Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

98. Memorandum of a Conversation¹

Washington, July 18, 1961.

PARTICIPANTS:

• General Maxwell D. Taylor
• Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
• Mr. W. W. Rostow

The inter-connection between various elements of policy in Southeast Asia was discussed.

1. The problem of improving the diplomatic foundation for a military contingency plan which would be aimed in part against North Viet-Nam was considered. Mr. Johnson undertook (a) to collect and examine the persuasiveness of the evidence on North Viet-Nam aggression against South VietNam; (b) to examine the best diplomatic forum or sequence of forums in which the issue might be raised. He expressed a tentative view that we might start with the ICC in VietNam. If we did not get satisfaction there; if the legal status of Viet-Nam in relation to the United Nations was sound; and if the case was good enough, the matter might be then taken into the United Nations.

2. The lack of common feeling among the Vietnamese, the Cambodians, and the Thais was considered in relation to the possibility of mounting a local effort to protect that area from guerrilla warfare and subversion. It was agreed that, while the job might not be impossible, important political and psychological obstacles would have to be overcome. The crucial long-term need for such an association of effort was emphasized.

3. The problem of creating quickly a program for northeast Thailand and finding the funds to finance it without undue delay was examined.

4. The advantages of clearing out the Pathet Lao pocket at Tchepone was considered as well as the difficulties of doing it while the cease-fire still operated in Laos.

5. The possibility of using evidence of North Viet-Nam aggression as a foundation for more aggressive limited military action against North Viet-Nam was discussed.

6. It was agreed that Mr. Johnson would undertake to design a general set of guidelines for policy in Southeast Asia as a whole, as well as recommendations for the organization of more unified political and military staff work in Washington. All hands agreed that there was a sense in which the region was made up of quite disparate countries; but a number of important inter-connections isolated, notably these:

a. The stability of Thailand in relation to Laos and the outcome of the Laos negotiation.

b. The extent to which public evidence and international acknowledgement of North Vietnamese aggression against South Viet-Nam might affect the shape of our contingency planning in respect to a breakdown of the Laos conference.

c. The connection between the situation in the Laos panhandle and the pressure the Vietminh could exert on southern VietNam.

d. The connection between the future of neutrality in Cambodia and the future of the Laos panhandle.²

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series, Regional Security Southeast Asia-General. Secret. Prepared by Rostow on July 19. A note on the source text indicates that the original was sent to the President and copies to Taylor, Robert H. Johnson, and Steeves.
2. Rostow appended the following note to the memorandum: “On July 20 Mr. Johnson informed me that the Secretary of State had assigned Mr. Steeves full time to work on the problem of Southeast Asia as a whole.”