Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

15. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, February 28, 1961, 7 a.m.

1414. Joint Embassy-USOM-MAAG message. Our 1391.²GVN SecState for Presidency Thuan given briefing on military aspects Counterinsurgency Plan Feb 27 in response his request. Political, psychological, and economic aspects of plan not included since Thuan indicated he understood those aspects but Emb and USOM representatives present to answer questions in those fields. During briefing and as result suggestion that discussion be opened on procedure for reaching agreement between two govts on plan, Thuan expressed views re certain aspect of plan:

On military aspects Thuan said:

1. He in general agrees with recommended organizational changes in DOD and has already initiated action to study these. Specifically change of director of personnel into manpower directorate with shift of operational management to JGS is being studied. Also consolidation of signal services with signal command in ARVN is under study. He stated he sees no problem in consolidating Navy and AF technical service directorate within Navy and AF HQS respectively.

2. With regard to consolidation of Engineer Command Services Thuan expressed considerable doubt. He fears that placing of responsibility in one man for expenditure of largest portion of military budget (other than pay and food) is not proper. He stated frankly temptations are too great. This problem is being studied.

3. The recommendation that certain powers of Director of Administration, Budget and Accounting be decentralized to Joint General Staff, Thuan expressed concern that military do not have qualified personnel to assume operational phases of financial and budgeting matters.

4. In discussing the requirement for some type of JGS reorganization which would establish centralized operational control for counterinsurgency, Thuan asked about relationship between a junior general, as Chief of Staff, with a senior general, as Chief of Operations Division, or Chief of Field Command. Thuan appeared to understand US Command relationship (chief of staff acting only for his chief) but feared it could not be applied to personalities in RVNAF.

5. Thuan expressed considerable concern over the government’s inability to control inland waterways in south. He was particularly worried about minor canals which lead to major waterways. MAAG concept of area control, securing an area from VC then moving on to an adjacent area, was described to Thuan in considerable detail as an approach to solution of this problem.

6. Thuan recalled Gen McGarr’s suggestion of “no man’s land” along border. He stated that this would require movement of many villages within this area and would present problems of considerable magnitude for GVN.

7. In summary he stated that recommended composition of 20,000 man force increase was acceptable. He stated that most of DOD reorganization might be accepted within day or two, except as noted above. JGS reorganization (centralized control for counterinsurgency) would be expedited and an answer might be expected in about a week.

On economic side Thuan said decree being issued on measures to place tax collections on current basis and that discussion would be undertaken with USOM about other means financing counterinsurgency plan on imminent return of Hoang Thanh, Chairman Credit Commercial, from abroad. These discussions would relate particularly to deficit financing since Thanh had already discussed sale government bonds with local banks who might take up to 1.5 billion piasters in such bonds at 3 per cent. Thuan said rubber taxes now in force would increase yield from rubber companies by 200 million piasters annually (his estimate given on Feb 25 to USOM director was 180 million).

On political side Thuan commented in general terms that GVN is taking measures along lines proposed in plan. Emb officer agreed this is true with respect certain of recommended measures. Thuan then took up specific political measures proposed in plan (enclosure 2 despatch 351³) emphasizing action being taken on certain recommendations but skipping over others:

1. He said that as GVN ministers already appear before National Assembly committees they could be questioned about operation their departments and he indicated this might be done publicly. GVN however opposed adoption of US system of investigation by legislative branch of executive department since that exists in no other country. It was pointed out that main purpose our suggestion was to find means to dispel rumors and doubtful that limited questioning of ministers would achieve that objective.

2. Thuan said wider legislative initiative now being permitted but made no comment on broader publicity about debate in National Assembly.

3. He said appointment oppositionists to cabinet posts would depend upon their acceptance of policy of chief. Was pointed out to him however that establishment national unity, which vital for conducting war against insurgents, may well require compromise on both sides. Thuan referred to current efforts outside government to establish national unity front (our G-346⁴).

4. He said he would take up with president proposals about altering or disbanding Can Lao Party.

5. He noted quickly in passing that GVN agreeable to encouragement adoption liberal press code bill by Assembly, to more frequent press conferences and to permit foreign correspondents to travel in interior.

6. He said arrangements for Vietnamese to study abroad already liberalized and noted even relatives of oppositionists permitted go abroad for study. He said SecState Interior Vui Van Luong had eased restrictions on departure Vietnamese from Viet-Nam after assuming office last Oct. Thuan claimed no particular difficulties exist about exit from Viet-Nam other than those related to foreign currency restrictions and fears of smuggling. (We believe there has been some recent easing of controls for leaving Viet-Nam. USOM reports students taking its competitive examinations for scholarships now being approved by GVN on straight merit basis. CAS states delays met by other Vietnamese in obtaining passports appreciably cut down since Luong took over Interior and lower level officials instead of denying applications also required provide superiors with reasons for proposing deny issuance of passports.)

On internal security council aspects of plan Thuan expressed intention increase authority of present secretary of council (Permanent Secretary General for National Defense) but Embassy suspects that SecState for Presidency himself will continue to be main coordinator of ISC decisions. Thuan said GVN considering establishment internal security council at regional, provincial, district and village levels, noting that British had also recommended this idea since it was used successfully in Malaya.

Country Team Representatives told Thuan in conclusion that Ambassador would probably wish discuss plan (especially political aspects) further with GVN on his return.⁵

Cunningham

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/2-2861. Confidential. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Vientiane, London, Paris, and CINCPAC for PolAd.
2. Telegram 1391, February 22, reported that in a meeting with Thuan, Durbrow stressed the need to discuss the counterinsurgency plan and work out an agreed program of action. Thuan replied that he and other Vietnamese officials had not yet had a chance to study the plan carefully. (Ibid., 751K.5-MSP/2-2261)
3. See footnote 3, Document 11.
4. Dated February 16, it reported the efforts of the Government of Vietnam to create a broad peoples’ organization, which included both opposition and government supporters. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.001/2-1661)
5. Durbrow raised the question with Thuan on March 11, but the Secretary of State for the Presidency added little to the information in this telegram. Durbrow concluded his report on the conversation by stating that he would confine to press for a detailed agreed plan. (Telegram 1454 from Saigon, March 11; ibid., 751K.5-MSP/ 3-1161; Declassified Documents, 1975, p. 315A)