Office of the Historian

325. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Special Assistant (Parker) to the Chairman (Lemnitzer)1

Washington, December 18, 1961.

The following are selected items of interest discussed at the Honolulu meeting. They are arranged in chronological order and generally follow the agenda2 item by item.

1.
SecDef announced intention to have such a meeting each month for the next three months, possibly in Hawaii but probably farther West.
2.
Secretary of Defense outlined mission of his visit as:
a.
What can we do to improve the situation.
b.
What do our people in the field need.
c.
We have great authority from the President.
d.
Money is no object.
e.
The one restriction is what combat troops will not be introduced.
3.
It was the general consensus agreed to by SecDef that there is not likely to be any gimmick which will win the war for us. While air and naval action contribute it’s mainly the ground force problem.
4.
After considerable discussion all hands seemed to have come around to General Lemnitzer’s view that we needed teams of 5 or 6 advisors down to and including battalion level.
5.
Doubt was cast on the wisdom of mounting the campaign to clear out Zone D. The plan was considered highly sophisticated for a [Page 741] first campaign, also it seemed to rest too heavily on the success of defoliant operations. MAAG is to re-study the plan and determine an alternate.
6.
After discussion of the pros and cons of Diem, SecDef pointed out that we are stuck with him and must make the best of it; we cannot expect to change him much; what we must do is present him with specifics and get his agreement on them rather than on broad general plans.
7.
We have to train at the same time and on an expedited schedule enough regular forces to make sweeps of areas, and enough pare-military forces to then hold them.
8.
When we speak of reorganization of the Vietnamese forces we are speaking basically of two aspects:
a.
Taking the Air Force and Navy into the JCS setup to further the team spirit all down the line.
b.
Give authority to field commanders. Diem says he has done this, the field commanders say he has not.
9.
After considerable discussion on use of Jungle Jim, General Lemnitzer cleared up all doubts by saying that they could use for many missions they wished in South Viet-Nam by putting one Vietnamese aboard.
10.
The Vietnamese navy capability border, coastal and inland waterway and particularly the latter is better than we thought back here.
11.
The training program for the civil guard and Self-Defense Corps extends to 1963. SecDef thinks this is a crucial problem that we can’t wait until 1963 and that we must find some other solution.
12.
SecDef gave approval on the spot for certain program to improve communications.
13.
SecDef approved going ahead with three construction projects.
14.
While Diem has agreed to making 5,000 rangers available for border patrol the implementation slow. General Lemnitzer pointed out that implementation should start on the Laos-Vietnam border leaving Cambodia border to the end.
15.
SecDef refused to discuss Laos indicating that Government decisions had been taken there and there was nothing further we could do for the moment. In Viet-Nam however there are many things we can and must do quickly.
T.W. Parker3
Major General, USA
Spec. Asst. to the Chairman
  1. Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, L-1141-71. Secret. Attached to the source text are 10 pages of handwritten notes on the discussion at the Honolulu meeting. The drafter of the notes may have been Parker, but this is not indicated on the source text.↩
  2. Regarding the agenda for the meeting, see Document 324.↩
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩