Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

108. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Southeast Asia Task Force (Steeves) to the President¹

Washington, July 28, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Southeast Asia Task Force Interim Report

Your Task Force on Southeast Asia is engaged in a preliminary review of our policy for the Southeast Asia peninsula which includes Thailand, VietNam, Laos and Cambodia. The object of our study is to devise a course of action to arrest communist encroachment into that area. The consensus, on a preliminary examination of the problem, brings us to the following conclusions:

1. It is essential to our policy interests in Asia, and indeed globally, to ensure the security of Southeast Asia against further communist advancement, whether communist strategy takes the form of political take-over or whether they intend to accomplish the task by covert or overt military means.

2. We should make the basic decision now to resist this encroachment by appropriate military means, if necessary, with or without unanimous SEATO support. The loss of Southeast Asia to the free world would be highly inimical to our future strategy and interest.

3. Any approach to the solution of this problem must entail a coordinated package approach involving the entire peninsula if the action is to be effective. It must encompass appropriate political, economic, psychological and military measures.

4. We recognize the DRV as the immediate focal point of the threat to the peninsula and whatever action is taken should bear on this objective if both Laos and Viet-Nam are to be secured and the approaches to the rest of the peninsula blocked.

5. A strategy and concept to accomplish our purposes contains the following ingredients:

a. At Geneva, our delegation should be instructed that the “sticking point” in our negotiations be our insistence on an effective, well-equipped ICC with adequate terms of reference as the minimum price we will demand for our military disengagement in Laos. This must not be made dependent on the uncertain effectiveness of any future RLG for the security of the entire peninsula must not be left dependent on the traditionally weak RLG, incapable of stemming communist aggression after the pattern of the past twelve years.

b. In Laos, our policy will be to keep a steady rein on the RLG, simultaneously encouraging it not to agree to the formation of a coalition government that would merely be a prelude to communist take-over.

c. Training and support of the FAL in and out of Laos will continue in a moderately increasing tempo to place that force in as good a posture as possible to resist any possible breach of the cease-fire or contain the Pathet Lao offensive.

d. While we will continue to encourage negotiation for a genuinely neutral Laos under proper safeguards, we will be prepared to support a divided Laos under a non-communist government rather than accept a so-called unified Laos under a communist-oriented government with an inadequate control commission resulting from failure to arrive at a suitable agreement in Geneva.

e. Give early indication to Thailand that we stand ready to take appropriate measures diplomatically, militarily and economically to strengthen her position. In Thailand’s present disillusioned and somewhat discouraged state, it is essential that her cooperation be insured. Thailand’s strategic position, quite apart from other considerations, makes her a key to any adequate Southeast Asia position.

f. In Viet-Nam we accept as general guidance the outline of the Staley report for improving the economic and military situation in VietNam.

g. In carrying out our programs based in Viet-Nam covert action be conducted to interdict North Vietnamese pressure on South Viet-Nam and, if these contacts do not prove successful, eventually give overt indication that the continuation of DRV aggressive policy towards Laos and Viet-Nam may result in direct retaliatory action against her.

h. Inasmuch as existing military plans have concentrated on the SEATO Plan Five type of operation in Laos [and?] do not seem adequate for this present strategy, a military plan be devised with or without SEATO concurrence but obviously include as many members of SEATO as possible to coordinate military action in Viet-Nam and Laos directed at the reduction of the threat based in the DRV should all efforts at a Deacefu1 settlement fail.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, Southeast Asia-General 7/25/61-7/28/61. Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text. A typewritten, undated, and unsigned note attached to the source text reads as follows: “This was brought to the meeting by Mr. Steeves, and discussed with the President by Mr. Steeves and Mr. Johnson.” The meeting under reference is apparently the one recorded in the memorandum of discussion, Document 109.