Office of the Historian

316. Memorandum of a Conversation1

US/MC/6
Quai d’Orsay, Paris, December 11, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • French:
    • M. Couve de Murville
    • Ambassador Alphand
    • M. de Carbonnel
    • M. Lucet
    • M. Laloy
    • M. Soutou
    • M. de Beaumarchais
    • M. Manac’h
    • M Froment-Meurice
  • United Kingdom:
    • Lord Home
    • Sir Shuckburgh
    • Sir Rumbold
    • Mr. Ledwidge
    • Mr. Samuel
    • Mr. Butler
  • United States:
    • The Secretary
    • Ambassador Gavin
    • Mr. Bohlen
    • Mr. Kohler
    • Mr. McNaughton
    • Mr. Lyon
    • Mr. Hillenbrand
    • Mr. Brown

SUBJECT

  • Vietnam

The Secretary said that the talks with Diem had led to considerable agreement and that additional steps are being taken to deal with the guerilla problem: improving intelligence, regrouping forces, improving civilian and military channels so as to improve action capability. We are providing additional economic and military support. Our objective is to help Viet-Nam do the job itself. We do not have in mind for the present sending organized units of American ground forces. We will supply aircraft and helicopters with American pilots. So far as the Geneva Accords are concerned, we want to concentrate on continuing violations from the North. We do not believe we are in violation because the relevant provisions have been suspended by the actions taken by North Vietnam.

Lord Home said that he agreed that Diem must be helped to fight and that he should be able to clean up the bad areas. The UK is concerned about the Geneva Accords. He hoped the US Government would not announce publicly that it is not bound by the [Page 728] Geneva settlement. It would render the British co-Chairman position difficult and might have an adverse effect in Laos….

The Secretary said that we have tried to avoid statements on the Geneva Accords. If questions are asked it would seem preferable to turn the question around to inquire into what the North is doing. If, in time, the other side comes into compliance, then we can cease extraordinary assistance. We can leave the Accords and Under Secretary Smith’s statement2 where they are. The purpose of the White Paper was to reveal North Viet-Nam activities and to prove to the Indians and others that it is not simply a question of civil disturbance.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2000. Secret. Drafted by Brown. There is no indication on the source text that it was approved by the Secretary. Rusk was in Paris to attend the NATO Ministerial meetings.↩
  2. For Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith’s statement at Geneva on July 21, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XVI, p. 1500.↩