178. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President1
Briefing on Laos and Vietnam
At your briefing this morning on the above subject, State Department will be represented by Under Secretary Ball, Governor Harriman and Mr. Hilsman; Defense by Deputy Secretary Gilpatric and General Lansdale. Mr. McCone will also attend.
[Here follows briefing material on Laos.]
Vietnam
So far as I can discover, there is no significant change in the general situation in Vietnam. There is an immediate problem over the border incident with Cambodia,2 but the feeling of the State Department seems to be that the situation remains potentially hopeful.
There is some concern that Operation Sunrise may be running into difficulties which were anticipated, i.e. since it has been undertaken in one of the more difficult areas, the forced resettlement is causing some defections among the villagers to the Viet Cong. Other programs for strengthening village defenses and pacifying selected areas are, however, proceeding satisfactorily.
The dual questions of defoliation and crop destruction have come up again. Secretary McNamaraʼs research group has indicated that defoliation is technically feasible if greater quantities of defoliant are sprayed per acre. A roadside experiment of a 7-kilometre stretch is being conducted, not only to prove out technical effectiveness, but also to determine whether defoliation will deter roadside ambushes.3
[Page 370]On the question of crop destruction, your staff has indicated to the State and Defense Departments that they should not come up with a request for your approval to turn the chemicals over to the GVN until a thorough discussion of all of the factors can be assembled, including:
- (1)
- scientific assurance based upon extensive testing that the herbicides are completely effective:
- (2)
- a selection of targets based upon sound intelligence, which would justify the conclusion that crop destruction will produce sufficiently valuable military results to justify the political cost.
In connection with (2) above, the question has arisen whether the destruction of crops would not simply cause the Viet Cong to attack loyal villages in order to gain a food supply at the time when these villages were not yet fully capable of defending themselves. There is also the problem of whether adequate arrangements can be made to assist friendly Montagnards who live in the hill country with the Viet Cong and whose crops would be affected.
No decision on crop destruction is required from you at this time.4
- Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-030-969. Secret.↩
- Presumably a reference to an incident in which a band of armed Cambodians crossed the border into Vietnam and killed several civilians, reported in telegram 1336 from Saigon, April 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 651H.51K/4-2362)↩
- In the margin next to this and the preceding paragraph the word “no” was written twice. Also in the margin was the statement: “I didnʼt mention this to Reynolds.” Reynolds has not been identified.↩
-
A memorandum for the record by Forrestal, May 2, supplies the only record of the meeting. With regard to Vietnam, three decisions were made:
- “3. The President asked that an effort be made to screen visitors to South Vietnam in order to limit any unnecessary trips there, especially by high ranking officers.
- “4. The President directed that the recent authorization for an operational experiment with defoliation on 7 kilometers of road in Vietnam be rescinded. Such an experiment would better be conducted in Thailand.
- “5. The President agreed that we should await the report of the ICC in Vietnam before considering indirect approaches to Hanoi on the Vietnam conflict.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC Staff memoranda, Michael Forrestal)