Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

80. Message From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles⁰

London, undated.

Dear Foster: I have just got back from fourteen days’ holiday in Spain and have been “reading myself in” on the situation in the Formosan Strait.

2. I hasten to send you my sympathy in the heavy burden of responsibility which you are carrying in these new developments. We await your further reply to Harold’s message of the 5th September¹ and I understand that you are to see HAROLD CACCIA tomorrow morning. In the meantime, I Felt that I should let you know my own first reactions to the situation.

3. What Churchill, Eden and Harold himself, when Foreign Secretary, stated in 1955 as our position over the off-shore islands is well-known to you. I have myself, whenever questioned, referred back to those statements as representing our views. Had Parliament been sitting now, no doubt I would have had a flood of questions designed to elicit the same answer.

4. Nevertheless, we want, as Harold put it in his message, to steer our public opinion towards an understanding of what is involved and to help and support you in any way that is possible. Your troubles are our troubles. In these days this is a matter of hard fact, not just sentiment. Therefore, I want, so far as is possible having regard to our previous statements, to prevent any open difference of opinion as to how to handle the present situation being revealed between us and to try to work together towards a common position.

5. This message, therefore, is how I would open the conversation were we talking together about the matter.

6. First, I share your views as to the Communist menace in the Far East. I believe in the importance of your containing line, i.e., Japan, South Korea, Okinawa, Formosa, South Vietnam, with such support as our position in Malaya and Hong Kong may afford. I believe that there is now beginning to be a wider recognition of the importance of this line than before although I must admit that for the past ten years Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek have been exceedingly unpopular figures in the United Kingdom. Therefore, it should be an object of Western policy to seek to maintain and not to weaken this line until there is a change in the attitude of the Chinese Communists (if ever).

7. Secondly, I must say that I feel that this line is weakened not strengthened by Chinese Nationalist retention of Quemoy and Matsu. The supply of their forces on the islands is hazardous, the islands themselves are very vulnerable to harassing fire by the Communists and their defence against attack is difficult. If that defence were to involve the use of even tactical nuclear weapons, then the risks involved for all of us by a process of chain-reaction are obvious. My view is that if a Nationalist withdrawal could be effected in a reasonable manner, it would strengthen not weaken Chiang Kai-shek and the anti-Communist line.

8. But what is a “reasonable manner”? I fully realise that if there is to be a withdrawal the Nationalists must have something to show for it. Perhaps the Warsaw talks (which I refer to below) might open up a prospect you could accept, and conceivably if they do not themselves do so, the United Nations could at that point somehow help. But I do feel that, if a settlement of this kind were not entirely one-sided, its consequences on other countries’ confidence in your position and determination in the area need not necessarily be quite so grave as you fear.

9. I know that some will say that withdrawal from any out-post position is a sign of weakness. In a sense it is. It may be the only way to avoid a defeat. If so, it is not weakness. I suppose it is even conceivable that some of your allies in Asia, and many of the uncommitted countries there, would even feel greater faith in your determination to stand on essentials if you and the Nationalists were able to prove together that you were prepared to compromise on an issue which so many people regard as less than vital.

10. I do not think it necessary to consider the longer term position of China. There is a view that if Communist China was within the United Nations it might be more controllable. I do not know. I think the answer is probably ‘yes’ to a limited extent. But this year we shall vote for the moratorium although I expect it will be a difficult debate.

11. To return to the immediate problem is there any way in which we can help? We have tried to give some support for your position by saying that we fully shared the concern of your government at any attempt to impose territorial changes by the use of force. Suggestions have been made about reference to the Security Council or to the General Assembly. If the matter were to be referred to the Security Council, the Communist Chinese might refuse to take part in any discussion on Article 2(7) grounds and that refusal might help us. There are obvious dangers of the matter going to the General assembly as an item although it is bound to be a subject of discussion in the general debate. We await your views on a demilitarization solution although in their present frame of mind I doubt very much whether the Communists would accept this even if the Nationalists did. In the meantime, the only suggestion I have is that the importance of the Warsaw talks might be stressed, their level perhaps heightened and the possibility of their being followed by still higher level talks might be hinted at. I am, of course, unaware of what the President will say tonight, but I repeat: is there any way in which we can help? Having regard to our 1955 statements, we are perhaps in a good position to float any idea which you do not want initially to sponsor yourself.

12. Harold has had a long message from Diefenbaker rather on the lines anticipated in his message to you of 5th September. He has sent a non-committal reply.

With every good wish,

SELWYN²

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret. Filed with a September 11 covering note from British Ambassador HAROLD CACCIA.
1. Document 70.
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.