Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

79. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State¹

Washington, June 30, 1961.

SUBJECT

• VietNam and Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. D. N. Chatterjee, Charge d’Affaires a.i., Indian Embassy
• Mr. Walter P. McConaughy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. Rogers B. Horgan, Officer in Charge, Indian Affairs
• Mr. Thomas W. Ainsworth, Acting Officer in Charge, Viet-Nam Affairs

Mr. Chatterjee called at Mr. McConaughy’s request to discuss the situation in the Indochina area.² Mr. McConaughy opened the conversation by remarking that the Department had been very busy recently with questions concerning Laos. General Phoumi, who was still here on his current visit, seemed to have decided to proceed further with the necessary steps looking to the attainment of a situation of guaranteed neutrality for Laos. The developments in Laos had required us to look carefully at the situation in all of Indochina. In particular the relationship to the situation in Viet-Nam was very close. Events in Viet-Nam and particularly the Communist guerrilla activities and infiltration of agents from the North had created a very grave problem which in our view clearly involved violations of the Geneva Agreements by the Communist side. In this connection we had reached a decision recently, because of the Communist violations and their stepping up of infiltration and subversion, that it was necessary to increase the strength of MAAG Viet-Nam by about 100. This was done solely because the Communist violations made a step-up of training GVN forces necessary. Our action did not mean that we did not respect the Geneva Agreements of 1954 or that we intended to push aside any part of these Agreements, even Articles 16 and 17. It was necessary, however, to have a freer hand to cope with the violations by the Communist side. The addition of the 100 personnel did not increase the strength of MAAG to the point where it would become a public issue. It might be necessary, however, to go higher in the future. This would involve only the minimum number necessary. We hoped that such an increase would not be necessary but that would depend on what the Communists did. We felt it most important to inform the Indian Government of this decision and our view of the situation because of the extremely important role India has played and is playing with regard to affairs in the Southeast Asia area. This included India’s part in the present conference concerning Laos as well as in the earlier Geneva Conference and in the International Commission.

Mr. Chatterjee thanked Mr. McConaughy for the information and commented that presumably the additional 100 personnel, or whatever the MAAG might amount to in numbers, merely indicated a stepping-up of the training effort and not that the American personnel would don uniforms and fight. Mr. McConaughy replied that Mr. Chatterjee’s interpretation was completely correct. There was no intention at all of having the Americans take over the fighting.

Mr. Chatterjee continued that he had asked this because of the reports concerning Laos where it was said that American officers had been sent directly to the front with the local forces. He wished to raise one other point. Because of the possibility of escalation he wondered whether the US intended to “hit North Viet-Nam in kind.” When he talked recently with Mr. Rostow,³ the latter had been much exercised over the situation where cadres, potential leaders in South VietNam, were being wiped out by the Communist action and had indicated that he felt it essential to take stronger countermeasures against the source of the problem. Certain press reports had also suggested that we might be thinking of retaliation in kind against North VietNam.

Mr. McConaughy said that of course he could not answer for all contingencies in the future, but the assignment of this group of 100 personnel to MAAG had no relation to such a change of policy. They were intended to improve the training of the Vietnamese forces for counter-guerrilla action. While we have to preserve our freedom of action as regards possible contingencies, there was no plan to take action at this time of the sort Mr. Chatterjee had inquired about and this increase was not related to any action of that kind.

Mr. Chatterjee remarked that after his talk with Mr. Rostow, he had informed the Ministry of External Affairs. He expected to be seeing Mr. Rostow again on this subject. One of Mr. Rostow’s main complaints was that the ICC was not really fulfilling its functions by investigating all complaints of violations. He felt he should point out two matters in this regard. First, the American attitude was based on the view that whenever a complaint against North Viet-Nam was filed, the North Vietnamese objected and this blocked any action by the ICC. Information he had received from India confirmed that North Viet-Nam had done this but that South Viet-Nam had actually done it on more occasions. He did not have complete information but believed that the Ministry might be assembling it.

Mr. McConaughy asked Mr. Ainsworth whether our information confirmed this. Mr. Ainsworth said that we had had reports that the Vietnamese Government had on several occasions objected to proposals for ICC investigations within its territory, but suggested that there seemed to be a considerable difference between the substance of the proposed investigations in complaints filed against the GVN and those filed against the Communist side. The GVN took the view that not being a signatory to the Geneva Agreements, its cooperation with the ICC was a voluntary act on its part.

Mr. Chatterjee said that the second of his points was that the Indian Government had now told the Indian Chairman of the ICC (in fact long before his conversation with Mr. Rostow) that the ICC must investigate complaints and that obstacles by either government were no excuse for inaction. Mr. Chatterjee had asked the Ministry for further details. Mr. Desai plans to get in touch with Ambassador Galbraith to discuss these questions at length. The problem was not that the Indians ignored complaints but that the Poles in particular made things extremely difficult and in fact the Canadians were also difficult on some occasions. When the Poles and Canadians each took a rigid position on a subject, Gopala Menon and some others had tended to take a middle position regardless of the merits of the issue. India hoped to correct this tendency but it would be difficult if both sides continued to take inflexible polar positions. He hoped that if the Indians’ attitude had appeared negative before, it would be more positive now. Mr. Desai’s attitude should be a great help in this respect. As for MAAG, it is a fact that it exists. A quantitative augmentation in MAAG was one thing, but a qualitative change such as would be involved in a significant alteration of its functions was quite another and would be likely to give an excuse for the neighbor to the North to come in. One may overestimate the Chinese Communists either as to their capabilities or as to their inclinations to embark on aggressive adventures, or both, but on our side we must be careful not to give them unwarranted excuses for such action. It seems that the military sometimes are likely to take the bit in their teeth and run. A partisan war (of which Mr. Chatterjee said he had had some experience in the sense of having spent some time in the jungle on the CBI front in World War II) presents special problems and this is often likely to lead to a situation where the obvious military solution appears to be attacking the home base of enemy forces as was the case in Kashmir and in Korea.

Mr. McConaughy observed that with us the military would not make the fundamental decisions on such questions by themselves. Even in the case at hand of the MAAG increase, care had been exercised that the number which was traditionally regarded as the MAAG ceiling was not exceeded. We shall take the minimum action necessary to deal with the problems we face.

[Here follow three paragraphs on the situation in Laos.]

Mr. McConaughy said that he desired to clarify his earlier reference to a MAAG “ceiling”. The MAAG strength was not now over what had traditionally and unofficially been regarded as the MAAG “ceiling” but we could not tie our hands. Mr. Ainsworth observed that according to our understanding the most recent ICC communication on the subject of MAAG (which had been a letter to the Vietnamese Government) had not said anything about a specific numerical “ceiling” for MAAG. Consequently when we mentioned a MAAG ceiling we were simply speaking in general terms and did not mean to imply that we felt that a specific figure had been set in this respect.

Mr. Chatterjee replied that the numbers of the MAAG were less important than its quality and the role it played. There was also the matter of one’s over-all assessment of the situation. Mr. Krapf, the German Minister in Washington, had recently remarked that the Russian national game was chess, the American national game was baseball. This might have some significance in terms of the difference in habits between rapid reflex action and long range planning. It was often hard to tell which move on a chess board was really the significant one. At the present time, to return to the baseball metaphor, there appeared to be quite a number of balls flying about, what with Laos, Berlin, etc. Walter Lippman had also stressed that one should never get held or committed by a move in one part of the map. As for the Chinese, his (Chatterjee’s) view was that they generally play in their own court unless they think they can get a quick victory. Thus they had moved into Ladakh which was easy but would be most unlikely to move seriously against India proper. Concerning VietNam, the Chinese would weigh the factors carefully but any development which would give them an excuse to move in there would be a great temptation. They obviously had strong capabilities in the area and it would give them a chance, which he believed they would welcome, to chasten Ho Chi Minh. It was certainly not desirable to have another Korea. In a MAAG the quantity was less important than quality, it was important not to give the Chinese an excuse. The people of South VietNam, he continued, would be our most valuable ally against the Communists. Diem was still completely dependent on the US. It would be most helpful if the Vietnamese could display more initiative on their own which would make them a true ally. North Viet-Nam was certainly no attraction to them. It was by all accounts a completely drab area. As regards South VietNam, a combined political and military solution was needed. Mr. McConaughy observed that we also hope that measures would be taken to increase the political incentive for a more active Vietnamese popular participation in the struggle against the Communist subversion. Diem had already taken some steps, which we thought should be useful in this respect.

On the way to the street, Mr. Chatterjee explained to Mr. Horgan that one reason he raised the question of our “hitting North Viet-Nam in kind” was that the Soviet Embassy had conveyed to him the Soviet impression that the US had this intention. He had not mentioned this to Mr. McConaughy because he had not been able to assess the Soviet purpose in telling him this: whether it was merely argumentative; or whether it was a matter of serious concern to the Soviets which they presumed Mr. Chatterjee would convey to the US.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/~3061. Secret. Drafted by Ainsworth and initialed by McConaughy.
2. On June 13, Cottrell informed McConaughy that the British, French, Canadians, and the U.S. Embassy in India all believed that the time had come to inform the Indian Government about the increase in the MAAG in Vietnam. (Memorandum, June 13; Department of State, Viet-Nam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 3-D GVN, ICC, April-June 1961) On the memorandum McConaughy wrote: “Pls make appt. with Indian Embassy.”
3. No record of this conversation has been found.