Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

179. Memorandum for the Record¹

Saigon, October 20, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Minutes of Intelligence Discussion, 20 October 1961

1. General Taylor conducted a conference of intelligence matters concerning South Viet-Nam in Chief MAAG’s office on 20 October, with following persons in attendance.

• General Taylor
• General McGarr
• General Timmes
• Dr. Rostow
• Mr. Cottrell
• Mr. Colby
• Colonel Bryant
• Major Hyler
• Major Freestone

2. Following is summary of discussion during the approximately two hour conference.

General Taylor asked for explanation of intelligence sources. Col. Bryant described how MAAG field advisors receive, translate and forward all ARVN generated intelligence reports from divisions, corps and Field Command to J2 MAAG; J2 MAAG also receives J2 RVNAF intelligence reports, estimates, studies, etc. Copies of all such reports are in turn transmitted to Army Attache and Evaluation Center-Attache consolidates, comments and forwards to USARPAC, PACOM and ACSI; Evaluation Center processes and produces collateral order of battle …. Within limited capability MAAG J2 utilizes all information received to produce current staff intelligence which is presented in form of weekly staff briefing of enemy situation and a monthly intelligence summary. General McGarr commented that MAAG not specifically charged with intelligence mission to collect information on ARVN and must be careful in this respect so as not to prejudice basic mission, however, do receive information on Viet Cong and North Viet-Nam from opposite numbers.

General Taylor inquired into ARVN intelligence system. Col. Bryant explained it is designed to operate same as US Army with flow from bottom to top. However, GVN also has civilian security/intelligence agencies, such as NPSS, SEPES, etc., which report information through the Province Chief and/or directly back to central headquarters in Saigon without in many cases passing the information to ARVN present in the area.

General Taylor inquired as to how the system should work to provide timely intelligence. It was explained that there should be free and continuous exchange of information at all levels between ARVN battalions/regiments in provinces and the provincial administration (which receives information from civil guard, SDC, police, own intelligence net, etc). However, this is not presently done in a considerable number of instances. Mr. Colby commented that province chief has civil guard, NPSS, own net, etc. reporting information to provincial headquarters and which province chief often uses solely in his own security operations, or reports to GVN in Saigon without disseminating to ARVN in the area. It was explained that intelligence for ARVN military operations comes from ARVN combat intelligence efforts plus that which may or may not be obtained from province administration sources.

Mr. Colby explained the seven intelligence agencies (in contrast to US five) and stated are numerous as President believes intelligence is “power” and through such organizations President is able to control, and by not centralizing them under a subordinate he avoids giving that power to someone who might use it against the President. Agencies are the ARVN intelligence, military security service (controlled by President and not ARVN), NPSS (National Police and Security Service), SEPES (Service for Social and Political Studies), Presidential Liaison Service (a private security service), and the recently organized Central Intelligence Organization which was organized at urging of US in order to pull all intelligence information together centrally, as is not now the case, where it can be collated, processed, and disseminated to users. CIO is having hard time in getting off the ground-lack of full Presidential support, and some other intelligence agencies. General McGarr stressed the great need for timely dissemination of all available intelligence to the military for effective conduct of operations.

Capability of MAAG advisors to collect and report enemy information and activity was discussed, and was explained that under present set up advisors are unable to do little other than collect enemy information from ARVN and forward up. This is because enemy activity is so numerous and widespread and advisors are seldom present on the actual scene of action.

General Taylor commented that reports received in Washington build up large red blots on the map which continue to accumulate as no subsequent information received to up-date situation allowing some units to be removed perhaps, and this possibly gives a misleading and scaring picture back in Washington. Mr. Colby commented that very possible the red blots do not build up as fast as the Viet Cong actually are building.

General Taylor, Mr. Colby, and Major Hyler discussed Viet Cong strengths compiled by Evaluation Center based on compilation of collateral order of battle and special intelligence information (information furnished General Taylor in separate report² and not repeated here). General Taylor stated all reports going to Washington should report VC battalion strengths (or estimates), otherwise present false picture to those who think of battalions as 800-1000 man units. Growth of VC military was discussed and explained that available information indicates armed strength in Delta area has not increased greatly, however, a consolidation and regularizing of forces into regular battalions has taken place. The significant increase has been in the 1st and 2nd Corps areas and indications are this has been accomplished largely by infiltration.

The figure of 200,000 Vietnamese being available to Viet Cong, as stated in GVN Aide-Memoire³ was discussed. It was explained this figure result of RVNAF J2 study based on information from the provinces as to number of villages controlled, or heavily infiltrated by VC (cy of J2 report⁴ available if desired).

Dr. Rostow queried as to order of battle picture at various echelons of ARVN and provincial administration levels. It was explained that province chief normally presents a neat picture of VC situation, but impossible for US personnel to evaluate accuracy. Also, in ARVN, the lower one goes in the units, the worse the situation becomes-in the past RVNAF J2 and Field Command G2 have been quite conservative from a quantity standpoint compared to subordinate divisions and slower in accepting new VC units and strengths. Dr. Rostow asked about interrogation of prisoners. Was explained that US does not participate in this activity, however, we supposedly receive results of interrogations if anything of value is revealed. Prisoners captured by ARVN are normally interrogated at division level then turned over to provincial authorities for trial, rehabilitation, etc. Mr. Colby commented on lack of cooperation in this and other intelligence matters from the NPSS due to antipathy towards Americans of NPSS Chief, Brig Gen La-presently OSA only receives, above board, a monthly roundup report from NPSS, … General McGarr briefly commented on how VC prisoners generally handled in attempt to rehabilitate them. General Taylor stated that POWs should be interrogated to provide evidence of link from NVN in order to make a case for the ICC. Mr. Colby commented that it can be proved that VC went North in 1954-55, trained there and resumed to the South.

General Taylor brought up fact of VC build up in SVN and apparent little increase in Delta area as opposed to Northern 1st and 2nd Corps area. Mr. Colby and others commented that appears Nambo (Delta area) concentrated on organizing a regular force structure from numerous platoon and skeleton-type units with little increase, relatively speaking, in overall military strengths, whereas, Northern area (1st and 2nd Corps) has seen a significant increase in military elements since Fall of 1960. Mr. Colby commented that it is apparent the VC opened up a second front of activity, so to speak, in the Northern Highland and Coastal areas due to considerable GVN success in suppressing activity in the South.

General Taylor brought up subject of casualties both sides. Col Bryant stated we have no confidence in reports received from ARVN on their own casualties, but there are indications that ARVN is becoming more reliable in reporting VC casualties, although still believed to be inflated considerably in specific instances. General Taylor wondered about the large VC casualty statistics commenting it might indicate low quality of recruits. Mr. Colby pointed out that casualties also include any innocent local people who may not have actually been connected with VC, or were at least passive concluding that a dead Vietnamese is always considered a VC by ARVN if killed in area of action. Dr. Rostow queried if study of casualties versus incident rate had been made-answer was no due to unreliability of statistics which would be used (MAAG judges that all statistics are only relative and do not show the complete picture. For example, a considerable amount of VC activity in areas heavily infiltrated or dominated by VC is never reported as there are no friendly sources to report.)

Types of VC (recruited in South, infiltrated, etc) discussed. General consensus that some 70 percent are recruited and trained in the South, approximately 25 percent are regrouped Southerners sent to North after war end (or later), trained, and infiltrated back to South, with some 5 percent probably originating from the North and sent here as political and military cadre.

General Taylor asked if US has capability to interrogate VC prisoners-answer was no due to language barrier, and must use Vietnamese Nationals. This is probably exploitable field as VC prisoners have not been systematically interrogated in past.

General Taylor asked for fundamental facts as to intelligence production by US in country, appears no one charged with nor staffed to do this, all agencies are collectors and reporters. Major Hyler described Evaluation Center operation and fact that MAAG, ARMA,OSA, etc, funnelled information into the Center. General Taylor asked for mission of EC and this furnished by Major Hyler, and which General Taylor read.⁵ It was explained that General McGarr got the Center going to assist in supplying hard targets to ARVN based on special intelligence and concealed as to source of information by use of collateral. The Center reports through SSO to ACSI and Task Force. Product of Center collateral order of battle effort made available to in-country and all US agencies. General Taylor posed question as to what should be done to provide efficient in-country intelligence apparatus for collection, processing, and dissemination of accurate, timely intelligence. Giving MAAG intelligence production capability, bringing in a team from USARPAC, straightening out GVN intelligence processes, were discussed. Mr. Colby stated that OSA has started on GVN but President does not want his intelligence funnelled through one person or agency. MAAG has and is exerting similar efforts in the military field to get MSS (counterintel effort) under the army where it belongs, organize an FOI capability, and train intelligence specialists. General McGarr stated that if US units came in we would want to control intelligence or at least have a strong hand in the effort. General Taylor asked for best way to set up a US intelligence production effort or agency. Col. Bryant expressed belief that Evaluation Center should be expanded. Dr. Rostow commented that first we need personnel to work on the raw material, and that G2 or intelligence activities must work closely with G3 or combat operations. It was also generally agreed that US intelligence effort, however organized, should include an organization to work hand in glove with ARVN intelligence producers to assure the effort is properly conducted, we receive all available information, and to gain benefit of being able to exchange ideas and rapidly clear up questions of doubt concerning translations, etc.

The discussion turned to plans for sealing the border in which General McGarr explained current ARVN plans of consolidating numerous isolated small posts into several large defendable border bases from which ARVN would conduct interlocking patrols, etc. General McGarr mentioned present capability of VC to infiltrate at will through many border points where there are no friendly units. General Taylor asked if important VC groups had been discovered or ambushed coming in from Laos. Mr. Colby stated yes and described several instances, all of which are included in GVN Aide-Memoire with supporting documentary evidence. Dr. Rostow posed question that if US should consider bringing infiltration question up in UN where should UN observers be stationed to detect infiltration. General consensus was that border is like a sieve and a half-dozen or so locations could not effectively detect infiltration along the numerous jungle trails. General Taylor finished reading EC mission, and stated that the US wants to and must know how the war is going from all aspects, and that although EC mission is important, it does not go far enough.

The conference was concluded with General Taylor stating it had been most profitable. However, problem remains as how to institute effective intelligence system for both GVN in countering the VC threat and US in order to be knowledgeable on the overall situation-both GVN and Viet Cong.

1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-015-69. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text, which is attached to a covering memorandum of October 27 from McGarr to Taylor in which McGarr wrote that it was MAAG’s memorandum for the record and was “a summarization of the items covered during the discussion.” not a verbatim account.
2. Apparently a reference to eight pages of outline notes, dated October 20, entitled “McGarr Briefing for Gen. Taylor.” Among the subjects covered in the notes were the terrain and climate in Vietnam, Viet Cong strength, RVNAF casualties and strength, actions which improve the situation in Vietnam, and actions the United States might take. Under this last heading, McGarr said the United States might “employ US combat troops to fight Viet Cong,” but they should not “come in at all unless in sufficient strength to tip the balance.” The minimum force recommended by McGarr was two full divisions, “suitably reinforced and supported with helicopters, engineers, etc.” (Ibid., T-637-71)
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