312. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Secretary of State1

Dear Dean: I attach our proposed concept for elevating the status of the senior US military man in Viet-Nam to that of a “Commander, US Forces Vietnam”. This draft reflects discussions with CIA and AID, and is a revision of an earlier draft.2

Essentially, I believe that if we are to give full impact to the increased efforts we are now making, and to take full advantage of the additional weight that the Nolting-Diem memorandum3 gives us in the conduct of the counter-insurgency effort, we must signalize the change by such an elevation of the senior military man. The attached proposal would give him a status, under CINCPAC, comparable to that now held by the Taiwan Defense Command, by the US Commander in Japan, and by the Commander in Korea, who is of course also the UN Commander.

The attached draft would maintain the existing situation vis-a-vis AID activities, with the military role confined to the coordination of those AID activities that have a clear relationship to the counterinsurgency effort. I understand that full coordination now prevails for such activities as roads, telecommunications, and police support. We propose no change in this.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

The attached proposal envisages a relationship with the Ambassador that falls within the terms of the President’s basic letter of May 29, 1961,4 i.e., that an area “military commander” is not under the Ambassador’s command, but retains his direct line of authority via the JCS to me and thence to the President. Obviously, political and basic policy matters must remain in Ambassador Nolting’s hands. We must of course take every precaution so that neither Diem, nor anyone else, can play off the two senior US representatives against each other. But the military man should have his status enhanced if he is to move into a new and more active role, and should have complete access to Diem and all other top GVN officials on matters connected with the counter-insurgency effort, keeping the Ambassador fully advised. I need hardly say that in our nomination [Page 721] for the position we shall give weight to capacity to work cooperatively under such an arrangement.

I should like to get a resolution of this issue as soon as possible, and to have your views before I go to Honolulu direct from Paris.5 I would anticipate that a new arrangement would require Presidential approval, which might be sought promptly upon my return from Honolulu.

Sincerely,

Bob

Attachment6

CONCEPT FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND, UNITED STATES FORCES, VIETNAM

General

1. Subject to agreement with the Government of Viet-Nam (GVN), as represented by letters which will be exchanged by President Kennedy and President Diem (copies of which will be made available), the United States will establish a subordinate unified command with Headquarters in Saigon.

2. The objective of this establishment will be to increase US military and economic assistance to the GVN, short of introduction of combat forces, and to increase US participation in the direction and control of Armed Forces of Viet-Nam (RVNAF) counter-insurgency operations, in order to assist the GVN to contain and eventually to eliminate the Viet Cong. To this end the command will draw together, under single command and control, all those US activities in Vietnam, including military intelligence operations and MAAG South Vietnam, which are related to the counter-insurgency effort.

3. The command title will be “United States Forces, Vietnam” (USFV); the commander’s short title will be “COMUS Forces Vietnam”

Mission and Functional Responsibilities

4. The mission of COMUS Forces Viet-Nam will be to assist and support the Government of Viet-Nam in its efforts to prevent the fall [Page 722] of Viet-Nam to communism, to defeat communist insurgency, and to destroy the Viet Cong.

5. The commander’s responsibilities, in discharging the above mission under CINCPAC, will include but not be limited to the following:

a.
Exercise operational command over all US military forces in Vietnam, including MAAG South Vietnam.
b.
Plan and conduct all US ground, sea and air operations in Vietnam, including US efforts undertaken in support of RVNAF combat operations against the Viet Cong.
c.

Exercise full control of all US military intelligence efforts in Vietnam.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

e.
Participate with the RVNAF at all appropriate levels in intelligence activities, the development of plans, and the conduct of operations, to the extent necessary to insure the effective employment of RVNAF forces.
f.
Coordinate, through the Chief of US Operations Mission, and other appropriate members of the US Diplomatic Mission, all US economic aid related to the counter-insurgency effort in Vietnam.
g.
Function, on a direct and personal basis, as principal US military advisor to the GVN and as single US spokesman in Viet-Nam for US military matters.
h.
Conduct planning, in coordination with PACOM agencies and other appropriate agencies, for the effective application and employment of US and GVN resources in execution of his mission. Such plans will be subject to approval by CINCPAC.

Command Arrangements and Relationships

5. [sic] USFV will be a subordinate unified command of PACOM with a joint staff;COMUS Forces Viet-Nam will report directly to CINCPAC. USFV will be comprised of US forces organized into Army, Naval and Air Force Service components and assigned for the accomplishment of the mission.

6. Relationship with CINCPAC:

a.
COMUS Forces Viet-Nam will coordinate all relevant activities with CINCPAC, who has over-all responsibility for the Pacific area, including Southeast Asia. As directed by CINCPAC, COMUS Forces Viet-Nam will communicate and coordinate directly with subordinate agencies of PACOM in areas adjacent to Vietnam.
b.
CINCPAC will be responsible to provide logistic and communications support to meet USFV requirements. Requirements which exceed CINCPAC resources will be referred promptly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, and when directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC will make available necessary staff and forces, including air and naval forces operating in direct support, for the execution of the COMUS Forces Viet-Nam mission.

[Page 723]

7. Relationship with the US Ambassador, Vietnam:

The status of COMUS Forces Viet-Nam will be co-equal with that of the Ambassador. In this connection reference is made to a letter from the President to all Ambassadors, dated 29 May 1961, which is pertinent to this relationship (copy attached as Annex hereto).7

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5811/12-761. Top Secret.
  2. Not further identified.
  3. The enclosure to Document 307.
  4. See footnote 5, Document 271.
  5. McNamara was planning to attend the NATO Ministerial meeting in Paris.
  6. Top Secret.
  7. Not found as an attachment, but see footnote 4 above.