226. Draft Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)1
SUBJECT
- Timing and Visibility of Action to Assist South Vietnam
In the light of our discussion last night,2 it is clear that there is great concern that the actions we take in the immediate future in South Viet-Nam will disrupt the possibility of a Souvanna settlement, including signature of Geneva agreements, which might otherwise be expected to take place within about a month. I think we must recognize that even the installation of a Souvanna government will not by any means eliminate the possibility of our having to take early action in Laos; the hope, however, is that such action would be in response to some breach of the situation by the other side. Otherwise, our political difficulties would be greatly multiplied-as they would be if our introduction of added elements into the Viet-Nam situation were blamed for upsetting the possibilities of a settlement.
Some of our discussion last night tended to assume that introduction of an 8000-man force (or some such number) would be a decisive event in determining reactions in Laos. I doubt if it is as [Page 559] black-and-white as this, and of course we must reckon that anything we say to Diem may lead in some way to reactions. What we need, however, is a very careful look at the successive military actions that we might take under the Taylor Report recommendations, the timing of these, their degree of visibility, and whether there is any way to frame plausible cover stories that would enable us to move forces into position without upsetting the apple cart. For example, the 8000-man force might be labelled as a reinforcement for Honolulu, or engaged in an exercise in the Philippines. In this connection, the use of an existing divisional staff organization, while surely much more efficient, may raise serious problems of publicity.
Could you look into these matters in a preliminary fashion and give me your best reading before the White House meeting this afternoon at 5:00?3
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Viet-Nam 092 Nov. 1961. Top Secret. Drafted by William Bundy on November 8. A handwritten note in the margin reads: “Not used. All other copies destroyed.”↩
- Lemnitzer’s journal shows that he left the Pentagon at 5:40 p.m. with McNamara to attend a meeting at the Department of State. (National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, L-419-71) No record of this meeting was found.↩
- See Document 225.↩