Office of the Historian

130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1

Washington, March 24, 1962—7:23 p.m.

1137. Ref: Deptel 1119.2 In view 1) difficulties we now facing with ICC/VN, 2) favorable action in ICCʼs legal committee on subversion and 3) fact that to get along with ICC we will have to play game partly their way i.e., a) limited ad hoc approach (case by case without involving large legal principles) and b) maintenance when possible [Page 275] decent veil hypocrisy, Department concludes and Defense concurs we should modify our approach to ICC and proposes following courses of action:

1.
We have prepared comprehensive memo3 of our legal position which we shall discuss with Canadians in first instance and Indians later. We will not, initially, seek any agreements or undertakings on this paper. (Paper being pouched all addressees.) We shall state we agree on objectives that Geneva Agreement should be maintained (this depending on cessation of DRV aggression) and that ICC remain in being. We shall express understanding ICC problems and shall ask Canadians specifically what they have in mind ….
2.
While realizing that Saigon has the only satisfactory deep water terminal facilities for off-loading in SVN, the JCS will instruct CINCPAC, when practicable, to utilize to the maximum other ports for off-loading unconcealable equipment and materials which are undeclared to the ICC.4
3.
We should seek further evidence Bloc importation men and matériel into North Viet-Nam. Realize this most difficult, but evidence need not be conclusive. In this connection ICC should be encouraged increase demands on DRV for access to North Viet-Nam points of entry. DRV refusals could be cited. Canadian Counselor Rettie said re Gia Lam airport ICC now restricted by its own “periodicity” ruling which only permits visits to airport one day a month (!) GVN might request reconsideration this ruling. We prepared help Canadians informally and if asked with legal problems they face in ICC.
4.
We must further step up:
a.
efforts increase ICC patrols DMZ.
b.
public release all possible evidence VC infiltration into Viet-Nam (hopefully as ARVN patrols augmented there should be more evidence).

Ball
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3-2462. Secret. Drafted by Wood; cleared with Czyzak, Rice, Pezzullo, and Heinz (DOD) and approved by Johnson. Also sent to Ottawa and New Delhi and repeated to London, Moscow, and CINCPAC for Polad.↩
  2. Document 119.↩
  3. Not found.↩
  4. For the original version of this paragraph, see Document 126.↩