Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

332. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, December 21, 1961, 7 p.m.

834. I saw Thuan yesterday (December 20) on many matters:

1. Honolulu meeting: reviewed with Thuan purpose and results this meeting, stressing US determination, vigorous planning and action under new partnership. Emphasized obvious fact that increased and accelerated US assistance imposes obligations and burdens on GVN as well as US task force to make effective use, and puts premium on GVN’s undertakings and plans to increase efficiency and expedite action from top to bottom in all branches. I reviewed in general major points covered in Honolulu meeting, saying that these would be taken up by General McGarr with Minister Thuan in more detail (McGarr has already begun this).²

I bore down on necessity including Viet-Nam Navy representative and Viet-Nam Air Force representative on Joint General Staff, as important element in achieving necessary GVN military coordination at top.

As agreed Honolulu meeting, I told Thuan we did not see necessity of, and had decided against, sending US uniformed personnel to man small boats for inland waterway patrol (a point which was subject to misinterpretation in US negotiating instructions.) He understands our position, but was disappointed; said this would require additional GVN naval personnel and training in handling US-furnished boats. I said I thought that, along with the boats, we would consider sympathetically any necessary increase in GVN naval personnel and training for them. He will send us a note with his specific ideas on this.

On joint provincial surveys, we agreed that Thuan would call first team together for final briefing this Saturday,³ with view to having them in field next week. In this connection, US press stories (especially articles in two recent issues of Time), emphasizing “concessions” which US has, or should, extract from GVN in exchange for increased aid, came up. Thuan pointing out how difficult such stories make our joint effort for improvement in GVN organization and personnel, in view of sensitivities and national pride involved. I told him I agreed 100 per cent; that I deplored such stories; that they had not originated with us here; and that I had done everything that I could to prevent our recent discussions and agreements from being reflected in this manner. (Comment: I cannot overstress disservice which certain press stories and obvious leaks have done, and are doing, to our cause here.)

2. GVN-Cambodian relations: I left with Thuan for info (we will follow up with Foreign Office) a memo suggesting steps to achieve GVN-Cambodian border liaison along lines suggested Phnom Penh’s 234.⁴ Thuan seemed sympathetic to this approach.

3. I asked Thuan how new GVN organizational arrangements are working, especially National Internal Security Council. He said NISC had met last week; next week they expected to start regular twice-weekly meetings, with agendas and with Secretariat headed by General “Little” Minh, who is already installed. I stressed importance of orderly and rapid decisions based on agenda items and passed to Secretariat for implementation action; only thus could we hope to keep pace with the many matters requiring rapid decisions and follow-through action.

4. Montagnards: Thuan reported that Montagnard population is “coming our way” in increasing numbers. This substantiated by other reports we have, and is encouraging.

5. VC strategy: Thuan, agreeing with President Diem switch to General McGarr and me last week,⁵ said that evidence available to GVN (particularly recent VC officer prior testimony) led him to conclusion that VC trying to group in larger units, up to divisional strength, with military and that he expected major VC attacks to be mounted within a couple of months we agreed that this analysis, if correct, makes it all the more necessary that our forces move promptly to the offensive to disrupt and destroy VC ability to concentrate.

6. Border Ranger Force: I mentioned to Thuan my disappointment at inference in President Diem’s last conversation with McGarr and me on this matter. I had asked him direct question of when 5,000-man Ranger Striking Force for Border Patrol would be organized in order, among other things, to use our helicopters. Thuan had replied somewhat evasively to two direct questions on this. Thuan said that this would be done as agreed; but that it would be great help if Chief MAAG could come up with a joint recommendation with ARVN field command on Ranger units which could best be spared from present duties. If [He]could then, he felt persuade Diem to release them. General McGarr is working on this. I made it clear to Thuan, and he understands that US cannot afford, in terms its own public opinion, to send to Viet-Nam supporting forces and material only to have them stand idle, waiting for GVN plans and actions. I was frank in telling him that such a situation would soon reflect itself in US press and no doubt in congressional questions; and that we counted heavily on GVN’s recognition of this fact and accelerated vigorous action on their part.

Nolting

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-2161. Secret, Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd, Bangkok, Phnom Penh. and Vientiane.
2. Copies of McGarr’s two memoranda of December 18 to Thuan, one entitled “Training of Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps” and the other “Civil Government Paramilitary Infrastructure (Organization) Required as Integrated Part of Military Phase of Pacification Effort,” were attached to McGarr’s memorandum of the same date to Nolting. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, Internal Security 1961)
3. December 23.
4. Not found.
5. See footnote 3, Document 323.