Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

76. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, September 8, 1958, 10:21–11:53 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Resumption of Ambassadorial Talks with Chinese Communists

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. William B. Macomber, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations
• Mr. Loftus E. Becker, Legal Adviser
• Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
• Mr. Marshall Green, Regional Planning Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. LaRue R. Lutkins, Deputy Director for Chinese Affairs

Mr. Robertson opened by reviewing the status of our moves to effect a resumption of the talks: Mr. Martin’s letter of July 28 to Ambassador Wang,¹ Ambassador Beam’s subsequent approaches to the Chinese Communist Embassy in Warsaw on August 4 and August 7 [6],² Chou En-lai’s reference to resumption of the talks in his August [September] 6 statement, and the White House release of the same day.³ The question now was which side should make the next move. In his opinion we were entitled to a response to our overtures before making any further move. He thought there was a psychological factor involved which might be important with respect to the success of the renewed talks. If the Chinese Communists were to conclude from our actions that we were panting for a resumption of the talks, the result might well be a hardening of their attitude. He expressed the opinion that while we certainly should not let small factors such as our already having approached the Chinese Communists stand in the way of our larger objectives, we might be well advised to delay further action for a while. After consideration of the possibility of an unpublicized phone call inquiring whether Ambassador Wang had received any instructions, the Secretary suggested the idea of Ambassador Beam sending a copy of the White House statement to Wang. He said that it would be very useful if at his press conference the following day he were able to state that a copy of the White House statement had been delivered to Wang. It was agreed that this would be a useful and desirable step, enabling us to sound out Peiping’s reactions while still leaving the initiative with them. The Secretary then dictated a telegram to Ambassador Beam instructing him to write Wang enclosing a copy of the White House statement, calling his attention to the fifth paragraph on our readiness to resume the talks, and stating that he would await further word from him.⁴

Mr. Robertson raised the question of what our response should be in the event that the Chinese Communists should propose continuing the talks in Geneva. The Secretary thought that we should go along with such a proposal, silly as it would appear for the two representatives to be traveling from their post of residence to Geneva. Being more complicated and time-consuming than talks in Warsaw, such an arrangement would in fact serve our purpose, which was to string the talks out as much as possible. Mr. Robertson commented that meetings in Geneva would also simplify matters for us inasmuch as our advisor and interpreter were both stationed in Switzerland.

Mr. Kohler speculated in the light of the Khrushchev letter to the President that the Communists regarded resumption of the ambassadorial talks as only an interim move pending a call for something at a higher level. The Secretary and Mr. Robertson agreed, with the former stating that he was quite surprised Peiping hadn’t proposed a higher level meeting rather than a resumption of the ambassadorial talks. Mr. Robertson thought the explanation might be the Communists’ uneasiness as a result of the firm stand we had taken; their aim was probably to get the ambassadorial talks back on the tracks first and later plug for something higher. Later in the meeting the Secretary expressed the opinion that Peiping would probably try to push the talks hard during the next few weeks. If nothing constructive were to be accomplished, it would then be argued in the General Assembly that the problem must be considered at a higher level.

The Secretary asserted that there were two problems involved in the situation which were at least partially separable; (1) the question of Nationalist jurisdiction over the offshore islands; he did not see that we had any basis for altering our position on this point in any respect; (2) the question of Nationalist use of the islands as bases for military and subversive activities against the mainland; on this we were not in too good a position in international law. Mr. Becker believed that at one time they had been used as staging areas for subversive operations on the mainland. The Secretary’s understanding was that this was much less true now than might have been the case in the past, but he said that an effort should be made to find out on an urgent basis the nature and extent of Nationalist activities undertaken from the islands in recent months which could with justification be regarded by the Communists as provocative. It was agreed that information should be immediately sought from Embassy Taipei, Defense and CIA.⁵

The Secretary said it was his own feeling that we shouldn’t really expect the Communists to refrain from attacking the islands if they were being used as bases for hostile activities against the mainland. He wondered if it might be possible to arrive at some sort of modus vivendi whereby Nationalist jurisdiction over the islands would be recognized but there would be some type of demilitarization. He mentioned that the President, among others, had long believed that it was absurd to have a large proportion of the GRC forces tied up as hostages in such a vulnerable position. Stating that he had mentioned the concept of demilitarization in discussing possible solutions with Lord Hood, he commented that Prime Minister Macmillan had seized upon the idea and attached undue weight to it. Mr. Robertson expressed the view that demilitarization would not be a practical solution since it would leave the islands completely exposed to Communist seizure at whatever time they chose to strike. He emphasized that for us to propose such a solution would provoke a tremendous row between the United States and the GRC which would bitterly resist it. However, he thought we were on strong grounds in calling on the Nationalists not to use the islands as bases for provocative operations against the mainland.

The Secretary continued to explore the question, arguing that if we were to conclude a demilitarization agreement with the Communists and they were then to violate the agreement by seizing the islands we would have a strong case in world eyes for retaliating. He realized, however, that President Chiang would not find a proposal along these lines palatable. He agreed with Mr. Robertson that the Communists would never agree to any de facto recognition of Nationalist jurisdiction over the islands in return for demilitarization. In his view this was precisely the reason why such an approach would provide us with a strong negotiating position. We would soon face a strong Communist effort at the United Nations to mobilize world opinion against us, and it was therefore necessary to give careful thought to our public posture. We should, of course, not give an inch on the basic principle involved, namely, rejection of the use of force to pursue territorial ambitions. However, the fact that his slight mention of demilitarization to Lord Hood had been seized on so strongly by Macmillan in reinforcing the latter’s argument that such an approach would make British support of the United States easier was an indication that the demilitarization concept might have some merit.⁶

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the GRC attitude with respect to the offshore islands was a strongly emotional one and that they would bitterly oppose any suggestion that these territories be given up. The Secretary stated that he was not suggesting that the islands be given up. Mr. Becker observed that the suggested proviso requiring Chinese Communist de facto recognition of GRC jurisdiction over the islands almost certainly ruled out Peiping acceptance of a demilitarization proposal along these lines. What we were really seeking, therefore, was merely to improve our negotiating posture in the eyes of the world.

The Secretary declared that the essential thing now was to sift out the extraneous elements of the problem and come to grips with the basic questions. The Chinese Communists should not, of course, enjoy the right to employ force to seize territory which had never been under their control. However, their line that the offshore islands were a constant thorn in their side because of GRC use of them to blockade the posts of Amoy and Foochow and harass the mainland was apt to have considerable appeal. He continued that world opinion would not be satisfied if we were to go back to the ambassadorial talks and merely replay an old record, asking the Chinese Communists to accept the formula of renunciation of force. We must get down to realities, though great care must be taken in view of our pledge not to discuss anything affecting the interests of the GRC.⁷

Mr. Green stated we might consider making it the first order of business in the renewed talks to examine means of avoiding provocative actions on both sides. We might suggest that each side prepare a list of the actions of the other side which it regarded as provocative, and that an effort then be made to reach agreement on steps that might be taken to discontinue such actions. Even if this approach proved fruitless, we would at least have gotten on the record evidence that we had made a fresh, positive effort to deal with the situation. The Secretary commented that he was thinking along much the same lines. Our efforts during the past three years to obtain an abstract agreement from the Chinese Communists on renunciation of force had not worked. It might, therefore, be useful to ask them to tell us what actions of ours they regarded as provocative and say that we on our side would put forward certain practical actions of theirs which we considered provocative. We might then consult and see how some of these actions on both sides could be eliminated. Mr. Robertson Felt that it would not be possible to make any such approach at the first meeting. For one thing, we must first consult with the GRC if we planned to pursue such a line, and secondly Wang would almost certainly come back and say that the basic provocation on our part was our alleged occupation of Taiwan. The Secretary said he realized that much that might develop from such an approach might serve only to expose the real purpose of the Communists, which in itself would be of some use to us, but that it might also produce something that we could really talk to them about.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–858. Top Secret. Drafted by Lutkins on September 11 and approved by Parsons for Robertson. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles’ appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)
1. See footnote 1, Document 18.
2. Telegram 173 from Warsaw, August 6, reported that Beam had had a call made to the Chinese Embassy on August 4 to request an appointment for him to see Wang on August 7. When a follow-up call was made on August 6, the caller was informed that Wang had referred the matter to his government and would get in touch with Beam when he had a reply. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–658)
3. See footnotes 2 and 4, Document 71.
4. Sent as telegram 220 to Warsaw, September 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–858) Telegram 229 to Warsaw, September 8, instructed Beam that when Wang made contact with him, he should propose meeting at the Swiss Embassy to discuss practical arrangements and procedures for the talks. (Ibid.; see Supplement)
5. Telegram 201 to Taipei, September 8, requested information on this subject. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–858; see Supplement)
6. In a September 7 telephone conversation with Green, Dulles had requested that the question of demilitarization be considered in connection with drafting Beam’s instructions. Green attached a memorandum of the conversation to a memorandum of the same date to Robertson, with an attached paper headed “Demilitarization of the Offshore Islands.” (Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 51 7, Offshore Islands (Misc.) Sept. 1–Sept. 11, 1958; see Supplement)
7. At a news conference on September 9, Dulles stated, “We hope that out of the talks will come, as a minimum, a modus vivendi which will assure that the issues there will not be resolved by recourse to force.” For the transcript of the news conference, see Department of State Bulletin, September 29, 1958, pp. 485–493.