Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

171. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Bagley) to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Taylor)¹

Washington, April 27, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Anspacher and South Viet-Nam

1. I discussed with Mr. Anspacher his detailed views on the situation in South Viet-Nam and the role the US should play at an advisory level to control future events.

2. Mr. Anspacher has prepared an informal paper,² predicated on the premise that the US is committed to success in SVN, which cites the primary need as a projection of GVN influence into the provinces and villages to motivate the people and develop a viable national entity. In developing his thesis, he understandably lays particular stress on the requirements for better public information, public relations, and general identification of the GVN with the populace. He carefully notes, however, the related economic, political, and security measures which must go hand in hand. This is of course a generally accepted idea; I attempted, first, to draw out the details which he foresaw for implementation and; second, to determine the role the US should assume to make the effort successful.

3. In the first instance, he has developed general conceptual support which involves “citizens committees,” Army civic action, GVN reforms, and discreet propaganda. He has not prepared a detailed plan and indicates that sort of approach, with specific objectives, is not yet being followed by our Embassy in Saigon. As I understand it, the Embassy is concentrating on “plugging holes in the dike” rather than trying to build an administrative framework to do a clearly defined job. In summary, Anspacher feels there is a need for such a plan of action on the US side which can then be translated into an acceptable form for discussion with the GVN. (Two recent examples of minimum response from Saigon involved a civic action plan and a proposal for rural medical teams. In the former, the Saigon reply to Washington said no plan could be formulated because the GVN had not decided on the relative priority of areas; if the Embassy had their own concept and plan a little push, this sort of problem could be solved quickly. In the case of the medical teams, no reply has been received. Both actions were suggested from Washington over 4 weeks ago.)

4. On the second point, Anspacher is convinced the GVN will not gain requisite identity with the rural populace unless there is an enlightenment which cannot now be foreseen. He feels, without specifying a time limit, that we will have to present to Diem certain minimum actions which must be taken to win the war. He stresses that the growing military capability will, in the last analysis, be unable to do the job regardless of the numbers of Viet Cong who are killed. He is not wholly pessimistic on the results of an approach to Diem, but recognizes that Diemʼs concern with his power position and Nhuʼs negative influence offer little encouragement unless our proposals are made in a concise, clear, and forceful way. Because of the possibility that Diem could not be swayed to the extent required, Anspacher advocates preparation now for the alternative of a unilateral US effort to gain rural loyalty for the GVN. (The province surveys which, aside from the information value, put the GVN in the villages, is [sic] dormant because the GVN is not making personnel available and desire to phase the surveys with the pacification strategy. The Embassy concurs with this approach and sees no advantage in pushing the issue. Again, without a plan of action of their own, the Embassy sees no value in getting into a maximum number of provinces quickly so that follow-up measures can be formulated and a campaign to reach the people can be pursued vigorously.)

5. He has not developed this alternative in any detail. He foresees exploitation of American influence and presence in the countryside through US provincial military advisors, US military advisors in ARVN down to battalion level, proposed USIS substations in the countryside, the capability of the United States to build up a specially configured group of aircraft to improve GVN official contact in the countryside, . … He thinks that Diem would be powerless to stop, and perhaps would not desire to stop, such a program. (Anspacher strongly supports the idea of an airlift for civil purposes; he concurs that it would be very useful. The Embassy has not requested such action; and the suggestion made in the Special Group (CI) weeks ago on this subject has produced no State reaction.)

6. Mr. Anspacherʼs recommendations suggest that a judgment must be made soon as to whether there is a need for greater GVN responsiveness to US advice and whether such receptivity will be achieved if the present situation and relations continue. There is increasing attention to this matter, but on the whole, we continue to be hopeful that the wide range of supporting actions being taken on our side will ultimately have some effect. While the two situations are not exactly parallel, this is the same mode of thinking which characterized the French effort in the early 1950ʼs.

7. It seems to me there continues to be a need for harder thinking on the various actions we would like to see taken in South Viet-Nam including those designed to gain the loyalty of the people. It is not sufficient to point to the Thompson Pacification Strategy as the solution of all ills, particularly since Diem has not yet defined the strategy as he sees it in terms of detailed implementing action. As we reach a consensus here (or in Saigon) as to what is required in detail, we can then assess the GVN position and capabilities relative to it. Until such a plan is developed, it will be impossible to gauge progress until very late in the game.

The Embassy has just forwarded an outline plan for counterinsurgency operations³ which is used as a guide on the US side in Saigon. It is a sound paper stressing concept, but falls short of providing a means by which action required can be determined and pursued. The plan is attached and two sections (concept and Political/Economic/Psychological Operations) are marked; if you scan these parts you will have a sense of what is contained in the overall plan.

8. You may desire to suggest to the Special Group (CI) that the TF be asked to use this Plan as a take-off point in developing specific courses of action required to support it and any enlargement of the concept that looks desirable here. The results could ultimately be sent to Saigon for comment leading to a paper that could be used for discussion with the GVN in whole or detail.

WHB

1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-016-69. Secret.
2. Not found.
3. Document 11.