Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, October 12, 1961, 7:33 p.m.

428. Following for your background and guidance in preparing for General Taylor’s visit.

General Taylor will be consulting with Ambassador, General McGarr, other members country team as appropriate,GVN officials and CINCPAC on additional courses of action that can immediately be taken to avoid further deterioration in South Viet-Nam and eventually contain and eliminate the Viet Cong threat. He will be examining possibilities of quickly improving effectiveness of GVN forces, including provision of additional equipment, manned if necessary by US personnel, to extent possible under civilian contract or MAAG cover, as well as possible means of speeding up and improving training GVN forces. He will also explore possibility further increasing size of GVN forces. Concurrently, he will want to look into what possibly could be accomplished by introduction various levels of SEATO or US forces into South VietNam, considering role, composition, and best disposition of alternative force levels, taking account of political and psychological as well as military factors.

General Taylor will also want to examine whether all our military and economic aid is being applied to main problem of internal threat in South VietNam, including its non-military dimensions. He will hope to determine whether greater simplicity and directness can be introduced into chain of economic and military responsibility between Washington and Saigon so as to permit faster reactions on our part. He will be examining all factors without regard to narrow fiscal considerations, on assumption that additional funding will be available if required and that funding should not inhibit us from now expending what may be required to save the situation as compared with incalculable costs that would result from large-scale hostilities involving US forces in Southeast Asia or loss of South Viet-Nam to Communists. General Taylor will hope to receive suggestions on unconventional forms of assistance which might also be brought to bear on this situation if we apply all our initiative and ingenuity.

With respect to GVN, General Taylor will, in his discretion and after consultation with Ambassador Nolting and General McGarr, also expect to talk with President Diem and other GVN officials in whatever terms it is felt are best calculated to bring about those additional political and military reforms which it is considered Diem can and should accomplish if present and contemplated additional US assistance is to be effective. Such assistance necessarily implies an even closer and more intimate relationship between USG and GVN. It will be important that Diem recognize that increase US assistance carries with it inevitably implications additionally involving US prestige, which may involve an increased US voice in GVN affairs.

Problems of ICC and Geneva accords that will inevitably arise from increased US support are of course recognized. Our general philosophy on this is that, while we do not seek to break those accords and will as long as possible attempt to maintain public posture of general compliance with them, we will not permit them materially to inhibit us in doing those things which need to be done.DRV is flagrantly disregarding accords, both with respect to Laos and South VietNam, and ICC frustrated by DRV, its terms of reference, and attitude of Poland and India in carrying out its functions. Therefore, under international law GVN clearly entitled disregard accords at least up to extent they disregarded by DRV. Nevertheless recognize it important establish public and political base for any action which is clearly and publicly in contravention of accords. While GVN has done much in this regard, more remains to be done. Our tentative thinking is along lines of publication by GVN of Jorden white paper, followed by appeal to UN by friendly power on behalf of GVN for observers or other such action prior to action on our part that would clearly and publicly not be in consonance with Geneva accords. Timing of such action will of course require careful coordination and working out with GVN. Jorden, who is traveling with Taylor party, is bringing with him draft of white paper² for clearance and coordination with GVN and will discuss this matter further with you. However, in meanwhile would welcome any views you may have.

Although some members of press are traveling to Saigon on same plane as General Taylor, they are in no sense part of or members of his party nor do they have any special privileges or mandate to cover his mission. In spite of the presence of members of press, it is hoped that public aspects of visit can be minimized and serious working aspects maximized. General Taylor desires that purely social aspects be kept to absolute minimum so as leave himself and party free as possible for large amount of work that will be required.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-1261. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only Ambassador and General McGarr. Drafted by Johnson (G), cleared with Taylor and Rostow and S/S, initialed by Johnson for the Acting Secretary, and repeated to CINCPAC exclusively for Admiral Felt and PolAd.
2. The draft taken by Jorden may have been the one dated October 8, entitled “Communist Subversion and Infiltration in South Vietnam,” a copy of which is ibid., Viet-Nam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, VN 1961 Presidential Program Psychological TF 26 through 31.