360. Letter From the Ambassador to Poland (Beam) to the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Martin)0
Dear Ed: At Ralph Clough’s suggestion we are writing you about some ideas we have been discussing here.
The sterile atmosphere of our last exchange with Wang and the exceptionally long interval before the next meeting have prompted us to consider whether anything might be done to re-inject some concrete, small issue into the meetings on which both sides would have some negotiating leeway. It would have to be a proposal from which, if finally agreed upon, both sides could derive some benefit. In order to render it more difficult for them to reject, it should also be a proposal, the rejection of which by the Chinese Communists would make them look unreasonable and adamantly hostile to the U.S. The introduction of such a proposal would enable us to test the firmness of their determination not to discuss “minor” issues, and might have certain other advantages which I will discuss below.
[Page 735]Whether we should take the initiative suggested depends ultimately on the conception we have of the purpose of the diplomatic channel to Peiping provided by the Warsaw talks, and that, in turn, depends upon how we visualize the future shape of our relations with the Chinese Communists. We recognize that such projections cannot extend far into the future in today’s uncertain world and we would not presume to suggest from here what even our short-range objectives and tactics should be with respect to Peiping. However, whatever they are determined to be, the Warsaw talks can conceivably provide a useful tool.
There is some danger that the usefulness of the talks as a tool will be impaired if they are permitted to degenerate completely into nothing more than a barren exchange of charges and counter-charges. If both sides become accustomed to regarding them as merely a propaganda gimmick, it may become increasingly difficult to conduct any serious negotiations through this channel. The likelihood of such a development would increase if Wang were replaced by a more doctrinaire type of negotiator who had no experience of the early stages of the talks when a real effort was made on both sides to keep the propaganda content down and concentrate on limited and therefore negotiable points. It seems to us that the less “hard” content there is to the talks, the more likely it is that when Wang is replaced we will find ourselves faced with a man whose forte is propaganda, and with whom it may be far more difficult than with Wang to negotiate on practical problems.
Of course, when we come down to conceiving a practical subject to discuss, it isn’t easy. Without being able from here to see precisely how actions at these talks fit into the whole picture of our relations with Communist China, we would imagine that these actions should be designed, in part at least, to demonstrate to Peiping that our relationship is not a frozen one, soluble only through war. It is admittedly difficult to project a convincing message of this sort through the veil of dogma, hostility, suspicion and ill-will which obscures the outlook of the Chinese Communist leaders. It may be impossible; but we would think it worth working at.
The most promising area in which to work still seems to us to be that of exchange of persons, particularly journalists. Although our last effort was rejected in a way which led almost inevitably to the conclusion that the Chinese Communists don’t want American journalists in mainland China under any conditions which we could accept, it should still be possible to devise new approaches. For example, we might offer to exchange lists of journalists from which each side would consider whether it could select 2 or 3 names of persons it would be willing to admit. Through discussion in Warsaw an equal number from each side could be agreed upon. This would ensure numerical reciprocity without binding us in advance to accept anyone they might propose. Other variations of this idea are possible. It might be extended to professors, for example. Obviously, [Page 736] any such idea contains problems which we probably cannot foresee from here, but we just put these up as points of departure.
The next meeting might be a particularly favorable time to table a specific proposal, or if we are not ready to table one, to hint that we might at the following meeting. Despite Peiping’s disparaging remarks about our new President, the Chinese Communists are bound to be curious to see whether anything has changed and they may be more receptive—or conceivably more suspicious—regarding our next moves.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files: Lot 71 D 368. Secret; Official–Informal.↩