39. Memorandum From the Ambassador-Designate to Vietnam (Nolting) to the Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- Program for VietNam
Understanding with Defense
At the Under Secretary’s request, Ken Young and I saw Mr. Gilpatric yesterday afternoon. There was a meeting of minds, I think, on the major points which had bothered us in substance, procedure and form of the Task Force Report on VietNam. Mr. Gilpatric said that he would introduce the Task Force paper for discussion at the NSC meeting, making the following points:
- 1.
- The recommendations for action in the Task Force Report should not be taken as the Law of the Medes and Persians but as authority to a Task Force to carry out, after recommendation from the Ambassador in the field, a series of accelerated measures along the lines of, and for the purpose stated in the Task Force Report.
- 2.
- The Task Force program may well have to be altered, either to provide greater US support or to modify the measures therein in one way or another, especially in light of the unfolding Lao situation.
- 3.
- Any regional program for Southeast Asia might also cause modifications in the program for VietNam.
- 4.
- The President should therefore authorize in general the undertaking of such a program, on the understanding that there would be further NSC consideration of the situation as it evolves.
In discussion, the following points emerged:
- 1.
- That the principle of a Task Force organization in Washington should be continued, but that for Mr. Gilpatric’s part, he felt that the Task Force should be located in, and receive its major guidance from, the State Department.
- 2.
- As regards organization in the field, he felt that the Ambassador and the Country Team should control the timing of the actions recommended, should have authority to recommend changes and should negotiate the steps. The Defense member of the Task Force, if he visited the country, would be subject to the authority of the Ambassador and would not visit the country unless asked for by the Ambassador.
- 3.
- Having read the substitute paper which was prepared in the State Department,2 Mr. Gilpatric thought it watered down too much the emphasis on anti-subversion activity and linked too tightly anti [Page 88] subversive measures to the political-social reforms which we have been trying to achieve. In discussing this point, Gilpatric agreed that persuasion towards such reforms should continue, but he was leery of making them a condition of our aid against guerrillas.
- 4.
- While agreeing that the Counterinsurgency Plan should be promptly negotiated to a conclusion and carried out, he felt that authority along the lines of the Task Force recommendation to accelerate and enlarge this Plan and to shift its emphasis towards greater anti-guerrilla activity should be requested now. The other measures proposed in the State paper should be considered by the Task Force as the situation progresses.
Recommended Tactics for the NSC Meeting
In light of the above, which seems to me satisfactory both in substance and procedure, I would recommend that you agree to the Task Force report, making clear that while some of the analyses might be more accurately done and some of the measures should be further considered, you too feel that a general approval of the accelerated program of action for VietNam is warranted. If in fact the above points do not come out in Mr. Gilpatric’s presentation, I think they should be made by you in order that the President will know the type of action which he is requested to take.
Although this point was not made specifically by Mr. Gilpatric, it would follow from our understanding that the next to the last paragraph of the covering note of his Memorandum to the President dated April 27 would be omitted and that the paragraph on organization (Para 9) would also be changed.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/4-2961. Top Secret. Drafted and initialed by Nolting and Cottrell. Also sent to Under Secretary Bowles.↩
- Presumably a reference to an early draft of the attachment to Document 42.↩