was the village? About how many houses and people? What type of houses? How do people earn a living? Were the market places (or shops) busy or vacant?

2. What was the villagers’ attitude towards the Vietnamese troops? Friendly, indifferent, sullen, afraid, hostile? Where were the children, outdoors or kept hidden indoors? Where were the young women?

3. What does it cost the villagers to give information to the troops? Are they taken in custody to be questioned for several days? If so, who takes care of their families in their absence? What happens to these villagers afterwards? Are they protected? Do the VC exact reprisal? Are there any rewards for giving information? What? Do the children give information?

4. Was there a village defense organization? How do you size it up? What was the attitude of the troops towards it? It towards the troops?

5. If troops stopped in the town, what happened? Were the troops quartered in homes? If so, were families removed? Remunerated? How? Was food obtained from the people? For the unit or individual military? Was there fair compensation? Was it given willingly or unwillingly? Were people happy to have the troops there, uneasy, or indifferent?

6. What measures did the Vietnamese troops take to get along with the villagers? Do you think these were effective? What do you think they should do? What was the attitude of officers and troops towards the villagers?

7. How many caches of VC arms, equipment, propaganda were found in the village? VC personnel? Did villagers help uncover? Why?

8. How was the village governed? A mayor? A council of elders? What say did the people have in who would govern them? How was this done?

9. If you saw a village several times, did you notice any changes in the attitude of the villagers? If so, what changed? What caused this?

10. How do the VC treat these same villagers? How effective is this?

Civilians

(Think of these as people in terms of Maoʼs “water” in which the military “fish” live.)

1. What happens to civilian casualties in military actions? Are they ignored by the troops? Left for village care? Given first aid by troops, then left in village? Taken to military hospital or civilian hospital? If military hospital, are they given equal treatment to military? If civilian hospital, who pays for their care?

2. What is attitude of Vietnamese troops towards civilians at check points on the highway? Are the troops alert, polite but firm? How do they check on bus passengers? On trucks? On farm carts? Are the civilians manhandled? Are there other abuses (collection of tolls, etc.)? If so, what remedies have been taken? Effective? How does attitude differ among units known to you?

3. What happens to civilians who come to a Vietnamese military unit with complaints, problems, or questions? Does the commander talk to them? A special officer on the staff? Are they turned away by the guards? If there are wrongs complained about, what redress is given? How? Do the local people hear about this? How?

4. When a Vietnamese troop unit is transferred to a new area, what indoctrination is given to the troops about local customs, tabus, etc.? How is this done? How effective is it?

5. What civilian organizations help the Vietnamese military the most? The least? In what way? How do you think this help could be best assisted to become more effective?

6. What happens on the highways (waterways) at night? Do the VC control? Do passenger vehicles run? If so, how do the VC treat the passengers?

7. What are the fundamental things which the people feel are worth defending? Their lives? Their property? Their village? Their way of living (as opposed to the Communist way)? Their form of government? What? Which of these are the Vietnamese troops helping the people to defend?

Civil Officials

(Include military acting as province chiefs or in other civilian capacities.)

1. When the military secure an area, how good is the follow-through by civilian officials? Who are they? Do they follow right up on the heels of the troops? Delay? Are they effective in dealing with the people? Do they have good team-work with the military? What improvements can you suggest?

2. In localities known to you personally, describe the activities of civilian officials. Do they get out among the people? Daily? Or remain in their offices/homes? Do they have bodyguards? Is this necessary? Why? What is the attitude of the people towards them? Are they invited into peoples’ homes? Only the biggest or poor farmers/shopkeepers as well?

3. In these localities, what were the last 3 visits by officials from Saigon? What did they come to do? Do you think they were successful? Why? Were their contacts on mandarin terms or on the peoples’ terms (talking down to the people, or with amicable equality)? Do you think they really found out about the local situation? What promises were made? What promises fulfilled?

Propaganda

(Think of this in terms of what troops and people talk about, as well as radio, leaflets, etc.)

1. What are the main VC propaganda themes? In wooing popular support? Against the Vietnamese government? Against Americans? How much of this do people believe? What is being done to prove this propaganda false?

2. How are the Vietnamese hitting back psychologically at the source of enemy strength? To stop popular support? To induce surrender? Do you believe this is effective? How would you improve it?

Prisoners

(Identify facts known to you first-hand, and stories you have heard from others.)

1. What happens to VC taken by a combat unit? Are they questioned promptly for combat intelligence? By whom? Are any of them liquidated on the spot? Without interrogation for combat intelligence? Why? What corrective measures are being taken? What happens to female prisoners?

2. What happens next, after capture and initial interrogation by the combat unit? Are they held in a compound by a military unit known to you? Turned over to another authority? Are they questioned further by military? How is this done? What use is made of the information?

3. What do you know about prisoner rehabilitation? First-hand? Hearsay? What methods are used? Do the prisoners learn a vocation? How do they earn their freedom? Do they denounce Communism publicly? Help the troops as scouts? Try to induce VC surrenders? Are freed rehabilitated prisoners turned loose on the community or sent to a separate community of their own? Do you think this system is effective? Why?

4. How do the VC treat prisoners? Vietnamese military? Vietnamese civilians? Foreigners?

Troop Morale

(Candid opinions are desired.)

1. What is the attitude of the troops on patrol? Aggressive? Need the eye of an officer on them? Have self-reliance if alone or with small group? Do they do night patrols? In storms? Do they really push into the jungle? Into swamps and grasslands? Into mountains?

2. Do the troops have any strong convictions about why they are fighting? What are they? Is there any troop I&E? Who does it? Do you think it is effective? Any ideas on how to improve it? What?

3. What are the feelings of troops about being in military service? Proud to be in uniform? Indifferent? Proud of unit? Indifferent? Homesick? Worn out? How much longer do they think the fighting will continue? What do they think will end the fighting?

4. Which weapons do the troops like best? Why? Which do they like least? Why? How effective are they with these weapons?

5. What are the major gripes of the troops? Which are justified and correctible? How? What do you know of Can Lao membership in units you have been with? About other political membership? How does this effect morale, promotions, preferential treatment, attitude towards top Vietnamese government officials?

6. What are the main superstitions of the troops? What are the main customs which are different from the military of other countries? How widely held are these? How do they help or impair the effectiveness of the troops?

7. How do you think the Vietnamese troops stack up in comparison to the VC? What are the main differences? Your ideas on why? Your ideas on how the Vietnamese troops think they stack up against the VC? Why?

8. What are the most important points you believe your replacement should know, for getting along with the Vietnamese?

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: Lot 66 A 3542 Vietnam 1962, 000.1-091. Also sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Signed “Ed”. On the source text McNamara wrote: “7/15 To Gen Lansdale. An excellent set of questions Ed—it is this kind of info I need & am not receiving—please discuss with Joe Carroll.” At the bottom of the source text Lansdale noted: “Discussed with Gen. Carroll. He said he would include this in further steps he is taking. He notes that some adding of intelligence & operations is needed.”