Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

159. Letter From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Viet-Nam (McGarr) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)¹

Saigon, October 12, 1961.

Dear General Lemnitzer: I trust that by now you have received my report to CINCPAC on my first twelve months as Chief MAAG Viet-Nam together with the important classified communications intelligence inclosure.² Although this report gives a fair encapsulization of progress, problems yet to be solved, and further objectives together with a projection of our mission into the future, I feel that I should attempt to wrap up in one letter for your personal information, my frank appraisal of the developing situation. My feeling of concern generated by many State and Task Force Viet-Nam messages from Washington of which State-Defense 337³ is a fair example appears to be growing in validity. For your information, all of the members of the Country Team, which is the Task Force group here in Vietnam, received the distinct impression that while this State-Defense message provides welcome and encouraging support, it was written primarily for high level civilian consumption to cover State Department with paper in the eventuality that the situation here goes from bad to worse. Also, State 269 to Saigon (TS)⁴ which went to all Ambassadors in this area dealt largely with military matters was followed by obvious pressure here to get a military statement that RVNAF could commit significant strength in Laos under coalition control. State-Defense 337 was discussed at the Ambassador’s conference during Admiral Felt’s recent visit.⁵ It was mentioned at that time that this message in effect, points up dangers in the situation here of which we were already well aware and which we have previously reported from this end. It then goes on to suggest a number of areas in which we may wish to take further action with the statement and implication that these things should be accomplished within the next thirty days if Viet-Nam were to be saved. Again, these suggested items are mostly items which we have reported from this end and upon which we are working and have made varying degrees of progress. Indications are that State has only recently been “reading their mail” and acquainting themselves with many of the details on the situation here.

For this reason, I feel that for the protection of the Armed Forces of the United States and specifically the Army which runs MAAG Vietnam, you should have my analysis and appraisal of the basic causes behind the presently worsening situation here. Although we are operating on the principle that we must get on with the job and not worry about past mistakes, I am firmly convinced that a history of these past errors is quite necessary to an objective understanding of the developing situation today. This is highlighted by the evident desire of State Department to gloss over or forget previous basic differences of opinion between them and the military, especially in this area, which have contributed so greatly to the present situation and which of necessity will continue to exert a significant and even controlling impact on what happens here in the foreseeable future. The extent of this control will be dependent on the communist timetable.

As you will recall, upon my arrival more than thirteen months ago, I immediately initiated action to increase the military strength of the Armed Forces of Vietnam. This was because the situation here was much more critical than had been indicated to me in my briefings enroute, and because it was apparent that we did not have the required sense of urgency either in Washington or here. Also, because of this deterioration and because it was apparent to me from a political-military viewpoint that the situation had changed radically since the formation of the Armed Forces of Viet-Nam in 1954, I made an all out effort to take the basic steps I considered necessary for improvement. President Diem had foreseen this change ahead of either the Embassy or MAAG here and had since 1955 continuously requested of our various Ambassadors and MAAG Chiefs additional MAP supported forces both regular and paramilitary. I have heard him a number of times ask former Ambassador Durbrow for a raise of 20,000 men in force ceiling. He also, acting on his own, organized the Civil Guard and continued to increase it to its present strength of 68,000, although initially our government’s representatives here and at home refused to support it with MAP or Defense support money. He stated over and over again to Ambassador Durbrow that the situation was worsening, and he did not have the force with which to stop it. As you recall, I fought a losing battle for my first ten months against the entire Country Team, which was then being ably supported by State Department, in an attempt to secure the increased force level which I considered an absolute minimum for the provision of a rotational training base so that the ARVN could be at least partially trained to successfully meet the Viet Cong threat. Contrary to general opinion in Washington then and apparently even now to some extent, this 20,000 was not primarily for the purpose of adding additional combat units for commission to the hot war going on at that time and still going on with increasing tempo. It was mainly for the establishment of a rotational base for training mentioned previously, to strengthen a rudimentary logistical system, and to give additional much needed strength to the engineer support as well as a practically non-existent military intelligence capability here at that time. Although I presented valid military justifications to Ambassador Durbrow and the Country Team here over a period of eight months after my arrival, and although the Ambassador finally admitted that my arguments were sound, he merely stated that in his opinion, additional force was not necessary and he would not approve it.

As you know, State dragged its feet for some months on the initial Defense-ISA efforts to develop a Counter-Insurgency Plan for Vietnam. Prior to State participation, Defense had already issued instructions and MAAG had developed the military portion of the Counter-Insurgency Plan for Viet-Nam as well as a rudimentary political-economic-psychological section as it impacted on the military. When, finally, the State Department directed Ambassador Durbrow in October 1960 to write such a plan,⁶ our completed plan was avidly seized upon as the initial Country Team effort. However, after the initial flowery approval, the Country Team then spent the next six weeks requiring MAAG to rejustify all the military facets of the military section of this Counter-Insurgency Plan before they would let it go forward. Then, some weeks and months later, they finally came up with their comprehensive political-psychological-economic sections.

The main stumbling block on the approval by the Country Team of MAAG’s counter-insurgency section was our unequivocal demand for at least an additional 20,000 addition to the force basis. By State Department directive to the Ambassador here,⁷ the approval of the Counter-Insurgency Plan was then made a quid pro quo for sweeping political reforms. The end result was that Ambassador Durbrow could not get what he considered adequate approval by the Vietnamese Government to this overall Counter-Insurgency Plan which, of course, held up the implementation of the 20,000 force increase. MAAG did go ahead without Counter-Insurgency Plan approval on its reorganization of RVNAF and its drive for a single chain of command as well as other military items which were approved and implemented or gotten underway during the period of the Durbrow-Diem Counter-Insurgency Plan negotiations in which Durbrow attempted to gain political concessions. When Ambassador Durbrow finally informed President Diem of the approval on the 20,000, President Diem’s reaction was cool, stating the approval only allowed him to spend his own money, which he did not have. A few days after the Ambassador left and before the arrival of the new Ambassador, President Diem gave his approval which started the final action on the induction of the 20,000. President Kennedy’s pronouncements on Viet-Nam as well as Vice President Johnson’s visit here, not to mention increasing Viet Cong pressure, made it imperative that this force increase be implemented as soon as possible. However, here again we lost approximately two months more trying to resolve the budgetary problems incident to how much the Vietnamese Government would pay toward the overall military budget. The Vietnamese Government had stated that they could not finance this additional increment of 20,000 and they did not start induction in earnest until after the Thuan visit to Washington and after the budget committee here in Viet-Nam composed of MAAG,GVN and the Country Team had approved the money as a supplement to the 1961 budget. This again lost more valuable time and has further set back the time when these units will become effectively operational. It appears that this “lead time” for induction and training which I emphasized over and over again during my fight for the additional 20,000 has now been more or less conveniently relegated to the background by State, with the approval of the 20,000 and an additional 30,000 at President Kennedy-President Diem level. However, this is one of the primary causes which is at the base of most of our current and future military problems here today. I feel this salient point must be kept in mind and restated periodically in discussions and correspondence affecting the situation as it is developing now. Of course, the facts of life of the impact of Laos was also used during the unsuccessful months of my attempt to obtain the additional 20,000 increase. As we now know, our military estimate on the seriousness of the Laotian situation as it impacts on Viet-Nam was not overstated at that time. Personally, I feel that if the communist steps up his timetable, which is well within his capability, in an effort to take advantage of our weakness here before these additional forces can be organized, trained and brought to bear, we may well lose South Vietnam. If so, the year’s delay in agreeing to increase the Vietnamese Armed Forces would be largely responsible.

The heart of the Counter-Insurgency Plan written by MAAG was the phased, coordinated, cohesive action in the political-military-psychological-economic fields under the overall direction and control of a National Plan to counter the Insurgency. This plan must exploit all elements of National Power, fully consider the border problem and subdivide the country into geographic areas which differ for varying types and degrees of guerrilla activity. This subdivision is based on the availability of food, terrain and characteristics of the population. The concept of operations cannot consist of a series of isolated, uncoordinated skirmishes and pacification measures cannot be applied uniformly in all parts of the country simultaneously because of the prohibitive number of troops this would require. Rather, the concept visualized on a pre-planned basis, the progressive pacification of selected areas. Further, it must be recognized that to drive the guerrilla force from a particular area is only the beginning. The guerrilla “sub surface” or political structure must then be eliminated, and replaced with a viable governmental structure which will rally the population to National objectives. This plan has not yet been written much less implemented. I feel this is currently one of the most important problems which must be solved and that this problem is now basically political as our significant military progress cannot be fully effective until this political progress is made. This is because of the absolute requirement for gaining and maintaining trust and confidence in the established government, particularly at village and hamlet level. Best estimates at present indicate that 25% of the population actively assist the Viet Cong, while another 25 % are sitting on the fence. Military, politico-economic and psychological plans-however fully coordinated at National and Regional level-are meaningless unless an integrated military-civic program is developed, recognized, understood and implemented in the villages and hamlets. It will require exceptionally firm and urgent pressure by our Ambassador and the State Department if we are to have such a plan in time. I have spoken about this necessity to President Diem and Secretary Thuan over and over again as it impacts on the military and have written a number of letters to them without success, copies of which have regularly been sent to you, pointing up the need for such a National Plan so that a Military Operations Plan could be made really meaningful. The government has organized a National Internal Security Council but it is not working to the degree that it is making a meaningful contribution to the overall vital control and coordination of the Counter-Insurgency Plan. The military member tells me, very confidentially as it could mean his neck, that he has little say in the operations of this group on military matters-that he merely goes to be told what to do. This apparently is true in varied degrees for the other agencies of the government also. The end result of this failure to develop a National Plan is disjointed and unconnected governmental actions in the overall counter-insurgency field. These uncoordinated, uncontrolled actions make it very difficult for the military to function effectively in the military phase of this counter-insurgency effort. Consequently, they are mostly reacting to Viet Cong threats rather than acting in an overall coordinated military effort.

As you know, MAAG has been pressuring and assisting the Joint General Staff and Field Command to develop a Military Operations Plan for inclusion in the National Plan when that plan is written. The Counter-Insurgency Plan and Tactics and Techniques of Counter-Insurgent Operations treatise written by MAAG⁸ have been used by the Commanding General of Field Command as a basis for the directives for this Operations Plan. His directives were sound and have gone to the three Corps Commanders for their guidance in writing their portion of the plan on a cohesive, coordinated, countrywide basis. He has received and returned their plans for additional refinement together with his additional guidance. It will probably take some two or three months before the final Military Operations Plan will be completed. Although this is not preventing a more coordinated purely military approach to the overall problem in so far as possible-it is slowing it down. In addition, I am convinced that until a meaningful valid National Plan is produced into which the Military Operations Plan can be integrated, the overall military operation in Viet-Nam cannot be adequately carried out with any certainty of success. At present, our problems are in the area of a firm control and coordinating framework under the National Internal Security Council extending down through subordinate councils or committees at the district, village and hamlet levels. This lack of an adequate framework, together with the chaotic, uncoordinated state of the intelligence effort in this country, will continue to handicap the operations of the military. Although a central intelligence organization has been set up, Colonel Y who is in charge is little more than an office boy, working on mostly inconsequential problems, rather than a director and a coordinator. He is being undercut by other civil intelligence agencies who do not wish to lose their power. It is problematic if President Diem intends to really build up a strong central intelligence office as he appears sensitive to the concentration of power in any one agency. On the military side, MAAG has brought in mobile intelligence training teams and has revamped the intelligence school system here to make it more responsive militarily to field work against the Viet Cong. However, with the lack of cooperation and coordination by the Province Chiefs, who collect intelligence at hamlet and village level and do not adequately inform the ARVN, this improvement in military intelligence cannot be meaningful. Here again is an area in which our Ambassador and the State Department must take necessary strong, positive and early action to insure that we do have an integrated and coordinated national intelligence effort here controlled at national level and reaching down to, and up from, the grass roots “hamlet” level.

I was concerned when State Department directed the Task Force group here to develop a phased Pacification Plan on a dateline basis.⁹ We most certainly agree and have been working for a phased, coordinated, cohesive, geographical plan for clearing the entire country of the communist guerrilla under an overall National Plan. However, it is impossible to get such a pacification plan developed unless we can get an overall National Plan developed first. Even then, it will be impossible to give State Department the phased plan with dates for completion of successive portions of that plan for which they continue to press. I understand second hand that Doctor Rostow and Ben Woods [Wood] are still pushing for this timetable of conquest in the clearance effort here in Vietnam. As previously stated, our recommendations to the government and to the RVNAF have pointed up the need for such a plan, without, however, the unrealistic timetable control. We feel this timetable approach to be highly questionable because of the advanced state of the insurgency and because of the lack of adequate forces to counter it. Although the plan must be geographically phased on the amoeba principle starting with the clearance of various key areas and expanding these areas until the entire country is covered, we do not feel it should or could be prepared on a mechanical timetable basis.

The victories which were won by the 7th and 5th Divisions of the III Corps in the Plaine des Joncs and Delta area in July, August and part of September were heartening to us all. However, these victories must be placed in proper context as they apparently have whetted the appetite of our people back home for additional continuing and successive victories. It is being intimated that we should follow through to complete victory now that we have the Viet Cong on the run. This is in spite of the fact that since 1 September, particularly in the Dak Ha-Pleikodil areas north of Kontum, we started meeting not territorial Viet Cong but regular Viet Cong units in larger numbers of from 500 to 1,500, and these larger Viet Cong units have been gaining successes of their own. I was asked by the Country Team “how could this happen after our victories!” I explained the military facts of life to them but am sure it has not gotten through to their top sides. Basically, the fact is that the operations in the Delta area which were successful were pre-planned set-piece operations. Plenty of time was given to their planning and moving into position and tactical surprise together with superiority of force was gained. Even though the planning, movement to contact and actual operations were surprisingly well done, errors were committed which could have caused failure. In these operations, the Viet Cong in some instances were either cooperative enough or forced by encirclement to stand and fight in larger groups against stiff opposition-which is not their tactic. The reorganization of the Armed Forces with the single chain of command and the progress we have made in our training over the past ten months in developing joint operations gave these divisions the capability to fight the set-piece battle-not the approved strength increase which is not yet inducted and trained. However, the battles up north against larger, better equipped, better trained, more conventional type Viet Cong units coming in from across the Laotian border have been significantly different. There, we have been hit by superior numbers who have taken the initiative, gained surprise and won. Due to the state of ARVN training, follow-up action has not been quick or well coordinated enough to gain decisive results although action of this type has, at times, inflicted comparable casualties on the Viet Cong. We have not yet had the opportunity to train the Armed Forces of Viet-Nam to the degree that they can react to a sizable surprise attack effectively and efficiently. The training which has been given here over the past year has of necessity been a “boot strap” operation by various ARVN units with approximately 75% to 80% of the entire ARVN regularly committed against the communist guerrilla. This leaves little if any time for badly needed training on a pre-planned basis. This is the result again of not having adequate strength to both train and fight and it will be some time in the future, months and probably over a year, until this can be done to the required degree. And, it can only be done then if the communists do not continue the significant increase of infiltration of guerrillas into South Viet-Nam across porous borders which has been going on to my knowledge for the past year. In this respect, I feel it is necessary to keep in mind and to convince our civil opposite numbers in Washington by constant reiteration that the military situation thirteen months ago was critical and that we were only containing the emergency at that time. The build up of additional strength in the 20,000 and the 30,000 increments were for the purpose of providing a rotational training base and liquidating the insurgency, and were predicated on the stated assumption that the communists would not significantly increase their guerrilla strength in South Vietnam. Since the first of the year, this strength has risen from approximately 10,000 to 17,000 with 4,000 of that increase in the past four months. So, again the situation has changed significantly, a fact apparently not fully realized or adequately taken into consideration by Washington civilians. I feel it quite illogical to expect that this long delayed, insufficient and not yet organized or trained additional increment of strength can be expected to account for impressive victories “which should be extended and capitalized upon.” Time, which was thrown away four years ago and even as late as thirteen months ago cannot be recaptured. It cannot be provided under MAP and delivered with the beans and bullets to the soldiers on the battlefield. MAAG is making every possible effort to speed up the training, keep pressure on for more rapid induction and to develop additional badly needed leadership-not to mention the urgent development of an all important National Plan. MAAG recommendations for large scale RVNAF effort against sizable Viet Cong build up in Zone D and along the I-II Corps boundaries have received approval and planning started last week. Properly supported, these look hopeful if done soon enough.

Another area which concerns me and which will no doubt have its impact to a greater and greater degree as the Viet Cong pressure mounts against the Armed Forces here is the force structure and capability of the regular ARVN troops. As you recall, State Department was insistent at the time of my arrival that the ARVN was too conventionally organized and operated. This was never so to the degree that they claimed and most certainly for the past year it has not been valid. Not only Rangers but all ARVN troops have received Ranger oriented training to the full extent allowed by hot war operations here. In figuring the force basis for the 20,000, State insisted on a great number of Ranger companies. We resisted this, fought a losing battle and finally settled for 21 Ranger companies. This was in addition to the 64 Ranger companies already in being which, if properly used, were considered militarily adequate by MAAG at that time. In order to activate these additional 21 Ranger companies, President Diem and the Joint General Staff, contrary to my recommendations, have been cadring all of the required leadership and enlisted strength from ARVN units. They claim that this is the only way they can develop these Ranger companies quickly enough in view of the “worsening” situation. This approach is proving counterproductive. After continued strong representation, I have finally succeeded in getting this system changed so that only 50 % of the leadership and men are taken from the ARVN units. However, I feel serious damage has been done to the capability of the divisional units which have been cadred for this purpose. For instance, the 5th Division is now only at 58/yo strength. In addition to this, Mr. Thuan is now insisting that we form four more airborne battalions from the additional 20,000 troop ceiling for use in the strategic reserve. As you recall, no airborne battalions were programmed in the 20,000. However, one was programmed for the additional 30,000 and three more if we go up to the 273,000. Although not fully supported by ARVN, Mr. Thuan demands all four battalions now, with the implication that we will lose the war if we do not allow this! In this respect, since the arrival of the Thompson Group, who were preceded here by Mr. “Dato” Fenner, Police Commissioner in Malaya for over 25 years and who naturally is a strong advocate of police rather than military counter-insurgency control,¹⁰ Diem and Thuan have tended to blame their defeats and shortcomings on American non-support to an increasing degree. I have agreed to the formation of one more airborne battalion which gives two regimental airborne groups. As only one battalion can be lifted by the airlift we have here at present and as 50 % of the country is impossible for paradrop, I feel this is more than adequate. These battalions, if they are forced upon us, will also be cadred from ARVN units which will further water down the current five airborne battalions as well as divisional capability past the point of no return and seriously unbalance the ARVN force structure. Even the ARVN Airborne Commander is “discreetly” concerned over this quantity vs quality approach. Frankly, the GVN appears to feel they can get anything they want, regardless of MAAG recommendations by going through the Ambassador to top American levels. What we need to win is National control and coordination of effort, not just hardware! I have alerted the Ambassador on this need and discussed it with him at some length. At present, he apparently agrees with me that we must present a united front but appears to be moving slowly on the problem.

Lemnitzer’s memorandum to Taylor, October 12, endorsing McGarr’s views is in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 324-326.

I have told Mr. Thuan and the top commanders here that in my professional opinion, they have watered down the capability of the regular ARVN divisions beyond the danger point and I have strongly recommended that raiding these outfits to form special forces stop. The civilian top side here insists that this is the only way they can quickly build the military units with the proper esprit. In this respect, as you will recall, I have written letters to both President Diem and Mr. Thuan stating that units trained as Rangers are being used improperly on static guard duty and as Province Chiefs’ body guards. A recent MAAG study shows a developing morale problem in the Ranger companies due to this misuse and poor support. I have also pointed out that the airborne units and the marine units in the strategic reserve are being used improperly which is breaking up their tactical integrity and cohesiveness as fighting units. This is also beginning to affect their morale. These small so-called elite groups lend themselves to misuse by the President through the Province Chiefs or by directive to ARVN as they are tailored in nice convenient packages. I have pointed this out in my attempts to convince Mr. Thuan that it would be unwise to form more airborne units. However, “airborne” has a magic connotation here and he is continuing to push for this. Actually, the facts of life for some time to come will be their continued use as regular infantry or truck transported units because of lack of airlift, airfields and large areas of operations. I cannot in good faith from my professional experience agree with the formation of new special units at the expense of the ARVN when it lowers the overall fighting capability of the entire armed forces. I do not believe the “psychological lift” claimed by the GVN compensates for an unbalanced Force Structure. This may be taken up over my head and, if so, I would appreciate your assistance. I have explained this situation to the Ambassador and as of now he agrees with me. However, GVN pressure could change this. If this continues, and if the communists continue to step up their timetable as is the case at present, we will be in bad shape to meet their growing conventional capability, already evidenced in the fighting in the north since 1 September.

I understand that State Department is again going to push for more Ranger companies in the 30,000 troop increase. In this respect, we have in the approved 30,000 troop increase two divisions which are badly needed, one each in the I and II Corps now being hit by the larger better equipped, better trained Viet Cong units infiltrating in from Laos. With the three more airborne battalions being demanded, this will be impossible and we should remember that the insistence on these Rangers does not emanate from here. Although this is a year in the future and may sound academic now, I feel we must insist on holding the line against these special type units especially as they are too often being used improperly and, therefore, do not contribute to the overall military posture of the country as they could and should.

I have mentioned the possible step up of the communist timetable and feel this could be a determining factor in holding South Vietnam. I am firmly convinced that our country’s actions in Laos, Berlin and Iran will determine whether or not the timetable out here is to be stepped up by the communists. This is another point which I feel must be continually stressed to the field marshals in the State Department who will then be wondering why, with all the aid and promises of assistance which they have already given us, we cannot hold South Vietnam. In this regard, at a Country Team meeting today, I tabled a recommendation that we take advantage of the many Washington offers of help to request that the solution in Laos include assurance that the Lao border be sealed or sanitized by political action-international if necessary. This is the best way to help us here. Of course, I have long fought for meaningful politico-military action to seal the Cambodian border without success. I feel it boils down to the fact that unless these points are made crystal clear over and over again in all dealings with these people in higher civilian levels, the military will be blamed for a situation here which is not of its own making and for which it has not been adequately supported by our country. As I am jealous of the professional good name of our Army, I do not wish it to be placed in the position of fighting a losing battle and being charged with the loss. Of course, we will continue the fight, but the ultimate battle will be won or lost as a result of DOD actions vis-à-vis State on military matters. I know you will continue to do all in your power to hold the line.

Although this is a frank objective reading from where I sit, I wish to emphasize strongly that I am not overly pessimistic or defeatist. Neither am I overly optimistic. I feel we still have a chance to pull this one out of the fire but that that chance is getting slimmer and slimmer due to the communist build up, the impact of past failures on our part to allocate adequate, timely resources to this country and the impact of possible future developments in Laos and elsewhere-not to mention the problems involved in adequately training the troops. Also, a continuing problem is the difficult job MAAG has without command authority of any kind whatsoever to get the GVN to take the proper politico-military measures which will adequately coordinate the overall counter-insurgency effort from the viewpoint of required political-military-economic-psychological actions. These interlocking political actions need more pressure from our political side if they are to be accomplished in time!

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lionel C. McGarr¹¹
Lieutenant General. USA

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 334, MAAG/Vietnam Files: FRC 64 A 2424, 250/16 Operations Planning. Secret.
2. A copy of this report, dated September 1, is attached to a memorandum of October 25 from McGarr to Nolting. (Ibid., RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, Internal Security 1961)
3. Document 136.
4. Not found.
5. See Document 142.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. I, p. 604.
7. Transmitted in telegram 1054 to Saigon, February 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/1-461) For text of the basic counterinsurgency plan, see Document 1.
8. A copy of this treatise, first published on November 10 and 15, 1960, and then reissued in four revised versions, the last of which was dated February 10, 1962, is in Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files:FRC 66 A 878, Internal Security 1961.
9. Not further identified.
10. McGarr sent a lengthy analysis of his reasons-for opposing the concept of police rather than military control in telegram SGN 693 to Lemnitzer, October 11. (National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, 1961 Eyes Only Messages)
11. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.