91. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President1
You ask: What are the implications of the situation in Southeast Asia for the handling of the Berlin crisis?
I believe they are the following:
- 1.
- Military Planning. The scale of our military build-up should take account of a Southeast Asia crisis as well as a Berlin crisis. The state of East Germany makes me somewhat skeptical that Mr. K. will push Berlin too far this year; although he may go as far as the treaty. Moreover, the possibility of a Southeast Asia crisis means we should delay until relatively late in the game the actual commitment of forces to Europe.
- 2.
-
Public Presentation. The military moves you take should be presented to our people, our allies, and the other side as justified not by Berlin but by a general heightening of danger in the world environment. We do not know whether access to Berlin will be cut; we do not know whether the offensive in Laos will be resumed. We do not know what scale of action the Viet-minh might mount in South Viet-nam; we do not know what lies behind K’s threats to Iran; we do not know what mischief Castro plans in Latin America, etc.
Legally, there would be great advantage in presenting your proposals as a modification of existing emergency arrangements. We have lived since 1945-or at least June 1950-under emergency conditions. Your action should simply record your conviction that-in degree-the dangers have increased, and prudence calls for a stronger contingency position across the board.
At home, this line of approach would strengthen your hand in holding the line on foreign aid, space, and education. Increased insurance outlays do not justify breaking up a family’s long-range planning, especially when the increased insurance is small in relation to the family’s income and income is rising rapidly.
This approach would avoid charges among certain elements in Europe that the U.S. is excessively excited and aggressive about Berlin.
With Khrushchev, this approach would minimize the challenge to his prestige on the Berlin issue, of which the CIA evaluation [Page 216] makes so much;2 and it would make it easier for him to talk or let the thing die down.
- 3.
- Asian Opinion. This approach would reassure our Asian allies that we are not so obsessed by Berlin that we are going to bug out in Southeast Asia. The Russians are using this interval to put the heat on Thailand; and, elsewhere as well, we can expect them to try to exploit our concentration on Berlin.
- 4.
- The ChiComs. We must draft instructions for enlarged conversation with the Chinese Communists, who have indicated a desire to talk with us over a widened range. It is essential that we communicate to them that our concern with Berlin does not mean that we are unmindful of Asia. Incidentally, I believe you should personally take a hand in formulating these instructions.
- 5.
- Planning. Finally, the forming up of a Berlin posture underlines the urgency of getting a combined military-political contingency plan for Southeast Asia of the kind General Taylor and I have advocated. General Taylor has made progress on the Pentagon component; but we still lack a coherent State Department position, and we lack a forum or task force in which the military and political elements could be brought together.
- 6.
- Speech. Your talk to the American people in the next week or two should focus primarily on the world situation and our preparations to meet it, rather than primarily on Berlin.
This memorandum has the approval of General Taylor and Henry Owen.