Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

3. Summary Record of a Meeting, The White House¹

Washington, January 28, 1961, 10 a.m–12:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President
• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of Defense
• General Lemnitzer, Chairman JCS
• The Director of CIA—Mr. Allen Dulles
• Assistant Secretary Nitze, Defense Department
• Brigadier General Lansdale, USAF
• Mr. Broe, CIA
• Mr. Parsons, State Department
• The President greeted General Lansdale and complimented him on his report on Viet-Nam.²

Secretary Rusk asked whether the President would prefer to consider this report first or have a briefing from Mr. Parsons on the Viet-Nam counter-insurgency plan³just submitted by the Country Team at Saigon.

Mr. Parsons then outlined the plan, saying that it comprehended not only military, but political, economic and psychological programs. Inspired originally by Defense, it was worked out by a group chaired in the Embassy with participants from MAAG, USOM, USIS and CIA. Apart from the recommendation for a 20,000-man increase in the Vietnamese army and accelerated training under MAAG of the 30,000-man civil guard, the plan recommended organizational changes in the Vietnamese Government having to do with security planning and execution, centralization of intelligence and other factors. The initial cost of the army and civil guard portions of the plan would be approximately $40 million chargeable to MAP in FY 61. Mr. Parsons said that the essence of the plan, including analysis of the situation, assumptions, tasks and recommendations, was in a 20 page double-spaced prelude to the full text. He added that, as regards status of the plan in Washington, it had only just arrived, was elaborated in some 220 pages of detail and in the State Department had received initial approval only at the lower levels of the Far Eastern Bureau. It was probable that FE would recommend to the Secretary that all the main features should be implemented as speedily as possible. Mr. Parsons did not know its status in other Departments. He also mentioned that the Country Team believed that implementation of the military portions of the plan would enable the Vietnamese army to turn from the defensive to the offensive against the Viet Cong guerrillas.

The President remarked that if the situation in Viet-Nam was now so serious he wondered why the recruitment of troops and the training of police, who could become effective only a year or two hence, would be of any use. He also wondered why, if there were only 10,000 guerrillas, an increase from 150 to 170,000 in the army was necessary.

Mr. Parsons responded that it was the judgment of the people out there that this plan would be useful, that civil guard training was already under way, and that it should be borne in mind that the Vietnamese army had two tasks, first to provide a deterrent against conventional attack by the 300,000-man army of north Viet-Nam and, second, to combat widespread and determined insurgency over a large area which, of course, has elsewhere pinned down a much greater number of men.

In response to the President’s invitation, General Lansdale spoke at some length along the lines of his report. He also said in reference to the counter-insurgency plan that it was written in the Defense Department and then sent out to Saigon for further consideration. He said that he had found that relations between the MAAG and CAS and President Diem were excellent and that the spirit of the MAAG and CAS people was constructive. Regrettably, it was otherwise in the Embassy and the Foreign Service people were defeatist and not as interested as they should be.

The President referred to General Lansdale’s reference to the morale of President Diem and his belief that the Ambassador and others were not fully behind him and perhaps favored the coup d’etat rebels. He wondered if a letter or some gesture from the new administration would help. General Lansdale thought that something of this nature would help a great deal.

Secretary Rusk said that he had received a draft letter for the President to send in response to President Diem’s congratulations⁴ and had sent it back for further redrafting with this morale problem in mind. It should reach the President shortly.

Mr. Allen Dulles emphasized the need for speed and for doing those things which would increase immediately the anti-guerrilla capability in Viet-Nam. With Mr. Broe he also mentioned the limited efforts being made to produce South Vietnamese guerrillas capable of harassing the north Vietnamese. Mr. Broe agreed with Mr. Parsons’ remark that thus far the Vietnamese Government had not been very receptive to this program. He added that the teams which had been trained were being used in the contaminated areas of South Viet-Nam.

Secretary Rusk mentioned that Ambassador Durbrow and his staff had had a very difficult role to play over these past three and a half years. Mr. Durbrow had had the unpalatable task of balancing representations designed to persuade President Diem to undertake reforms and other tasks to improve the Vietnamese position against the need to assure him of our support and friendship. This was never easy nor was President Diem an easy person. He thought that the Ambassador had energetically and effectively done this but that it was now time for a change and he should be relieved in the near future.⁵

At the close of the meeting Secretary Rusk suggested, and the President agreed, that a task force should be set up similar to the one on Cuba to study at once and recommend soonest on the Country Team counter-insurgency plan.⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/1-2861. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Parsons. Although the source text indicates the meeting began at 11:45 a.m., according to the President’s Log Book and Rusk’s Appointment Book, the meeting began at 10 a.m., and Lansdale and Parsons did not join until 10:45. (Kennedy Library, President’s Log Book; Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) For another account of the meeting, see the memorandum from Rostow, infra. Parsons in his oral history interview incorrectly dates this meeting on January 21 or 22. (Kennedy Library, Oral History Program, J. Graham Parsons)

   In a memorandum to Dulles, Rusk, and McNamara, January 27, McGeorge Bundy reported that the meeting was called to discuss Cuba and Vietnam, the latter because of the President’s “keen interest in General Lansdale’s recent report and his awareness of the high importance of this country.” (Ibid., National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series)

2. See Document 2.
3. Document 1.
4. Neither letter has been found.
5. On January 25, Wood drafted a memorandum to this effect for the Secretary of State. It was cleared by Anderson, Cleveland, Parsons, and Steeves and sent through the Under Secretary of State for Administration. (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 1-C.2 Ambassador Durbrow, GVN 1961)
6. As a result of this meeting, the President on January 30 authorized an increase of $28.4 million to expand the Vietnam force level by 20,000 and an expenditure of $12.7 million to improve the quality of the Vietnam Civil Guard. For text of the memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense authorizing the money, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, p. 13.