Office of the Historian

162. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Bagley) to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Taylor)1

Washington, April 18, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • GVN responsiveness

Recent assessments of the situation in SVN stress that future success depends on the GVN ability to correlate diverse administrative requirements to implement the pacification strategy.

Doubts are expressed that the GVN can achieve this task. Diem has created a number of committees and councils in the past 3-4 months ostensibly designed to decentralize administrative control. No observer feels confident that these actions will be, or are, effective; the same deficiencies noted during the period of your mission prevail.

At the same time, Diem continues to resist basic improvements recommended by the US. Thompson has met a similar response when he engages in discussion of details. The Ambassador, General Harkins, and Mr. Thompson, from contact on the ground, caution slowness in pressing Diem along these lines.

The US, however, has executed in full measure its commitments to Diem, which stemmed from your mission, and assumed thereby a degree of responsibility for success. A vital part of the US-GVN contract was recognition that the GVN should seek improvement in administration and public image. Few think the victory can be won if [Page 334] Diem does not take steps toward limited liberalization of his regime. To assist him, the US offered, on GVN concurrence, to provide selected advisers on a mutually acceptable basis; Diem has not chosen to take up this proposal.

The question now is whether the US should continue to exert such influence it can on Diem and hope the GVN can do the job, or should it insist on certain minimum actions which will increase the odds that the GVN will do the job.

This issue was a difficult one last November and a source of US-GVN disagreement. Nevertheless, it is important we develop some sort of rationale on the problem. I suggest that this is the time for State to study the prospects in SVN. Recommendations should be made as to whether we should expect Diem to respond more positively in accordance with our jointly undertaken agreement or, alternatively, if a projection of present levels of progress represents a risk of future increased US involvement.

W.H.B.
  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-030-69. Secret.↩