96. Editorial Note
From June 8 through 25, 1961, a research and development team headed by William H. Godel, Deputy Director of the Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency, visited Viet-Nam to discuss with United States and Vietnamese officials the establishment of a joint research and development center. The visit was in response to Article 20 of the Presidential Program for Vietnam. (Document 56) In a conversation with Godel and McGarr on June 15, President Diem said, among other things, that he was very interested in the development of a defoliant and would prefer one that permitted subsequent agricultural growth. (Telegram MAGCH-CS 921, June 16; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1803)
As a result of the visit, President Diem directed the Vietnamese Armed Forces to establish a Combat Development and Test Center to be commanded by a senior engineer officer, Colonel Trach, who was to report to him through the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. General McGarr concurred in the team’s recommendation that a separate element be established within the Military Assistance Advisory Group, a research and development office composed initially of five people to form the United States component of the joint operation. The team also developed a precept for the establishment of the joint center which was approved by President Diem and Ambassador Nolting. Working with MAAG representatives and RVNAF authorities, the Godel team also prepared an initial list of problems and proposed projects to be considered by the center. In a memorandum of July 12 to Lansdale, Godel reported on the background and results of the team’s visit. Attached to the memorandum was a copy of the precept for the center and the list of problems and proposed projects. (Ibid., OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Vietnam-2 Jan.-Oct. 1961)
A summary of Godel’s report on his visit to the seminar on Southeast Asia at the Foreign Service Institute on July 6 is in a memorandum of July 7 from Robert H. Johnson to Walt W. Rostow. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Staff Memos-Rostow)
On July 17, Godel discussed the results of his mission with the Viet-Nam Task Force. According to the minutes of this meeting:
“Mr. Cottrell introduced Mr. William Godel, an expert from the Department of Defense on the techniques and practices of psychological warfare. Pursuant to Article 20 of the Presidential Program Mr. Godel and a team of experts went to Saigon and established, in [Page 229] conjunction with the ARVN, a combat development test center to experiment with new techniques and weapons for the guerrilla war that is being fought in VietNam. The Vietnamese responded to the idea of a development test center with enthusiasm: Diem conducted no less than three personal interviews with Godel and assigned Colonel Trach to command it. Trach was placed directly under the supervision of the President. Among the new equipment introduced by Godel are: a power glider, a light highly-maneuverable aircraft which can fly for long periods on one tank of gasoline (an airborne Volkswagen), a paddle wheel boat with a steam engine burning cane alcohol which could operate in 3 inches of water, carrying 20 to 30 men, an armolite rifle, something the short, small Vietnamese can fire without bowling themselves over. This is a 22 caliber, commercially produced weapon with a high propellant charge. It could be used to great effect. It might be possible to issue this weapon to a ranger battalion and test it thoroughly under battle conditions. Dogs, trained to work with patrols, could introduce some mobility into the largely static patrol operations of the Vietnamese Army when night falls. Mr. Godel also explored many new techniques. Among them is a quiet, tiny, effective village alarm system that could alert the ARVN at a distance of 25 miles without giving away the identity of the village informer. This alarm system is being developed simultaneously with a similar project by ICA. ICA is developing a bulky piece of equipment, which could hardly be hidden and could be immediately spotted by the alert Viet Cong. Another experiment concerns a defoliant to denude border infiltration areas. This is a costly operation which would require some three years for maximum effectiveness. Godel spoke of a hormone plant killer to eradicate the manioc crop on which the Viet Cong subsist while operating in the northern mountain regions. Godel analyzed the problem of bringing medical aid to the villages and affirmed that this operation should be part of the ARVN’s civic action program. Uniformed medical orderlies, corpsmen or aides could best perform this difficult task as they could protect themselves from the Viet Cong while public health teams, Americans or Vietnamese could not. The ‘flying doctor’ technique whereby sick villagers are flown to hospitals in the major urban centers could also help to ameliorate the problem. Godel also spoke of the problem in the areas where Montagnards, mountain people, live. These people resent the pretensions of the Vietnamese to govern them and administer their needs, what they would desire is a degree of autonomy within the Vietnamese state.
“Godel concluded that the program had begun well by showing the Vietnamese what kinds of weapons they need to fight their peculiar kind of war. The program will have, in time, a significant impact. Godel stressed that the procurement problem must be met by more expeditious handling of requests within the Defense Department for these special items of equipment.” (Department of State, Viet-Nam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, Minutes of TF Meetings)