Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

215. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Bagley) to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Taylor)¹

Washington, June 13, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Southeast Asia Task Force

1. In talking with Mr. Cottrell yesterday afternoon, I gathered Alexis Johnson is moving ahead with plans to form a Southeast Asia Task Force. Cottrell indicated present thinking is to chair the Task Force with Mr. Koren, Director of Southeast Asian Affairs at State, maintaining the Viet-Nam Task Force as a separate entity. Cottrell and Koren will then effect necessary liaison and coordination between the two groups.

I sense State may be running with this ball too quickly and that there is a need to stop and look at the concept of Task Forces.

2. Based on past discussions within this office, on task force organization, the important issues can be isolated as follows:

a. The scope and definition of responsibilities of the task force director.

b. The Department from which the director is selected.

c. The character of the task force membership.

And, as a separate issue, related to the regional approach,

d. The organization in the field which can best respond to Washington task force direction.

3. The Task Force Director should be formally chartered and accorded specific responsibilities. He requires the tools to undertake an active role in implementing an agreed Program; if his authority is not spelled out, experience suggests the Task Force will become a passive forum. Since the Special Group (CI) has specific functions in Southeast Asia in accordance with NSAM 124,² and is to rely on performing such functions upon country or regional interdepartmental task forces, the relationship of the Task Force to the Special Group (CI) should be dearly delineated. As an example, I have attached a rough list of task force director responsibilities which seem to me to meet the several needs without intruding radically on sensitive departmental prerogatives.

4. NSAM 124 indicates a task force is normally to be chaired by a State Department Assistant Secretary. That level of rank is desirable if any degree of authority is to be plausible. In addition, Task Force operation would be smoother if the Director came from the Department of dominant interest. In the situation at hand, we are discussing South Viet-Nam with an active insurgency; Laos with a dormant, but advanced state of insurgency; Cambodia, whose internal security must depend in the immediate future on the Army rather than on the police; and Thailand, which has US armed forces present but whose immediate need is a build-up of non-military counter-insurgency assets. A good argument can be made that Defense should chair this task force but, at a minimum, the problem should be examined.

5. The character of the task force membership should be defined in the formal charter referred to in paragraph 3 above. The membership subordinate to the Director preferably should be at the regional level within each department or agency. Membership would then be held down numerically and, if the desk-level Viet-Nam Task Force continues separately, many of the same individuals will not attend two meetings. At the regional rank level, it will be easier to effect the broad coordination implicit in the establishment of a SEA Task Force.

6. There has been previous discussion as to the desirability of some sort of regional US administrator on-the-ground in Southeast Asia. You will recall Mr. Godelʼs recommendations of last fall on this point. Since the military currently has this arrangement, it is perhaps more desirable now that non-military functions be so organized. If we are to effect coordination in Washington through a regional Task Force, a parallel organization in the field would help to gain compatible approaches to priorities of effort, allocation and interchangeability of resources, coordination across country boundaries, and centralized capability to respond. It is largely a political problem, however, and in the past State has objected on the grounds that it is not diplomatically realistic among the diverse and contentious states of SEA.

7. While the State desire to keep the Viet-Nam Task Force separate from a SEA Task Force is understandable, for many of the reasons listed above this proposition should be reviewed before a new Task Force is formed. If separated, it means individual attendance to some extent at two Task Force meetings, the possible generation of requirements in South Viet-Nam not coordinated with those of the rest of Southeast Asia, and a split responsibility in Washington administration of programs in the region. In addition, since Cottrell does not have specific responsibilities and his operation is more passive than active, the Viet-Nam Task Force would not properly complement a Southeast Asia Task Force clearly chartered for active operation.

8. These observations are not intended to provide answers. They do, however, point up some of the considerations which we have been unable to attack directly in the past. Current formulation of a Southeast Asia Task Force affords an excellent opportunity to look at these matters now. I suggest that this sort of an examination would be appropriate within the responsibilities of the Special Group (CI) and you may desire to consider an approach on that basis.

WHB

[Attachment]

List of Task Force Directorʼs Responsibilities

The Task Force Director should be accorded specific responsibilities:

a. Supervise and coordinate all activities in Washington related to the implementation of the Program.

b. Authorized to call for information and progress reports from all participating departments and agencies and to invite attention to any deficiencies or slippages in performance.

c. Review adequacy of resources to deal with the situation at which the program is directed.

d. Report to his Departmental Secretary and to the Special Group (CI) on any matter he is unable to resolve that detracts from the effectiveness of the Program.

e. Make recommendations to the Special Group (CI) on changes in Program policy or detail which are considered necessary.

f. Make recommendations to the Special Group (CI) on changes in US organization or relationships in the field required for proper implementation of the Program.

1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-185-69. Confidential.
2. Document 26.