Mr. Cottrell of the Department of
State advises that Ambassador Galbraithʼs memorandum has not been referred to State
for formal staffing and comment. Mr. Harriman regards it as a private communication to the
President from Ambassador Galbraith. However, an initial draft of the attached
memorandum to the President was reviewed by Mr. Cottrell and his comments have been
considered.
[Attachment]
Memorandum for the President4
SUBJECT
Comments concerning Ambassador Galbraithʼs memorandum of 4 April 1962 on the
subject of Vietnam are submitted in response to your request.
The burden of Mr. Galbraithʼs
proposals appears to be that present US policy toward Vietnam should
be revised in order to seek a political solution to the problem of
Communist penetration in the area. The effect of these proposals is
to put the United States in a position of initiating negotiations
with the Communists to seek disengagement from what is by now a
well-known commitment to take a forthright stand against Communism
in Southeast Asia. The various measures approved for implementation
by the United States in support of our objectives in South Vietnam
have not yet been underway long enough to demonstrate their full
effectiveness. Any reversal of US policy could have disastrous
effects, not only upon our relationship with South Vietnam, but with
the rest of our Asian and other allies as well.
We accept the judgment of the U.S. intelligence community expressed
in SNIE 10-62 (21 February 1962) as
follows: “The long-range Communist Bloc objectives in Southeast Asia
are to eliminate U.S. influence and presence and to establish
Communist regimes throughout the area. Although the Communist powers
have some differences of view as to tactics and priorities and the
risks to be run in
[Page 326]
pursuing their objectives, they have thus far maintained a basic
unity of ultimate objectives and a high degree of policy
coordination with respect to Southeast Asia.”
Ambassador Galbraith may not
be aware that although our military assistance and support of South
Vietnam has grown, our military commitment has continued as stated
in your letter of 14 December 1961 to President Diem: “Your letter underlines what
our own information has convincingly shown—that the campaign of
force and terror now being waged against your people and your
Government is supported and directed from the outside by the
authorities at Hanoi. …5 In response to
your request, we are prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to
protect its people and to preserve its independence. We shall
promptly increase our assistance to your defense effort. … If the
Communist authorities in North Vietnam will stop their campaign to
destroy the Republic of Vietnam, the measures we are taking to
assist your defense efforts will no longer be necessary.”
Our present policy in South Vietnam does contain some risk of
military escalation. The alternative is U.S. withdrawal, which is
tantamount to abandoning South Vietnam to the Communists. The
Department of Defense considers this unacceptable. To prevent the
fall of South Vietnam to Communist aggression and subsequent loss of
the remainder of the Southeast Asian mainland must remain our
unalterable objective. The military considerations involved are
clear. Also of major importance is the psychological impact that a
firm position by the United States will have on the countries of the
world—both free and Communist. South Vietnam is a testing ground of
U.S. resolution in Asia.
More important than these immediate losses are the eventualities
which could follow for the remainder of non-Communist Asia.
The problems raised by Mr. Galbraith with regard to our present policy have
been considered in the coordinated development of that policy. There
follows discussion of several points in Ambassador Galbraithʼs memorandum which are
seriously questioned by the Department of Defense.
There is general recognition of the deficiencies of the present
Government of Vietnam. At the same time it should be recognized that
the Government also has notable strengths and has recently taken
measures to increase its popular support and to mobilize the entire
country in support of the war effort. The present policy of
supporting the Diem regime,
while applying continued pressure for improvement, appears to be the
only practicable alternative at this time
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The parallel between the present U.S. and past French roles in
Vietnam is unjustified. The following statement in your State of the
Union Address bears on this point: “The systematic aggression now
bleeding that country is not a ‘war of liberation’—for Vietnam is
already free. It is a war of attempted subjugation and it will be
resisted.” French forces participated directly in the prior
struggle; U.S. personnel have only an indirect role and are not
subject to “bleeding” in the sense implied.
We are mindful of the probability that the Communists will attempt to
identify the U.S. with initially unpopular measures associated with
pacification. Accordingly, the activities of our advisors are being
regulated to avoid conspicuous participation in these measures.
We concur that the door must be kept open for a political solution,
but the policy advanced by Ambassador Galbraith does not address the basic problem. His
proposal contains the essential elements sought by the Communists
for their takeover by providing a set of rules which the free world
would be forced to obey, while the Communists secretly break the
rules to gain their objective. The Department of Defense concurs
with Secretary Rusk in his
statement of 1 March 1962: “In reference to the demand by the
Communists that the co-Chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference and
other countries concerned consult regarding Vietnam, the U.S. is
always willing to talk about situations which represent a threat to
the peace, but what must be talked about is the root of the trouble;
in this case it is the Communist aggression in Vietnam in disregard
of the Geneva Accords… . There can be peace overnight in Vietnam if
those responsible for the aggression wish peace. The situation is
just as simple as that.”6
It must be recognized that a suspension of Viet Cong activity would
be readily terminable by the Communists and is not a concession
equivalent to a “standstill on an introduction of men and material”
and “phased American withdrawal.” Such withdrawal would leave South
Vietnam incapable of continuing development of a permanent basis for
resisting Communist subversion and would be, in fact, a surrender of
Vietnam.
Because of the foregoing, the Department of Defense cannot concur in
the policy advanced by Ambassador Galbraith, but believes strongly that present policy
toward South Vietnam should be pursued vigorously to a successful
conclusion.
