Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

172. Briefing Paper Prepared by the Embassy in Vietnam¹

No. 2

Saigon, October 17, 1961.

POSSIBLE ACTIONS BY GVN AS QUID PRO QUO FOR ADDITIONAL U.S. SUPPORT

I. Organizational steps:

1. Retain Thuan in one of three jobs he now holds, but appoint capable officials to other two jobs in order permit all three of these key positions function adequately.

2. Delegate real coordinating authority to the three coordinating “super ministers”.

3. Flesh out delegation of authority to Field Command for counterinsurgency operations so that authority will be commensurate with responsibility.

4. Set up functioning internal security councils at central, regional, provincial, and district levels along lines of models used in other countries which have conducted counterinsurgency campaigns.

5. Give Central Intelligence Organization substance, and not just shadow, of authority and control over all intelligence operations.

6. Free both Diem and Assistant Secretary of National Defense from operational functions to sufficient extent to permit them to visit scenes of ARVN victories or defeats immediately after action has occurred and to maintain more frequent informal contact with armed forces in other ways.

7. Higher and more regular pay to local officials.

II. Steps to rally mass support:

1. Increase Diem’s personal contact with people through more informal trips to countryside, by making himself available at palace to ordinary people, either in groups or individually, by occasionally hearing mass in small church or visiting Buddhist Pagoda, et cetera.

2. Travel by Diem, wherever possible, by helicopter directly from palace in order reduce adverse reaction from closing off of streets, motorcades proceeding at high speed, behavior of security guards, et cetera.

3. Frequent, frank, and down-to-earth talks over radio (at least once a month) and on TV if system set up.

4. Use flood actions as opening gambit in campaign for less luxury in Governmenf in view general emergency in which country finds itself.

5. At same time stop emphasizing “sacrifice and discipline” theme in talking to the people and tell them what they are anxious to hear-that better times are coming and that soon they will not be afraid to sleep at night.

6. In Saigon and other cities institute, visit, and dramatize laborconsuming projects for unemployed who have increased considerably as result influx into cities because of insecure conditions in countryside.

7. Initiate and publicize economic and social programs aimed at improving conditions in every village.

8. Proceed set up provincial councils which Diem has already promised publicly.

III. Steps to rally support of educated class:

1. Bring non-Communist political prisoners promptly to trial, including Dr. Dan and Pham Khac Suu.

2. Set up public tribune for free expression of ideas and criticisms as safety valve.

3. Establish political consultative council and consult this body sincerely and frequently. Council should include leading oppositionists since they are not in National Assembly.

4. Try to make it clear that National Assembly can vote freely on measures placed before it. Send back for thorough open debate measures recently adopted at Madame Nhu’s instigation re taxi girls and establishment women’s paramilitary force.

5. Permit opposition parties to operate and put up candidates for 1962 National Assembly elections.

6. In effort reduce criticism of family, place Nhu in ministry where he will have to accept responsibility.

IV. Armed forces:

1. Higher pay or increased family allowances to soldiers.

2. Better food.

3. Better system of promotion.

V. Social

1. Tax reform-higher rates and collections from well-to-do.

VI. Financial:

1. A realistic military rate of exchange.

1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-637-71. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text, but the paper is 1 of 11 attached to a cover sheet entitled, “Briefing Papers: Current Situation in VietNam.” The following papers are not printed: (1) Status of US GVN Action Programs, (3) Geneva Accord Aspects of U.S. Military Assistance to GVN, (4) Summary of Recent Aid Levels and GVN 1962 Budgetary Problem, (5) Fact Sheet-Personnel Build-up of RVNAF, (6) Status of Preparation of a Geographically-Phased Strategic Plan for Bringing VC Subversion under Control, (7) Upgrading Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps Training Equipment, (3) Civilian Counter-Insurgency Plan, (9) Proposed Montagnard Program, (10) Unrest in North VietNam: Current Manifestation and Potential, and (11) Concept of Border Control.