Office of the Historian

206. Memorandum From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt), to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)1

Honolulu, November 2, 1961.
1.
This is in response to your questions concerning interdiction of North Viet-Nam capabilities for aggression.2
2.
An intelligence appreciation is contained in enclosure (1).3 From this kind of appreciation we derive our target criteria and lists which are worked out in detail for use by strike forces.
3.
Strike operations which we have in mind can be graduated dependent on the politico/military objectives which are determined for us. We pay particular attention to DRV military forces, their operational bases, support and control installations and lines of communications. We are prepared also to take out selected industrial-economic targets. We have selected areas for mining so as to shut off the sea approaches to Haiphong and the mouth of the Red River. Target lists are comprehensive, thus permitting specific objectives for several modes of attack.
4.
Here are some of the possibilities for which we are prepared:
a.
Air
(1)
Conduct air reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam.
(2)
Conduct fighter sweeps along roads and railroads in North Viet-Nam to destroy military supplies destined to support Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam.
(3)
Harass DRV communist aircraft supplying communist insurgent forces in Viet-Nam by U.S. fighter aircraft.
(4)
Destroy DRV communist aircraft flying supplies to Viet Cong insurgents.
(5)
Attack singly but progressively key military targets in North Vietnam.
(6)
Drop raiding parties for sabotage, and to disrupt LOC’s.
(7)
Conduct aerial mine laying operations.
b.
Sea
(1)
Mine approaches to Haiphong.
(2)
Sink large ship in Haiphong Channel.
(3)
Blockade DRV shipping and fishing vessels. Degree and areas of blockade to progress from less severe to more severe.
(4)
Destroy DRV military naval craft which oppose U.S. maritime action.
(5)
Conduct small amphibious raids.
(6)
Conduct naval gunfire on key coastal targets.
(7)
Conduct underwater demolition team raids (UDT) from surface ships or submarines for beach reconnaissance and beach attacks along the coast of North Vietnam.
c.

Land

(1) Introduce raiding parties into North Viet-Nam overland by infiltration by sea or air drop. Missions to include:

(a)
Raids to destroy command posts, bridges, facilities, etc.
(b)
Ambushes to harass and/or destroy vehicles, patrols, and supply columns.

Resp’y

H.D. Felt
  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-015-69. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that copies were also sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Pacific commands. The Taylor Mission stopped briefly at CINCPAC headquarters on November 2 en route to Washington.↩
  2. See Document 170.↩
  3. This 15-page untitled and undated paper is not printed.↩