356. Editorial Note
At the 464th meeting of the National Security Council, October 20, 1960, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed Sino-Soviet relations during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Robert H. Johnson, October 24, reads as follows:
“Mr. Dulles next turned to the Sino-Soviet dispute, describing a review of the dispute which Khrushchev made to the satellite leaders while they were in New York. Khrushchev had stated that the U.S. was now deterred from war by the military strength of the USSR. While the USSR could liberate the world from capitalism by war, to do so would now set humanity back centuries. Therefore, the USSR could not urge war. The Communist Chinese, he said, did not understand this situation. They cited Lenin’s authority and argued that peaceful co-existence will lead to the downfall of socialism. Khrushchev stated that the Chinese did not understand that Lenin taught the inevitability of war before any [Page 730] socialist society existed. Lenin would have revised his views today because socialist systems are now in existence. Khrushchev made the following charges, among others, against the Chinese: the Chinese were engaged in splinter activity; they pretended to accept Soviet leadership but actually rejected it; they say that Nehru and Nasser support imperialism and thus antagonize these important leaders; they refuse the USSR bases in their harbors for Soviet submarines; and after the Bucharest Conference China had invaded Soviet territory and built fortifications. We have no confirmation of this last Soviet claim; it could be the Soviet version of certain incidents that have occurred along the USSR-Communist Chinese border.
“Khrushchev had gone on to say that the November meeting to deal with this dispute was scheduled to go forward as planned and that a Party commission was preparing documents for signature at that meeting. He stated that the Chinese needed discipline; that Mao lives the life of a hermit; and that the cult of personality was strong in Communist China and is mixed with Buddhism. The USSR could not accept the claim that Mao is the greatest Marxist dialectician. Moscow, he indicated, cannot back down in this dispute.
“Mr. Dulles continued, stating that the Soviets were apparently working to confront the Chinese with unanimous condemnation by world Communist Parties. Why Albania stands out against the Soviets is strange. Albania is apparently quite seriously irritating the Russians. This situation might give us a chance to do something about Albania. He noted that Albanian ports and intercept stations were important to the Russians and that the Soviets would be dealt a significant blow if Albania were to be separated from them. He noted finally that a Yugoslav in New York had stated that Khrushchev’s visit to the UN was the greatest fiasco that Communism had ever suffered.
“Secretary Herter observed that State experts who had analyzed Khrushchev’s behavior in New York believe that it is related to his battle with Mao. His actions were designed to show that he could be tough with the West. Mr. McCone asked how we could account for the violent Soviet support of Communist China for UN membership. He had been surprised, he said, by the violence with which the Russians had made a play for Chinese representation at the recent meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. He said that he took the schism between the Chinese and the Russians with a grain of salt. In response Mr. Dillon observed that the Chinese may not want to get into the UN at this time and that Soviet support does not necessarily coincide with Chinese views. Mr. Dulles agreed that having Communist China in the UN would put the Chinese Communists under some discipline.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)